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In the last few decades the Hungarian Statistical Review has published an Eng-
lish version once or twice annually in order to enlarge the number of foreign read-
ers and users of the papers and studies published in the journal.  
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Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The topics of the studies in-
troduce the main characteristics of global economic trends and provide a detailed 
picture about the state of Hungary in a transitional world. The studies are charac-
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information create a good opportunity to the cooperation between the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office responsible for the set up and publication of statistical 
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We hope that the English issue, the result of cooperation between the Hungar-
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ian Academy of Sciences, will enlarge the number of the readers of the journal and 
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Globalisation and macroeconomic statistics: 
Problems of measurement, interpretation  
and international comparison* 
  
Gábor Oblath  
PhD, member of the Monetary 




The article addresses a general problem and two 
specific economic-statistical issues related to global-
isation. The general point concerns certain conflicting 
trends involved in globalisation: while the macroeco-
nomic importance of, and the demand for statistics on 
international transactions increases, it is becoming 
more and more difficult to apply the standard distinc-
tions between “domestic” and “cross-border” real and 
financial economic transactions. The effects of this 
conflict are primarily experienced by institutions re-
sponsible for supplying statistics. However, users of 
economic statistics also face challenges deriving from 
trends associated with globalisation. Economic ana-
lysts tend to interpret national developments in inter-
national comparison on the basis of a few headline in-
dicators, but this may result in misleading conclusions. 
To illustrate this point, two examples, both related to 
the experiences of the new members of the EU, are 
discussed: 1. the interpretation/comparison of income 
convergence on the one hand, and 2. that of external 
imbalances on the other. As pointed out, it is necessary 
to look beyond the “big picture” in order to reach con-
clusions that are sound both from an economic and a 
statistical point of view.  
 
KEYWORDS: Economics.  
International analyses, comparisons.  
Qualitative questions of official statistics. 
 
  
* This article is based on the keynote speech presented at the 93rd DIGNS Conference, 19-21 September 
2007, Budapest, “Globalisation and economic statistics: a ‘multifunctional’ user’s perspective”. The views ex-
pressed are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Bank of 
Hungary or its Monetary Council. 
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The impact of globalisation on economic statistics is a highly topical and in-
creasingly relevant issue for both statisticians, who provide, and economists, who use 
macroeconomic statistics. The mounting cross-border interactions and the increase in 
openness of nations involve significant challenges for suppliers of macroeconomic 
data, but the interpretation and application of statistics – the task of economic ana-
lysts – is also becoming more difficult. Though we shall addresses some problems 
that statisticians have to face, our focus is on the interpretation and comparison of 
macroeconomic figures in the present era of globalisation.  
The article consists of two main parts. First, we discuss certain conflicting trends 
of economic globalisation and some of its implications for suppliers and users of 
economic statistics. Second, we deal with two closely related macro-statistical issues 
that have to do with the interpretation of statistics: 1. real income levels/convergence, 
and 2. the size of external imbalances.  
1. Globalisation and economic statistics from  
the perspective of suppliers and users of statistics  
From the point of view of real and financial economic developments, globalisa-
tion involves the increasing openness, as well as intensifying interactions and inter-
dependence of national economies. From the point of view of economic statistics this 
results in two contrasting trends.  
1. On the one hand, regarding business operations (decisions of 
economic agents), the relevance of legal national borders is fading. 
This, among others, is due to the increasing internationalisation of 
production (expansion in the activity of multinational companies, new 
forms of trade in services, growing importance of off-shore compa-
nies, etc.) and the migration of individuals (“labour”). As a result of 
these developments, it is becoming more and more difficult to apply 
the standard definitions regarding “internal” (“domestic” or “na-
tional”) vs. external (“foreign”) economic activities. Therefore, the di-
viding line between “resident” and “non-resident” economic units – a 
major distinction for national accounts – is also fading. 
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2. On the other hand, globalisation involves the increasing macro-
economic importance of international transactions (both real and fi-
nancial), as well as cross-border ownership of financial assets for na-
tional economies. 
 
The two trends accompanying globalisation are in clear conflict with one another, 
which is primarily experienced by the national institutions responsible for compiling 
and providing economic statistics. From the point of view of microeconomic agents, 
the distinction between “domestic” and “international” economic activities are be-
coming less relevant (moreover, in an attempt at “tax optimisation”, they may even 
have an interest in obscuring this distinction), while – due to their macroeconomic 
importance – governments, central banks, investors, international organisations, eco-
nomic analysts, etc. would like to know more and more about expanding interna-
tional transactions.  
It is worth noting that these conflicting trends may involve an internal paradox for 
multinational companies, major drivers of globalisation. These business organisa-
tions are both important suppliers and users of data on international transactions. In 
their first capacity they might have several reasons to conceal certain aspects of their 
cross-border transactions, while as users – e.g. for building their business strategy, 
evaluation of country risks – they need reliable and accurate statistics on global 
transactions and asset-holdings.  
Regarding the effect of globalisation on users of macroeconomic statistics, sev-
eral users, in particular market analysts, interpret national developments in interna-
tional comparison and, in order to simplify their task, tend to categorise/group coun-
tries according to a few and very simple “headline” indicators. The implication for 
statistical institutions is the increased importance of applying common international 
standards for ensuring comparability of national data. There is another implication as 
well, which concerns both statisticians and economists (familiar with macro-
statistics): the education of the public in general, and market participants/analysts in 
particular, by calling attention to statistical indicators enabling a better understanding 
and/or a finer analysis of economic developments.1  
In the following we discuss two examples to show that it is useful to look behind 
the main figures, as this may lead to the reinterpretation (or, at least, refinement) of 
the “big picture” derived from headline data on national economic developments. 
Both examples address the challenges (increased difficulties) involved in interna-
tional comparisons of macroeconomic developments in the era of globalisation. The 
first concerns the comparison of national real income levels and their changes over 
  
1 In this respect, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) has shown a good example in KSH 
[2007]. See: especially p. 52-56 on the macro-economy. http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/ 
mo/hungary2006.pdf  
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time. The second example pertains to the cross-country comparison of external im-
balances.  
2. Relative income levels and income convergence  
The terms “relative income level” and “income convergence”, respectively, are 
shorthand phrases, applied by economists, for expressing 1. per capita GDP of a 
country measured at purchasing power parity (PPP/PPS) in comparison with a refer-
ence country (USA) or a region (the EU); 2. the catching up of countries in terms of 
per capita GDP measured at PPP. GDP, however, is essentially an indicator of out-
put, rather than income.2 Since globalisation entails the possibility of increasing dif-
ferences in per capita output on the one hand, and various measures of domes-
tic/national income on the other, it is important to take the latter into consideration in 
comparative analyses related to the level of, and changes in, the real income of na-
tions.  
There are three directions for extending the simple comparisons based on 
GDP/capita, in order to capture certain macroeconomic effects of globalisation. Two 
of these are actually included in the statistical framework of national accounts 
(SNA/ESA), but one involves an amendment to the official system of indicators.  
1. The fist direction is the quantification/comparison of indicators of per capita 
national income (GNI, GNDI). A reason why the distinction between aggregate do-
mestic output and national income may become more relevant in the era of globalisa-
tion is that factors of production, and, as a result, production itself can move easily 
among countries, which does not necessarily involve similar changes in the aggre-
gate income of residents of a nation. For several countries there are significant dif-
ferences not only in the levels, but also in growth rates of real national income vs. 
real domestic product.  
2. The second, equally important, aspect of the distinction between output and in-
come concerns the macroeconomic impact of changes in the terms of trade on aggre-
gate domestic income, which is revealed by the indicator of real gross domestic in-
come (RGDI). An important sign of globalisation is the tendency toward increased 
openness of countries (the rise in the ratio of external transactions to GDP). As a re-
sult, the relative impact of variations in the relative price of exports to imports tends 
to increase. By definition, the “level” of per capita RGDI cannot be interpreted at 
  
2 On this point see in particular Chapter XVI, paragraph 16.151. of the SNA or/and Chapter 10, paragraph 
10.57. of the ESA.  
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current prices; it can only be measured at prices of a fixed base year. Therefore, it 
should be compared among countries (and to per capita GDP) by using constant, 
rather than current PPPs.  
3. A third direction of extending international comparisons is relevant mainly for 
the less developed, in particular new, members of the EU (new member states – 
NMS). This extension goes beyond the difference between output and income, as it 
is related to the distinction between disposable income and disposable resources of 
countries. The reason why this is important for NMS is that while current transfers 
made to the EU budget are recorded as items decreasing disposable income (GNDI), 
there is no macroeconomic aggregate to indicate the opposite (positive) effects capi-
tal transfers from the EU on available resources. Therefore, a supplementary indica-
tor (GNDI+capial transfers) may be useful in international comparisons involving 
less developed members of the EU. 
We shall proceed in two steps in demonstrating the empirical/statistical relevance 
of these extensions to international comparisons based on per capita GDP. First we 
consider the impact of implicit real income transfers, associated with changes in the 
terms of trade, on the aggregate real income of countries. In the next step, the effect 
of explicit transfers (including net foreign income, as well as and both current and 
capital transfers) are taken into consideration. The distinction between implicit and 
explicit transfers is based on whether they have to be reconstructed by means of for-
eign trade price indices, or they are explicitly revealed in balance-of-payments statis-
tics. It should, however, be kept in mind that transfer pricing is a potential channel 
for shifting foreign income between explicit and implicit channels.  
2.1. The effect of changes in the terms of trade  
(implicit real income transfers) 
If the price level of a country’ exports increases more (declines less) than that of 
its imports, the real purchasing power of the country’s revenues from exports over 
imports grows (and vice versa, if export prices increase less, or decline more, than 
import prices). Changes in the real purchasing power of exports over imports entail 
implicit real income transfers received (or made) by countries. Their macroeconomic 
impact is revealed by the indicator of real gross domestic income (RGDI).  
RGDI is derived by adding “trading gain” (or loss, if negative) to GDP measured 
at constant prices, i.e.:  
RGDIt = (GDPt/PGDP +T), where 
T= (Xt–Mt)/PXM – (Xt/PX – Mt/PM) 
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PGDP denotes the GDP-deflator,  
T is trading gain/loss,  
X and M are, respectively, exports and imports,  
PX and PM are price indices of exports and imports, respectively,  
PXM is the average of the two, and the t index refers to the time period.  
By definition, if the terms of trade improve (PX > PM,), T is positive, and it is 
negative, if the terms of trade worsen. The change in RGDI may be reflected by the 
difference between either 
RGDIt and GDPt–1, or 
RGDIt and RGDIt–1 (if t–1= t0, RGDI0 = GDP).  
Before presenting comparative data on RGDI and GDP, the question of accuracy 
of foreign trade price statistics has to be addressed. What if foreign trade price indi-
ces are inaccurate, and, as a result, the terms-of-trade index is under/over estimated? 
There are two major reasons why foreign trade price data may be distorted. The first 
is related to potential measurement errors: both the calculation of price indices for 
trade in services, and adjustments for quality changes in the case of manufactured 
products, involve serious difficulties. Second, as mentioned previously, firms may 
have incentives (“tax optimisation” in particular) to move profits from one country to 
the other by under/overpricing exports or/and imports. But whatever the reason, for-
eign trade price data and, therefore, the terms-of-trade index, might indeed be dis-
torted; and perhaps more so in the present era of globalisation, than formerly. This, 
in turn, may appear to suggest the irrelevance of the aggregate real income measure 
reflecting the impact of changes in the terms of trade.  
However, even serious distortions in foreign trade price indices do not imply the 
uselessness of the RGDI indicator. Just on the contrary. Assuming that there are sig-
nificant measurement errors in foreign trade price indices, there should be opposite 
errors in the measured volume of exports and imports, thus of net exports and, as a 
result, real GDP as well. Therefore, the indicator reflecting the change in RGDI actu-
ally corrects for those potential errors of the GDP volume index that are related to 
(possible) distortions in foreign price indices.  
The following examples focus on developments between 1995 and 2006 in the 
Central and East European (CEE) new member states of the EU. In some of these 
countries, significant and persistent differences can be observed between the growth 
of real GDP and RGDI.  
As shown by Figure 1 four of the new EU countries (Lithuania, Romania, Bul-
garia and the Czech Republic) have experienced not just large, but also enduring im-
provements in their terms of trade, which lead to much stronger growth in their do-
mestic income than what is implied by the increase in real GDP. Slovakia, in con-
trast, displays a longer-term decline in its real income relative to its output. Poland 
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was characterised by a similar trend between 1999 and 2003; in Hungary’s case the 
gap between the growth of income and output turned negative after 2004.  
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Source: Here and in Figure 2 and 3 the author’s own calculations based on the AMECO database. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_en.htm 
 
In order to gauge the macroeconomic significance of the difference between the 
growth of GDP and real domestic income (RGDI), it is useful to compare the cumu-
lative gap between the two indicators to the growth rate of GDP. (See Figure 2.)  
Figure 2 presents developments in Eastern Europe in a wider, European context. 
In the period 1995–2006, the cumulative gap between the increase of gross domestic 
income and GDP was the largest in the four CEE countries mentioned previously, 
while the CEE countries characterised by an opposite trend, perform relatively 
weakly in a wider European comparison as well. Figure 2 also shows average growth 
rates of GDP in the same period, demonstrating that, for several CEE countries, the 
increase in real GDP/capita is an inadequate (often misleading) indicator of per cap-
ita income convergence. This is clearly borne out by Table 1.  
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Figure 2. The cumulative difference between RGDI and GDP growth* 
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* Percentage points. 
** In percent. 
Table 1  
Per capita GDP and RGDI convergence: relative levels and the speed of convergence, 1995–2006 
(EU 15=100.0) 










Number of years 
of GDP/cap con-
vergence to fill 
the RGDI-GDP 
gap** 
Romania 27.2 31.3 34.4 110.1 1.3 2.2 7.6 
Czech Republic 63.1 71.0 75.6 106.4 1.1 1.7 5.7 
Bulgaria 27.9 33.2 35.8 107.6 1.6 2.3 4.5 
Lithuania 30.0 51.5 57.6 111.8 5.0 6.1 2.2 
Slovenia 61.6 77.1 77.7 100.8 2.1 2.1 0.4 
Estonia 31.1 59.6 60.9 102.1 6.1 6.3 0.3 
Latvia 27.0 51.8 51.7 99.9 6.1 6.1 0.0 
Poland 36.7 48.6 48.2 99.2 2.6 2.5 –0.3 
Hungary 45.4 59.6 58.4 97.9 2.5 2.3 –0.9 
Slovakia 40.0 52.4 50.8 97.0 2.5 2.2 –1.3 
Note. * log(Y_06/Y_95)/t; where Y= Yi/YEU15 (Y refers to GDP/cap or RGDI/cap; and t indicates the num-
ber of years considered; in the table t = 11); ** ≈log[(RGDI_06)/(GDP_06)]/(Conv_GDP). GDP/cap95, 
GDP/cap06 and RGDI/cap06: measured at constant purchasing power parity (PPS) of 1995.  












HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 11 
14 
In the case of the four countries already referred to, the size of the cumulative gap 
between the increase in domestic income and output is striking. It corresponds to 2 to 
7.5 years of real convergence (as measured by per capita GDP) to the more devel-
oped part of Europe. The reason why the relative size of the gap is so large for the 
first three countries is that they experienced very low average rates of GDP growth 
over the period considered. As their rate of GDP growth increases, the contribution 
of the terms of trade to income convergence is expected to diminish.  
Differential growth rates between output and income naturally lead to differences 
in relative levels of per capita GDP and RGDI; this is shown by Figure 3.  
























Per capita GDP and RGDI 
 
Note. On the vertical axis per capita GDP and RGDI are measured at PPS of 1995. 
 
In 2006 several CEE countries displayed considerable differences regarding their 
level of relative per capita income and output. The level of per capita income (meas-
ured at constant, 1995 purchasing power parity, PPS) was significantly higher than that 
of per capita output in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, while it was lower in Slova-
kia. The explanation of these contrasting developments requires further analysis, but 
they certainly have to be kept in mind when comparing the change in (“catching up”), 
and the level of, real incomes of the new member states of the European Union.  
2.2. The effect of net income flows and transfers  
on comparative growth rates 
On measuring national income (disposable resources), there are three types of ex-
plicit net transfers that have to be taken into consideration: 1. income flows, 2. cur-
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rent unrequited transfers and 3. capital transfers. As discussed before, these are con-
sidered to be explicit because they are disclosed in balance-of-payments (BOP) sta-
tistics. In the following, the implications of these items for national growth rates are 
addressed.  
First the economic and statistical content of macroeconomic aggregates corre-
sponding to the notion of national income has to be clarified. There are two major 
items in BOP statistics that affect national income – net income flows and net unre-
quited current transfers– and there are two macro-indicators in the SNA/ESA reflect-
ing the impact of these flows: 1. gross national income – GNI; and 2. gross national 
disposable income – GNDI. 
These aggregates are defined as follows: 
GNI = GDP + net foreign income,  
GNDI = GNI + net current transfers.  
 
There is a third aggregate, which is not an “official item” in the SNA/ESA, but is 
highly relevant for the less developed (in particular, new members), of the EU:  
GNDI + net capital transfers.   
 
Although the latter is not an indicator of income, as discussed in Section 2, it is 
an important measure of national disposable resources. As to be shown later, this has 
direct implications for the interpretation of external imbalances as well. 
Since our focus is on growth rates of real national income/resources (as con-
trasted with real domestic output, GDP), the choice regarding the deflator for assess-
ing volume changes has to be specified. Skipping the discussion of alternative possi-
bilities, foreign income flows and current transfers are deflated by the price index of 
domestic final expenditures (as suggested in Chapter XVI of the SNA); while capital 
transfers are expressed at constant prices by the deflator of gross fixed capital accu-
mulation. The reason for the latter choice is straightforward: capital transfers are 
meant for investments. 
Figure 4 focuses at recent developments in three CEE countries, and demon-
strates the importance of indices of income (disposable resources) vs. GDP. 
While the scale of recent growth rates clearly differs among the countries (ac-
cording to all of the indicators, Hungary experienced much lower economic growth 
in this period than the others), there is a common pattern: in all of the three countries 
the “headline” indicators, i.e., GDP and, to some extent GNI, show lower rates of 
growth than the one indicating the impact of capital transfers. This is explained by 
the fact that this was the period when transfers from the EU funds began to flow to-
wards the new members of the EU. As these transfers are expected increase in the 
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next few years, the indicator reflecting the change in real disposable resources should 
continue to attract the attention of economic analysts.  
Figure 4. GDP, GNI, GNDI and GNDI + capital transfers:  
recent average annual volume changes, 2004–2006 



























GDP GNI GNDI GNDI+captr
 
Note. GNI, GNDI and GNDI + capital transfers are calculated by combining national account and balance 
of payments data.  
Source: Here and the following figures: the author’s calculations based on the Economy and Finance data-
base of the Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=0,1136173,0_45570701&_dad= 
portal&_schema=PORTAL) 
 
To sum up, globalisation has important implications for the measurement and in-
terpretation of changes (thus, convergence) in real incomes of nations. As countries 
become more open (the ratio of external transactions to domestic production in-
creases), changes in the relative price between exports and imports tends to have an 
increasing impact on domestic real income. The neglect of these developments may 
lead analysts astray in international comparisons (see e.g. the contrasting experiences 
of the Czech Republic and Lithuania on the one hand, and Slovakia, on the other). 




















Percent                                                                         Percent
Percent 
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fers. Beside net foreign incomes, the effect of transfers (including capital transfers) 
has also to be taken into consideration in assessing changes in disposable resources 
of countries. Therefore, the one-dimensional approach, focusing solely on the rela-
tive level (change in) per capita GDP at PPP, needs to be amended in several respects 
in order to capture the implications of globalisation for cross-country comparisons of 
relative income (performance) of nations. The following section addresses some cor-
ollaries of these points regarding external imbalances 
3. The interpretation and comparison of external imbalances3 
The increase in international gross and net capital flows is partly a reflection, 
partly an actual driving force of globalisation. Although net capital flows, by defini-
tion, involve external imbalances, the interpretation and international comparison of 
foreign imbalances is very far from being straightforward. Nevertheless, most eco-
nomic analysts consider it to be relatively simple: they generally rely on a standard 
indicator, the ratio of the current account balance to GDP (CA/GDP). This is sup-
ported by the “received wisdom”, according to which a CA/GDP deficit above 3-5 
percent is “dangerous”.4 However generally applied in cross-country comparisons, 
this indicator suffers from several weaknesses. The following discussion focuses on 
certain economic-statistical problems – partly related to the measure-
ment/comparison of national income levels – of both the numerator (CA) and the 
denominator (GDP) of the CA/GDP ratio.  
3.1. The numerator (CA)  
The point that capital transfers have to be taken into consideration in compari-
sons of real income holds a fortiori for comparisons regarding external imbalances. 
That is, the headline indicator of external imbalances – the current account (CA) of 
the balance of payments (BOP) – has to be corrected for international capital trans-
fers, recorded in the capital account (KA) of the BOP. According to current statisti-
cal definitions, the financing requirement (net borrowing/lending) of a country is in-
dicated by, thus, changes in net foreign assets of a country are associated with, the 
  
3 This section draws on Oblath [2006]. 
4 See e.g. UN [2003] p. 15.: “Indicator: Current external account deficit/GDP. Interpretation: Ability to ser-
vice imports and current rate of growth (warning signal if over 3%).”; and Milesi-Ferretti–Razin [1996] p. 1. : 
“…current account deficits above 5% of GDP flash a red light”. 
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consolidated balance on the current and capital account.5 As already discussed, due 
to the character of transfers from EU funds, the capital account is particularly impor-
tant for the less developed EU members. (See Figure 5.) For the new member coun-
tries its importance has grown, and is certain to increase in the future.  
Figure 5. The current and the current plus capital account balance relative 
 to GDP in nine EU countries and the United States 












CZ EST HU PL SK GR ESP PT IRL USA
CA/GDP (CA+KA)/GDP
 
Note. CA – current account balance; KA – capital account balance.   
Table 2 
The structure of net financing requirement* in three new members of the EU, 2005–2006 
(in percent of GDP) 
Czech Republic Hungary  Poland 
Denomination 
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
CA+KA –3,3 –5,6 –6,2 –5,1 –1,5 –2,6 
CA –3,5 –6,0 –7,0 –6,0 –1,9 –3,4 
KA 0,2 0,4 0,8 0,9 0,4 0,8 
* The current plus capital account. 
Note. CA - current account balance; KA – capital account balance. 
Source: Eurostat, Economy and Finance database. 
  
5 Although the definition of the “current” and the “capital” account was changed many years ago (in 1993, 
in line with the System of National Accounts), most economic textbooks still rely on the former definitions. 
What was formerly (and in several textbooks, is still) referred to as the “capital account” is, according to the 
current definition, labelled as the financial account. Some items, in turn (e.g. certain foreign unrequited trans-
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The balance on the capital account, as compared to the current account, is empiri-
cally relevant in the three Southern EU countries, especially in Greece and Portugal, 
where, as a result of this item, the size of the external deficit-to-GDP ratio shrinks by 
more than one percentage point in the first half of this decade. In Ireland the discrep-
ancy is not an issue, while in the US there is practically no difference at all. In the 
new EU countries the effect is much smaller, but still observable (in Estonia, Hun-
gary and Slovakia), and has recently been increasing. (See Table 2.) 
Turning to the second problem with the numerator of the CA/GDP ratio, there is a 
challenge in the interpretation of reinvested earnings of foreign-owned companies, 
representing virtual outflows recorded on the income account of the BOP (and 
“backed” by a corresponding FDI-inflow in the financial account). Though a large 
size of (increase in) this item has a negative effect on the current account, it has no 
implications for actual external financing. Moreover, from a policy perspective, it is 
clearly “good news” (potential source of additional investments). The special fea-
tures of reinvested earnings call for careful reading of current account data of coun-
tries where this item is significant and/or markedly changing. By implication, inter-
national comparisons of current account imbalances cannot be meaningful, if cross-
country differences in reinvested earnings are disregarded. This special item in the 
current account is much more important for the new member states of the EU than 
for the older ones with which they can be compared. (See Figure 6.) 
Figure 6. The current and the current plus capital account balance corrected  















* Czech Republic: 2001–2005; Estonia: 2002–2005; Poland: 2004–2005 
Note. CA - current account balance; KA – capital account balance; IRE – inward FDI flows in the form of 
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In Figure 6, the ratio of “inward” reinvested earnings (RE) to GDP can be gauged 
by the deviation between the second and the third (or, for net RE, the second and the 
fourth) bar for each country. Clearly, this item is much more important in the new 
EU members (most notably in Estonia) than in the older ones. The reasons for these 
differences mainly have to do with the relative importance of gross and net FDI in 
the countries concerned, but they may also be related to the average “age” of foreign 
investments.6 
By taking reinvested profits into consideration, our perspective regarding the rela-
tive size/burden of external imbalances in the countries compared significantly 
changes. In the new member countries the adjusted external deficit radically de-
creases (in particular in Estonia and Poland, but this applies to the Czech Republic 
and Hungary as well.) In Spain and Portugal, in contrast, the latter effect is negligi-
ble. Considering the full impact of the two adjustments discussed previously (the 
capital account and reinvested profits), as compared to the “raw” CA/GDP indicator, 
the relative size of the external deficit declines in all new member countries below 
that of Portugal, and comes close to (or under) that of Spain.  
The important message conveyed by Figure 6. is that a simple comparison of 
CA/GDP ratios of countries with different experiences/prospects regarding capital 
transfers and reinvested earnings is almost certain to lead to mistaken conclusions 
with respect to the relative size/burden of external imbalances. 
3.2. The problem with the denominator (GDP) and possible solutions 
It is commonly believed that if the nominal magnitude of an external deficit is di-
vided by the nominal GDP of the county, we get a “standardised” – i.e. internation-
ally comparable – measure of an external imbalance. This belief, however, lacks 
economic foundations: rather than being a neutral measure, the deficit-to-GDP ratio 
is a strongly biased indicator. The reason is that international transactions (therefore, 
imbalances) are measured at international prices, while GDP is measured at domestic 
prices. The domestic price level, in turn, is an increasing function of the level of real 
economic development (this is the so-called Balassa–Samuelson effect).7 Thus, in 
less developed countries – due to the low relative level of non-traded (mainly ser-
vice) prices – the CA/GDP ratio may overstate the actual burden (relative size) of ex-
ternal imbalances. What, then, is the economically satisfactory denominator? 
  
6 On this point see Brada–Tomsik [2003]. 
7 Economists refer to this effect by quoting the relevant articles of two outstanding economists: Béla 
Balassa [1964] and Paul Samuelson [1964]. However, both economists mainly relied on the work of two statis-
ticians: Milton Gilbert and Irving Kravis (Gilbert–Kravis [1954]). Therefore, the positive relationship between 
real economic development and the level of prices could just as well be referred to as “Gilbert-Kravis effect”.  
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The answer depends on whether we wish to handle the consequences of interna-
tional differences in the prices of non-tradable services by altogether neglecting this 
sector, or by including the sector, but correcting for the price differences involved. In 
the first case, revenues from exports of goods and services may serve as an approxi-
mation for the earning capacity (though total current revenues may also be consid-
ered as a reference.) In the second case, “real” GDP (i.e. GDP converted at PPP) can 
be used for comparing the size of deficits. Figures 7 and 8 show the relative magni-
tude of external imbalances, depending on how the question is answered.  














Note. Xgs –  exports of goods and services; CFR – current foreign revenues. 
 
If the ratio of deficit to revenues from exports of goods and services (the second 
bar) or to total current revenues (the third bar) are considered, the order of countries 
with respect to the relative size of their external imbalances – defined as the balance 
on current and capital transactions – change in a fundamental way. Most notably, ex-
ternal imbalances in Greece and Portugal appear to be significantly (in Spain, 
slightly) larger than in the new members, as a result of comparing deficits to actual 
foreign revenues, instead of the nominal GDP.  
Figure 8 shows the effect of considering nominal, versus real (PPP-adjusted), 
GDP as a benchmark.  
If external imbalances are compared to the PPP-adjusted, instead of the nominal, 
GDP, the relative size of external deficits decline significantly in the new Eastern 
members of the EU. As a result of this change in the denominator, relative deficits in 
the older members also fall somewhat, but by much less. The outcome of the com-
parisons shown in Figure 8 are similar to those in Figure 7, though the effect of 
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* Exchange rate-based. 
** PPP-based. 
 
To sum up, according to the conventional CA/GDP indicator some of the East-
European members of the EU have much larger external deficits than certain older 
ones. This picture changes the more, the more the deficiencies of the CA/GDP ratio 
are corrected for. When the capital account and reinvested earnings are taken into 
consideration on the one hand, and deficits are compared to GDP valued at PPP, or 
exports (gross foreign earnings) on the other, external imbalances in the new EU 
countries appear to be milder than in the older ones chosen for comparison. Does this 
also mean that external deficits are less important in the new member states than in 
the three earlier EU members? Not necessarily. This only means that economically-
based statistical standards have to be applied in international comparisons. In lack of 
these, comparative economic analyses cannot be meaningful.  
* 
Globalisation involves challenges not only for suppliers, but also for users of 
economic statistics. The simple observation of the headline macroeconomic figures 
may lead analysts astray in international macroeconomic comparisons. Therefore, 
there is a need for caution in comparing some of the most frequently used macroeco-
nomic indicators across countries. Analysts should not accept the “big picture” at a 
face value, but rather try to look at the details behind the headline indicators.  
In this respect, both statisticians and economists (familiar with economic statis-
tics), have a lot to do. There is an important task in educating not only the general 
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naturally implies that the macroeconomic performance of nations (in particular, 
growth and external imbalance) is assessed in international comparison, but this calls 
for much finer analysis than what is enabled by the headline data, in the focus of 
public discussions.  
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The paper investigates the quality of Hungary’s 
structural-upgrading performance with a novel ap-
proach. It compares the evolution of the output struc-
ture with changes on the input side, more specifically, 
with changes in the quantity and quality indicators of 
labour. 
We find that despite the similarity between ad-
vanced and Central European economies (CEE) in 
terms of structural upgrading, the upgrading of CEE’s 
labour input was lagging much behind that of ad-
vanced economies. Hungarian performance was the 
worst among CEE in this respect. 
While technical change in advanced economies 
was skill-biased in the surveyed period, and demand 
for highly-skilled workforce increased considerably, in 
the surveyed CEE (and especially in Hungary) demand 
for the relatively-skilled labour declined, and the skill 
structure of persons engaged deteriorated. Transfer-
driven technical change in CEE’ manufacturing indus-
tries has thus been complementary to raw, low-skilled 
labour and the thesis of capital/skill complementarity 
did not apply. 
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Intertransitional country differences in the extent of structural change have been 
subject to a large number of analytical papers that related these countries’ restructur-
ing and competitive performance to foreign direct investment (FDI) involvement by 
branches and to the technological features of both the new industry mix and trade 
specialization (Soós [2000], Landesmann−Stehrer [2002]). 
Early papers usually praised the countries with extensive structural change. The 
performance of transforming economies with an increasing specialization in high-
technology industries was particularly acknowledged. Two main indicators were 
used to measure the quality of structural upgrading. The first one was the technologi-
cal composition of production and exports, i.e. the share of high-growth, high-
technological-opportunity industries. The second indicator structural upgrading per-
formance was measured with, was the degree of export similarity. High values of ex-
port-similarity index suggested an advanced stage in the catching-up process.  
Later papers have, however, pointed to substantial quality differences hidden be-
hind the surprisingly high values of export-similarity indices of transforming coun-
tries (e.g. Dulleck et al. [2005]). Similarity of production structure may hide impor-
tant quality differentials. Hence, these papers used other indicators to measure qual-
ity differences: export-unit values, quality-segment indicators, and indicators refer-
ring to the prevailing and very slowly diminishing productivity gap between the 
transforming and the advanced economies.  
Realistic assessment of the quality of structural change is especially important for 
a small open economy like Hungary, with a spectacular and rapid foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI-) led structural-upgrading performance. The country’s reintegration – 
following the political transition – into the global structure of world manufacturing, 
with the help of efficiency-seeking foreign investors, brought about a spectacularly 
increased share of high-tech products both in total Hungarian output and exports. 
The Figure uses office-accounting and computing machinery (NACE 30) and radio, 
television and communication equipment (NACE 32) as a proxy for high-tech indus-
tries and presents their increasing weight within total manufacturing output. 
In spite of this spectacular shift to high-technology production (inter-industry up-
grading), from time to time scholars have recalled that Hungary’s competitiveness 
cannot be assessed as unambiguously positive. The evolution of the industry mix 
ought to be considered together with the country’s technological potential, R&D in-
dicators etc. to be able to provide realistic assessment. With poor performance in the 
latter field, the beneficial evolution of indicators in the former field reflects only cost 
competitiveness (Török–Petz [1999], Török–Borsi–Telcs [2005]). 
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Note. According to OECD and Eurostat classifications, high-tech manufacturing industries also comprise 
NACE Groups 24.4: Pharmaceuticals; 33: Instrument engineering and 35.3: Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft. 
Source: Here and in the following Tables the author’s own calculations from EU KLEMS Database 
(www.euklems.net). 
This study examines the quality of Hungarian structural upgrading performance 
with a new approach. It compares the evolution of the output structure with changes 
on the input side, more specifically, with changes in the quantity and quality indica-
tors of labour. This method reconciles two usual approaches of development eco-
nomics, 1. the accumulationist and 2. the structuralist. The former focuses on physi-
cal and human capital accumulation, considered as key drivers of development, 
catching up and productivity growth. The latter concentrates on the transformation of 
the sectoral and the industry composition of economic activity as a fundamental 
characteristic of growth and development. This paper deals with the interaction of 
changes in the composition of output with changes in the factor (labour)1 use. With 
this method, the analysis of structural change is not restricted to the output side.  
In principle, the upgrading of the composition of output ought to be in line with 
the evolution of inputs, i.e. with quality changes in factor use and in contribution of 
factors to growth. According to textbook theses, the correlation is very strong: qual-
ity changes in the structure of factor inputs imply increasing capital/labour ratios, as 
well as an increasing share of human capital within total inputs.  
As opposed to this reasoning, in economies where FDI is the key driver of struc-
tural upgrading, the development of the input side may lag behind the upgrading of 
the output structure. The technological structure of these catching-up economies’ 
 
1 The author analyzed the interaction between technical change and capital use and capital intensity in 
Szalavetz [2007]. 
Percent 
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output is similar to those of the advanced economies, while other indicators – capi-
tal/labour ratios, research and human capital intensities of production2 – are compa-
rable rather to those of the relatively underdeveloped economies. 
This disharmony in the evolution of input and output indicators is puzzling, since 
in standard analyses that relate factor supplies to specialization or factor accumula-
tion to structural change, the temporal sequence of the evolution of inputs and out-
puts is just the opposite. The traditional Heckscher–Ohlin theory states that coun-
tries’ specialization patterns are determined by their relative factor endowments. In 
these analyses, changes in the structure of production (and exports) are preceded by 
changes in factor proportions. By Romalis ([2004] p. 67) “Countries that rapidly ac-
cumulate a factor see their production and export structures shift towards industries 
that intensively use that factor.” 
Nonetheless, experiences of recently integrated economies that had undergone an 
FDI-driven structural upgrading justify an investigation “in the opposite direction”. 
In the following I will analyze whether the evolution of factor use has been in line 
with the FDI- and transfer-driven rapid upgrading of the composition of output. Can 
a growing similarity – beyond increased structural similarities between advanced 
economies and transforming economies – be detected in the structure of labour in-
puts as well?  
I investigate four post-transforming economies: 1. Hungary, 2. the Czech Repub-
lic, 3. Slovakia and 4. Poland. I examine labour-input indicators in three industries, 
in the traditional industry of textile and textile products (TT), in a mature industry: 
transport equipment (TE) and in the emerging electrical and optical equipment indus-
try (EOE).3 
The analysis is based on EU KLEMS database. EU KLEMS project created a da-
tabase on measures of economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital 
formation and technological change at the industry level for all European Union 
member states from 1970 onwards. Data were made available for the public as of 
March, 2007 at www.euklems.net. 
My investigation proceeds as follows. Section one examines intercountry labour-
share differences, i.e. differences in the value-added share of labour compensation. 
This section analyzes whether this indicator can be regarded as a good proxy for la-
 
2 The BERD / GERD ratio was 41.1 percent in Hungary, in 2004, compared to 70.1 percent in the U.S.; 
70.4 percent in Germany; 57.8 percent in the Netherlands (OECD [1998]). According to Eurostat, in 2003, 
R&D expenditure/value added was 1.4 percent in manufacturing in Hungary. The respective value was 6.4 in 
the EU 25; 0.5 in Poland; 2.1 in the Czech Republic and 0.8 in Slovakia. R&D personnel intensity (R&D per-
sonnel/number of persons employed) was 0.7 percent in manufacturing while the respective indicators were 4.9 
for the Netherlands; 6.7 for Finland; and 4.1 for Germany. This performance is similar at our CEE competitors: 
the respective indicators are 0.5 in Poland; 0.9 in the Czech Republic and 0.3 in Slovakia. (Wilén [2007]). 
3 EOE is, of course, a much broader category than that of high-tech or emerging industries. Nevertheless, I 
use this aggregate since I intended to obtain a fairly large country coverage for comparison. 
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bour-intensity differences. Section two reviews the labour-input (quantity and quality) 
indicators of selected advanced and Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies. I 
scrutinize whether the evolution of labour use in the surveyed new member states has 
been in line with both their rapidly increasing development level and the advanced 
economies’ respective evolution patterns. The analysis is characterised by a descriptive 
approach rather than an intention to make formal calculations. 
1. Structural change and the evolution of labour share  
in total value added 
It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a detailed analysis of CEEs’ struc-
tural change performance. Simply for the sake of illustration we provide Table 1 that 
summarizes the increasing weight of electric and optical equipment industry in the 
surveyed countries’ manufacturing value added.  
Table 1 
EOE’s share in total manufacturing value added 
(percent) 
Country 1995 2004 
Hungary 9.27 23.8 
Czech Republic 7.41 11.9 
Slovakia 5.88 11.0* 
Poland 7.01 8.57 
* 2005. 
Note. Table 1 is restricted to NACE 30 and 32 since these two industries are the ones that were more or less 
newly established by efficiency-seeking foreign greenfield investments, and the performance indicators of 
which showed a spectacular evolution. 
The question this paper investigates is whether the spectacular changes in the 
output structure, as shown in Table 1, have also been accompanied by similar 
changes in the quality of labour input. 
As it was argued before, specialization in the fields of high-technology opportu-
nity does not necessarily reflect technological competitiveness. With quickly increas-
ing production fragmentation the previous strong relation between technological spe-
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cialization and technological competitiveness has considerably weakened. Countries 
can feature high revealed comparative advantage in fast-growing technological fields 
without substantial own R&D activity and technological capabilities, i.e. capabilities 
that exceed production and technology assimilation (e.g. innovation-generation ca-
pability). Therefore, occupations, rather than industries, should be regarded as the 
basic units of analysis: a country’s or a region’s competitiveness and the real local 
human-capital intensity of apparently technology-intensive industries are reflected by 
its occupation mix rather than its industry mix (Feser [2003]). 
Since detailed statistics on labour-force skills are available only in a few coun-
tries, I rather examined, whether the indicator of “labour compensation as a percent-
age of value added” can be applied to assess the quality of changes in the output 
structure. My working hypothesis was that a higher than the international industry-
average value of this indicator would reflect a higher than the average labour inten-
sity in a specific country. Table 2 presents the share of compensation of employees 
in the total value added of the three selected industries. 
Table 2 
Compensation of employees over value added, 2004 
(percent) 
Country  TT-ndustry TE-industry EOE Deviation 
Austria 49.8 51.2 59.0 5.0 
Czech Republic 70.5 50.0 61.5 10.3 
Finland 70.2 83.8 41.5 21.6 
France 66.8 63.1 81.4 9.7 
Korea* 62.4 61.7 41.6 11.8 
Poland 68.1 44.1 45.2 13.6 
Hungary 81.5 41.7 42.3 22.8 
Mexico* 48.5 30.8 53.5 11.9 
Germany 68.7 81.0 75.6 6.2 
Spain 72.3 68.0 65.4 3.5 
Slovakia 83.1 37.6 52.2 30.0 
USA 71.2 80.2 80.8 5.4 
Average 68.8 59.7 56.4  
Deviation 12.4 16.0 16.8  
* 2003. The source of these data: OECD [2005].  
As it can be seen, with the exception of some countries (Finland, Hungary, Slo-
vakia) the intercountry dispersion of labour shares exceeds the interindustry devia-
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tion of the indicator. Although the value-added share of the compensation of em-
ployees is higher on the average in the traditional labour-intensive TT industry than 
in the other two industries, intercountry differences are quite large even in this indus-
try. It is puzzling that the relation between the surveyed indicator and the relative de-
velopment level of the countries does not seem very strong. Data do not support my 
hypothesis of a larger-than-the-average labour share in the relatively underdeveloped 
countries which could be expected to specialize in unskilled labour-intensive screw-
driver operations within industries classified as technology-intensive.  
Analysis based on wage convergence or the lack of it would be misleading, since 
in relatively low wage countries such as Hungary or Slovakia the value of the indica-
tor in the TT industry is much higher than the international average. Nevertheless in 
Austria – a country with a relatively high wage level compared to, say, Spain4 – the 
value of the indicator is systematically lower in all the three surveyed industries than 
the respective Spanish values. Therefore, explanation for the previous results ought 
to be found elsewhere. 
In Korea the value of the indicator is quite high both in TT and TE industries. In 
recent decades Korean firms have implemented sizeable investment in modern pro-
duction machinery embodying state-of-the-art technology (similarly to other South-
east Asian economies) in order to compensate for increasing labour costs. According 
to Lim ([1999] p. 17.) the machinery and equipment stock per worker has increased 
3.5fold at constant prices in the manufacturing sector between 1970 and 1990. In-
crease has been much higher in traditional industries: in the shoe industry a more 
than twenty-fold, in the textile industry a 5.3fold and in the food industry a 5.8fold 
increase can be observed. At the same time, significant changes took place in the 
employees’ skill composition: the share of highly-skilled and well-paid technicians 
and employees with tertiary education increased considerably (Loo [2002]).5 As a 
consequence of these changes Korea has become similar to advanced economies in 
the sample. High labour share in the TT industry reflects a relatively high share of 
skilled workers, specialization in high value-adding activities and industry segments. 
In advanced economies, the restructuring of the textile and apparel industries has 
been marked by extensive investment in modern machinery, while changes in the 
composition of the labour force have been in line with the thesis of capital skill com-
plementarity (Griliches [1969], Goldin–Katz [1998]). 
As opposed to the foregoing reasoning, the outstanding high value of the indica-
tor in Hungary’s and Slovakia’s TT industries is the result of completely different 
tendencies. Transformation recession as well as the collapse of the Council for Mu-
 
4 In industry and in services the Spanish wage level was 61-63 percent of the Austrian level in 2002. 
(Source: Mittag [2006] the author’s own calculations). 
5 Loo’s [2002] data refer to TT industry in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, changes in employees’ skill-
composition were similar in the Korean TT industry as well. 
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tual Economic Assistance (Comecon) market and intensive import competition hit 
TT industries relatively harder than other manufacturing industries. Undercapitalized 
Hungarian actors failed to carry out the painful but efficient restructuring steps their 
advanced economy competitors had implemented. As the industry was unable to at-
tract FDI, its deteriorating performance indicators hardly improved even after the 
transformation recession. TT industries in these countries are characterised by a rela-
tively large weight of outward processing.6 In outward processing the compensation 
of employees accounts for the dominant part of value added, since the material to be 
processed (and in some cases also the machinery) is in the contractor’s ownership. 
The contractor assumes responsibility for the design and the technical specifications; 
it organizes for logistics, marketing and sales. As a result, labour share accounts for a 
very high percentage of the processing firms’ value added. The high value of the 
surveyed indicator therefore fails to reflect high competitiveness or high technology- 
and human-capital intensity of the industries in question. What the high value of the 
indicator suggests is just the opposite: adverse perspectives and vulnerability. 
The evolution of the level of labour share in value added did not allow for unam-
biguous conclusions concerning the quality of production activity. I assumed that 
within technology-intensive industries, relatively underdeveloped economies would 
specialize in activities characterised by higher-than-the-average labour intensity, thus 
labour share in these countries will exceed the industry average. However, data in 
Table 2 show opposite results: labour share in the EOE industry is higher in the ad-
vanced economies, while in catching-up countries this share is lower than the inter-
national average.  
The high value of the surveyed indicator in advanced economies can be explained 
with the fact that in these countries a large part of EOE industry value added stems 
from production-related services, including R&D, design, marketing, etc., rather than 
from manufacturing. These services feature much lower capital/labour ratios than 
processing activities, and their (skilled) labour intensity is higher than that of manu-
facturing. Physical processing activities are outsourced to relatively lower wage 
catching-up economies.  
The indicator’s lower-than-the-average value in these countries can be explained 
with the fact that although the processing activities local producers undertake are 
more labour-intensive than the international average in this industry, production ac-
tivity started as a result of foreign greenfield investments and has been performed 
with high-value, state-of-the-art machinery (characterised by significant depreciation 
rate). Furthermore, the share of operating profit as well as the balance of taxes and 
subsidies can also be different from the ones prevailing in advanced economies 
which all have an impact on the value of the labour share. 
 
6 Ninety percent of sales of some industries within the Hungarian apparel industry were realized within the 
frame of outward processing contracts even in the 2000s. (Lázár [2003]).  
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In sum, one can conclude that similar labour share values mask large differences 
in the quality composition of the labour force, as well as in the capital/labour ratios 
or in the skill levels of local operations. From comparative levels of the labour share 
– without complementary indicators (e.g. the share of white-collar workers or other, 
even more detailed occupational data and/or the R&D-intensity of production, unit 
value of exports, etc.) – no reliable conclusions can be drawn concerning the quality 
features of the output. Analysis of the relation between changes in the composition of 
output and labour input has to be carried out with the help of other indicators. 
2. Quantity and quality indicators of labour input 
In this section I will compare the evolution of simple quantity indicators of labour 
use (number of employees, number of hours worked). International comparison in 
Table 3 and 4 suggests that although there was an across-the-board reduction in 
manufacturing’s labour use, substantial intercountry and interindustry differences 
can be observed in the extent of this reduction. 
Table 3 
Changes in the number of employees in manufacturing, 1995–2004  
(1995 = 100) 








Czech Republic 92 
Slovakia 86 
Poland 80 
According to Amil–Giannoplidis–Lipp-Lingua [2007], there is a strong correla-
tion between the technology intensity of an activity and the rate of employment 
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growth. The referred authors established four groupings of manufacturing activities 
to reflect differing levels of technology intensity (1. high technology, 2. medium-
high technology, 3. medium-low technology and 4. low technology). They showed 
that EU 27 manufacturing activities, classified into different groupings by technol-
ogy intensity, exhibited different evolution patterns in terms of employment in the 
period between 1995 and 2006. Low-technology industries have experienced the 
largest reduction in employment. In technology-intensive industries employment 
started to fall only after 2000, but reduction was sharp from that time on.  
As for intercountry differences, Table 4 reveals that the highest increase in labour 
input can be observed in the surveyed relatively underdeveloped economies pursuing 
an FDI-driven catching-up strategy. The number of employees or the hours worked 
increased much slower even in Finland which otherwise rapidly increased its spe-
cialization in EOE industries. 
Table 4 
Evolution of labour input in EOE and TE industries, 1995–2004  
(1995 = 100) 
EOE TE-industry EOE TE-industry 
Country 
Number of employees Hours worked 
Czech Republic 141 122 135 116 
Slovakia 143 115 143 118 
Hungary 217 197 207 193 
Poland 84 76 83 77 
Austria 84 135 80 119 
Finland 124 86 127 82 
France 91 101 86 97 
Germany 89 118 84 102 
Spain 114 122 113 119 
United Kingdom 74 99 72 98 
United States 81 90 80 88 
EU 15 91 107 89 100 
Quantity indicators of labour input ought to be complemented with a review of 
intercountry differences in the skill intensity of production. In a dynamic setting, the 
evolution of labour use has to be examined together with changes in the skill mix of 
ANDREA SZALAVETZ 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 11 
34 
the labour force. The (rising) share of non-production workers is a good proxy for 
(increasing) the skill intensity of production (Berman–Bound–Griliches [1994]). 
Since only a few countries publish industry-level data on the share of non-production 
workers I rely (partly) on anecdotal evidence when claiming that skill intensity – 
proxied by the previous indicator – of the surveyed industries in advanced economies 
has significantly increased in the last decade.  
According to Pilat and Wölfl ([2005] p. 19.), in Austria and in Italy 40 percent of 
all manufacturing employees was in reality engaged in service activities rather than 
in physical processing in the early 2000s. In the Netherlands the respective figure 
was as high as 58 percent, while in less developed economies (e.g. Portugal, Greece) 
it was about 30 percent. Nunnenkamp [2005] documented the decline (from 76.2 per-
cent in 1992 to 70.2 percent in 2003) of the share of production workers in the Ger-
man vehicles industry. Changes were spectacular in the apparel industry of Canada. 
There was a significant (25%) reduction in the overall number of employees between 
2003 and 2005, and in this short period the share of non-production workers almost 
doubled: from 45 to 84 percent. (The Canadian Apparel Industry: The Shape of the 
Future. Apparel Human Resources Council. www.conferenceboard.ca/education/ 
symposium/partners2004/presentations/partners04_rivard.pdf) In the United States 
the share of production workers also declined between 1995 and 2005 (Annual Sur-
vey of Manufactures http://www.census.gov/econ/overview/ma0300.html): from 
95.5 to 83.7 percent in the textile industry, from 95.5 to 76.5 percent in the apparel 
industry, from 91.7 to 71 percent in the transport equipment industry. 
In contrast, the upgrading of employees’ skill mix in manufacturing has been very 
slow in Hungary and in the other surveyed catching-up economies. Irrespective of the di-
rection of the changes in employment, i.e. whether there was an expansion or a reduction 
in the employment of the given industry, the ratio of non-production/production workers 
hardly increased. Employment in TT industry, for example, fell by more than 50 percent 
between 1995 and 2005 in Hungary. Meanwhile the increase of the ratio of non-
production/production workers was hardly noticeable: from 14.3 to 14.7 percent. How-
ever, employment in EOE industry doubled in this period. At the same time the surveyed 
ratio increased from 23.7 only to 27.5 percent. As for the TE industry data suggest even a 
deterioration of quality: 82 percent employment growth and a reduction in the non-
production/production ratio from 37.4 percent in 1995 to 25.3 percent in 2005 (HCSO: 
Statistical Yearbooks [1996], [2006]. www.ksh.hu). 
Crinó [2005] documented the evolution of the skill ratio (i.e. non-manual em-
ployment relative to manual employment) in selected Central European economies. 
According to his calculations, relative employment of skilled workers in manufactur-
ing – proxied by the ratio between the number of non-manual and manual employees 
– has shown a decline in the case of Hungary and the Czech Republic (from 0.29 in 
1993 to 0.25 in 2001 and from 0.38 to 0.33, respectively). In Poland, the ratio has 
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slightly increased since 1994 (0.28), and in 2001 it amounted to 0.31. The picture is 
gloomy at the industry level as well, with Hungary showing far the poorest results, as 
presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Ratio of non-production to production workers 
Hungary Poland Czech Republic 
Industry 
1993 2001 1994 2001 1993 2001 
Textile and textile products 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.21 
Transport equipment 0.34 0.26 0.34 0.32 0.40 0.36 
Electrical and optical equipment 0.39 0.23 0.39 0.43 0.48 0.32 
Source: Crinó [2005]. 
The adverse changes documented by Crinó [2005] are attributable to foreign in-
vestors’ strategic approach towards their newly acquired local subsidiaries. The new 
owners closed down the marketing and sales departments, design labs and R&D labs 
of the newly acquired subsidiaries since they considered them as unnecessary under 
the circumstances of exclusively intra-firm deliveries and manufacturing according 
to the owner’s technological specifications. In most cases even the procurement 
function became superfluous as the owner-customer organized for the timely deliv-
ery of the raw material and components necessary for the subsidiary’s production. In 
this way the local companies that used to perform each single corporate function 
have become single-functional production facilities within their owners’ organiza-
tion. This has led to substantial labour shedding of skilled, white-collar workers, in 
many cases in excess of relatively unskilled blue-collar workers. Although this strict 
division of tasks and corporate functions began to change at the end of the 1990s, 
changes are slow to manifest. 
Another indicator – quantified in EU KLEMS Database (www.euklems.net) – 
that sheds light on the quality of labour inputs is the share of hours worked by high-
skilled persons engaged, in total hours worked. Table 6 shows the evolution of this 
indicator. 
The situation revealed in Table 6 is slightly less gloomy in the case of the surveyed 
catching-up economies than the one reported by Crinó [2005], probably because 
alongside to pure processing activities local subsidiaries in CEE have also assumed in-
creasingly some relatively skill-intensive production-related services in the past couple 
of years (after 2000). Locally performed production-related services included product 
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and/or process R&D, logistics, customer-relationship management, etc. Nevertheless, 
the evolution of this indicator is far slower than in advanced economies.  
Table 6 
Hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged in total hours worked 
(percent) 
Manufacturing TT- industry EOE TE-industry 
Country 
1990 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 
Austria 3 4 7 1 4 5 9 5 9 
Finland 18 23 28 16 18 27 35 27 35 
France 5 6 8 4 4 8 10 8 10 
Germany 6* 7 9 2 3 13 15 13 15 
Spain 6 7,5 13 3 7 15 22 8 15 
United Kingdom 5 8 13 5 9 8 13 8 13 
United States 18 20 25 11 12 32 44 23 29 
Hungary . 8 10 4 5 9 10 9 10 
Czech Republic . 6 7 3 4 7 8 7 8 
Slovakia . 6 8 4 4 7 8 7 8 
Poland . 7 12 4 8 9 14 9 14 
* 1991. 
Source: EU KLEMS Database.  
Another indicator suggesting the lagging quality improvement of employees’ skill 
composition in the surveyed catching-up economies is the persisting large gap between 
advanced economies’ and the CEEs’ apparent labour productivity. (See Table 7.) 
A further method to investigate quality changes in labour input is to compare the 
evolution of labour services – an indicator that combines both the quality and the 
quantity of labour as a production input – with the evolution of the pure quantity in-
dicator of labour input (hours worked). In cases of skill upgrading, i.e. quality 
changes in employees’ skill mix, increases in labour services exceed increases in 
hours worked. Similarly, if in a given industry total labour input decreases but in the 
meantime skill upgrading occurs, the reduction of labour services is inferior to the 
decrease in the hours worked. Table 8 compares the gap between the evolution of la-
bour services and that of hours worked in the surveyed economies. 
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Table 7 
Apparent labour productivity in the surveyed industries, 2004 
(value added per employee, 1000 euros) 
Country TT-industry EOE TE-industry 
Austria 53.8 76.3 87.9 
France 48.2 56.9 74.8 
Germany 43.3 67.1 72.5 
Finland 40.2 116.6 45.0 
Spain 22.8 41.6 46.7 
Hungary 5.8 23.6 32.0 
Czech Republic 8.3 14.4 21.0 
Slovakia 5.9 12.5 26.5 
Poland 7.3 18.4 17.5 
Note: Slovakia and Hungary 2005. Applied euro-conversion rates: Hungary: HUF 248; Czech Republic: 
CZK 32; Slovakia: SKK 38.4; Poland: PLN 4.5. 
Source: The author’s own calculations from EU KLEMS Database. 
Table 8 
Labour services and hours worked, volume indices, 2004 
(1995 = 100)  
TT-industry EOE  TE-industry 
Country 
Labour services Hours worked Labour services Hours worked Labour services Hours worked 
Czech Republic 61 54 139 135 118 116 
Slovakia 82 80 143 143 119 118 
Hungary 74 79 176 207 163 193 
Poland 56 55 87 83 79 77 
Austria 63 59 83 80 123 119 
Finland 77 67 133 127 88 82 
France 58 52 90 86 101 97 
Germany 58 55 87 84 107 102 
Spain 114 108 121 113 121 119 
United Kingdom 45 37 80 72 108 98 
United States 49 46 89 80 92 88 
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There are only two countries (Finland and the United Kingdom) where the gap 
between the two indicators is significant in each of the surveyed industries, pointing 
to an across-the-board skill upgrading and a switch to quality competition.  
Catching-up economies’ skill-upgrading performance lags much behind the one in 
advanced economies. In Hungary, the situation is even worse than the case of a simple 
time lag: the evolution of the surveyed indicators does not conform to the one in ad-
vanced economies. The increase in hours worked exceeds that of labour services (and 
similarly, the reduction of hours worked in the TT industry is smaller than that of la-
bour services). Nevertheless this points to fairly good performance in employment 
creation. However, economic-policy decision makers ought to be concerned with the 
other side of the coin: with the increasing vulnerability of a strategy based purely on 
price competition. The other CEE economies fare a little better in this respect, never-
theless their performance still lags much behind the one in advanced economies. 
3. Conclusions 
From the foregoing, it emerges that despite advanced economics, CEE similarity 
in terms of structural upgrading – with Hungary being the best performer in this re-
spect – the upgrading of CEE countries labour input, in contrast to advanced econo-
mies’ experience, has not been in line with this development. Hungarian perform-
ance was the worst in the CEE countries in this respect. 
While technical change in advanced economies was skill-biased in the surveyed 
period, and demand for highly-skilled workforce increased considerably, in the sur-
veyed CEE countries (and especially in Hungary) demand for the relatively skilled 
labour declined, and the skill structure of persons engaged deteriorated.7 Transfer-
driven technical change in CEE manufacturing industries has thus been complemen-
tary to raw, low-skilled labour and the thesis of capital/skill complementarity did not 
apply for several reasons. 
First, the newly installed high-technology production equipment simplified proc-
essing tasks. The new, modern machines required routine skills that could be assimi-
lated and mastered within two or three weeks of shopfloor learning-by-doing. Sec-
ondly, the deterioration of the skill structure can also be explained with the fact that 
similarly to the accumulated physical capital stock, part of the human capital stock 
also became suddenly obsolete following the political transition. Furthermore, as it 
 
7 This development is in puzzling contrast with the substantial upsurge in the skill premium that can be ob-
served in CEE countries as well. Note, that the quantity and quality of skills in each of the skill categories has 
undergone sizeable changes in this period. 
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was already mentioned, FDI-driven structural change and modernization had a nega-
tive side effect: production-related human-capital-intensive activities, especially 
R&D, were abandoned in the privatized entities.  
Nevertheless, interindustry disparities in the quality upgrading of labour input 
calls for caution concerning the working hypothesis of this paper. I assumed that 
changes in the output mix are strongly correlated with changes in the structure of in-
puts. When, for example, a shift towards technology-intensive industries becomes 
manifest in the composition of output, the quality structure of labour input will im-
prove as well, at least in advanced economies. However, data suggest remarkably 
large input-quality changes in low-technology industries, which question the hidden 
assumption of our hypothesis that the larger a shift towards higher-tech industries, 
the more improvement in the structure of labour input can be expected. We may con-
clude that the correlation of changes in input and output structures is more complex 
than it was originally assumed.  
A model that describes this correlation would contain variables quantifying the 
extent of structural change as well as the extent of the shift towards high-tech indus-
tries. These variables ought to be weighed with the given countries’ potential to at-
tract outsourced processing activities (OPA potential). OPA potential is a narrower 
category than the well-known FDI-attraction potential, quantified in the annual 
UNCTAD World Investment Reports (www.unctad.org/wir). 
OPA potential focuses on manufacturing activities, at a time when the services sec-
tor is characterised by sizeable and increasing FDI-attraction potential.8 OPA potential 
excludes FDI transactions with the purpose of technology acquisition as well as other 
M&A (materials and applications) deals with the purpose of market extension; product 
or service extension; various defensive purposes, etc. The gap between FDI-attraction 
potential and OPA potential that can be explained with this latter reason is significant 
only in advanced economies: in catching-up countries the annual flows of manufactur-
ing FDI can more or less allow for estimating the given country’s OPA potential. 
Using OPA potential as a weight to correct for distortions caused by large shifts 
towards high-technology industries is necessary because in countries with a large 
OPA potential, the correlation between changes in input and output structures is 
weaker than the one in countries with insignificant OPA potential. 
The other variables of the model quantify the extent of changes in the quality and 
quantity of labour input. However, similarly to measurement problems related to in-
tangible capital, measuring the quality of labour presents non-negligible difficulties. 
Recall Corrado–Hulten–Sichel [2006] estimates of the scope of intangible invest-
ment in the United States. According to the cited authors, intangible business in-
 
8 According to UNCTAD World Investment Report ([2004] p. 97), world FDI stock in the services sector 
has quadrupled between 1990 and 2002.  
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vestment in the U.S. amounted to about USD 1000 billion in 1999. Nevertheless, 
only 15 percent of this amount was included in the national accounts with the capi-
talization of investment into software. Capital intensity of production quickly in-
creased as a result of this reform. Since software investment is only a fragment of to-
tal intangible investment the authors conclude that the capital intensity of value-
added creation is higher than calculated. 
Nevertheless, measurement problems related to the other source of growth should 
not be neglected either. Capital/labour ratios are hard to estimate, not only as a rea-
son of unmeasured intangible investment but also because of unmeasured human 
capital. Calculating the exact extent and the value of human capital is even more dif-
ficult than that of intangible capital, so the real labour intensity of value-added crea-
tion may also be higher than its officially calculated value.9  
An indicator that indirectly refers to increasing labour input in manufacturing is 
the increase both in the volume of intermediate-service inputs and their share within 
total intermediate inputs.10 Of course, capital/labour ratios calculate only direct la-
bour input, but in contrast to the past when dominant part of purchased intermediate 
inputs consisted of raw materials, parts and components (the labour input of which is 
accounted for in other manufacturing industries), at present an increasing volume of 
labour input in manufacturing, i.e. the one related to purchased services, is accounted 
for in the services sector not in manufacturing. The human-capital intensity of pur-
chased services is difficult to estimate, since a part of purchased services consists of 
low-skilled outsourced services. However the share of high-skilled business services 
is also rapidly increasing (Alajääskö [2007]).  
It also can be seen that the elaboration of a complex model that describes the rela-
tion between changes in input and output structures, driven by technological change, 
as well as the realistic assessment of individual industries’ capital/labour ratios and 
of factors that influence these ratios requires substantial further research. 
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The first three years of membership in the EU have 
had substantial impact on the trade of the new member 
countries (NMS) in general, and on that of Hungary, in 
particular. Trade creation, an obvious tendency from the 
early 1990s on, has stopped in NMS exports to the 
EU 15. Even more, EU 15 share started to diminish sub-
stantially, between 2.2 and over 20 percentage points. In 
turn, EU 15 share in total imports reveals a more con-
troversial picture of trade creation and trade-diversion 
effects. By far the biggest change is represented by the 
dramatic increase of intra-NMS trade. Its volume more 
than doubled from less than EUR50 billion in 2003 to 
almost EUR 100 billion in 2006. Thus, intra-NMS trade 
flows did not only become the most dynamic factor of 
EU 25 trade but they played a fundamental role in re-
placing previous commodity flows to, and partly from, 
the EU 15. Hungary’s exports and imports from the 
EU 25 grew slower than those of other NMS but much 
quicker than the EU 25 average. Two important new 
trends have to be highlighted. First, Hungary’s intra-
NMS-trade has been characterised by a strong increase 
of the share of NMS in total exports (from 7.5 to 13 per-
cent in a four-year period). Second, and not less impor-
tantly, Hungary’s traditional trade deficit with the NMS 
turned into a remarkable and sustainable surplus and 
contributed by EUR 1.7 billion to the improvement of 
the country’s overall trade balance. This figure points to 
sustained competitiveness. It is the task of forthcoming 
studies to shed light on the main factors that had been 
driving exports and fostered competitiveness in intra- 
NMS-trade. 
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For external-economy-dependent countries, foreign trade is one of the most evi-
dent macro-economic indicators of successful or failed adjustment, growing or de-
creasing competitiveness. In this context, all new member states (NMS) that joined 
the European Union in May 2004, belong to this category. Thus, their foreign trade 
performance in the EU 25 may provide important guidance in assessing their adjust-
ment process in the last three years of membership.  
Moreover, such a survey offers several challenging issues related to traditional 
theoretical hypotheses and approaches. First, establishment of or accession to a re-
gional integration is expected to produce trade-creation and trade-diversion effects, 
particularly if the given integration is not only a free-trade area but a customs union 
as well. Second, what is the impact of accession on intra-NMS trade, particularly if it 
became fully liberalized just at the moment of accession to the EU? Third, free trade 
between differently developed countries used to produce high trade surplus for more 
developed and high trade deficit for less developed member countries of the given 
integration. Fourth, and in continuation of the previous line of thinking, the commod-
ity pattern of trade relations between more and less developed member countries of 
the same integration is expected to represent bilateral commodity flows of high 
value-added and high technology-content of exports from more to less developed 
countries and, at the same time, low value added and low(er) technology-content ex-
ports from the less to the more developed member states. 
To what extent, if at any, can the given – still deeply-rooted – theoretical assump-
tions (or, even more, stereotypes) be verified or refuted in the special context of 
“Eastern” enlargement characterised by 
– rapidly expanding globalization, 
– foreign trade and investment flows predominantly driven by 
global activities of transnational companies (with differently strong 
positions in the NMS), 
– free trade in all industrial and most agricultural products several 
years before membership (in contrast to previous enlargements by less 
developed new members), 
– a new pattern of strategic decision-making on the level of transna-
tional companies from the traditional vertical towards a future-oriented 
horizontal structure of organizaton and international division of labour. 
 
Based on this theoretical backgorund and considering the changing framework 
conditions, the statistical analysis offered in this paper sheds light on some important 
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trends that can be observed as a result of a three-year membership in the EU.1 The 
basic fields covered by statistical figures and own calculations include: 
– the evidence of trade creation and trade diversion, 
– the impact of membership on intra-NMS trade (as a priority area 
of this paper), 
– development of competitiveness of the NMS mainly based on 
growing or declining shares on different markets, 
– bilateral trade balances and finally, 
– the commodity pattern of NMS exports. 
 
The period covered by the survey includes the years from 2003 to 2006. The ini-
tial date represent the last year of pre-accession, while 2006 offers the most recent 
annual figures. For unbiased comparison, all statistical data are taken from different 
publications of Eurostat (“External and intra-European trade”), on which own calcu-
lations are also based. The analysis incorporates respective trade figures of all NMS 
that joined in 2004, excepting, for their negligible impact both on total and intra-
NMS trade, Cyprus and Malta.2  
The analysis of the growth of exports and imports, trade balance, individual country 
shares, as well as commodity pattern focuses not only on overall figures but tries to 
distinguish between intra- and extra-EU trade, with particular reference to intra-NMS 
trends of trade flows. As a last remark, the basic approach is focused on the perform-
ance of the NMS 8 group, however, in most cases, with special attention to Hungary, 
both as compared to overall EU trade developments and to the basic trends that could 
be identified in other NMS countries, as – at least – short-term competitors of Hungary. 
The paper is divided into four major parts. First, overall trends of the NMS trade 
within the EU 25 will be elaborated on. Second, special attention will be paid to 
some characteristic features of intra-NMS trade between 2003 and 2006. Third, some 
basic elements of the commodity pattern of trade, with special emphasis on the struc-
ture of exports, will be highlighted. Finally, as a concluding section, important and at 
least partly surprising changes in the geographic distribution of NMS trade will be il-
lustrated. 
  
1 Due to the obvious limitations of the paper, several background statistical tables and own calculations 
based on Eurostat figures could not be included into the printed form, even if reference has been made on 
selected relevant developments verified by statistics. The complete statistical material can be consulted on the 
internet Supplement of this article. Reference to each additional table can be found in the appropriate section of 
the paper. 
2 Therefore, a category of NMS 8 was created (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). Bulgaria and Romania, although partly included in EU trade statistics 
retrospectively (EU 27), have not been considered, since in the period of the survey they had not yet been 
members of the EU. 
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1. The new member countries in the EU 25 trade developments 
Following the full-fledged membership, trade of the NMS 8 kept on developing 
dynamically. Between 2003 and 2006, total exports grew from EUR 172 billion to 
EUR 298 billion, while imports increased from EUR 199 billion to EUR 325 billion. 
Both intra-EU and extra-EU trade experienced high growth rates. However, calcula-
tions based on Table 1 reveal some remarkable features that need further explana-
tion. 
Table 1 
Development of NMS 8 trade 
(EUR billion) 
Year Total exports Intra-EU 25 exports 
Extra-EU ex-







2003 171.97 139.57 32.40 199.39 136.83 62.56 
2004 211.12 169.59 41.53 237.59 177.34 60.25 
2005 246.29 193.43 52.86 269.18 200.99 68.19 
2006 297.96 231.33 66.63 325.32 237.76 87.56 
 EU 25 
2003 2.761 1.878 883 2.729 1.788 941 
2004 2.997 2.028 969 2.983 1.951 1.032 
2005 3.236 2.164 1.072 3.276 2.092 1.184 
2006 3.608 2.428 1.180 3.698 2.346 1.352 
Note. For individual country data see Tables S1, S2. and S3.  
Source: Eurostat. External and intra-European Union trade. Monthly Statistics, various issues. 
 
1. Total exports and imports of the NMS 8 group indicate much stronger growth 
than the EU 25 average (of which, of course, this group is also part of). The difference 
in cumulative growth rates is particularly evident in exports that grew more than twice 
as quicker than the overall export growth of the EU 25 (73.3 vs. 30.7 percent). 
2. Exports to extra-EU countries experienced a much higher growth than to the 
EU 25, which is an indicator of trade diversion instead of trade creation following 
accession. In turn, trade creation did take place to some extent in imports, where in-
tra-EU imports grew much quicker than extra-EU imports.  
3. The EU 25 indicated a cautious (much less dynamic) shift to external geo-
graphic orientation. This was much less accentuated in exports than in imports (4.3 
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percentage point difference between the growth rate of intra-EU and extra-EU ex-
ports, and 12.2 percentage point difference in the respective imports). 
 
How can the discussed and partly surprising trends be explained? Evidently, one 
reasonable explication is that the NMS 8 group had implemented free trade covering 
almost 100 percent of the total exports several years before membership (in fact, as of 
2001). Consequently, most trade-creation impacts had been working prior to member-
ship, practically over a period of more than one decade (from the entering in force of 
the trade section of the association agreement between 1992 and the mid-1990s). An-
other argument can be linked to the low growth rate of the traditional EU markets as 
compared to other markets. This development may have been strengthened by the im-
pact of globalization that opened up new market opportunities in rapidly growing non-
EU countries, particularly in Asia but also in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. More-
over, to some extent EU support can also be taken into account, particularly in the con-
text of agricultural exports, since the new member countries started to enjoy the export-
subsidy mechanism of the EU. This may have had a positive impact on agricultural ex-
ports to neighbouring countries, particularly Russia (it is not by chance that Poland 
could accumulate the highest agricultural-export surplus among the NMS 8 in the last 
years). Nevertheless, the most plausible explanation seems to be that transnational 
companies rooted in the NMS (although with rather different macroeconomic weights 
and role in total exports) several years before institutional membership, started to make 
full use of the enlargement by having the legal, institutional and also political support 
derived automatically from the fact of accession. 
In turn, statistical figures confirm trade creation in NMS 8 imports. This has been 
happening in contrast to EU 25 developments that indicate a higher dynamism of ex-
tra-EU imports than intra-EU imports. The latter can relatively easily be explained 
both by growing competition from China and other emerging economies as well as 
by higher energy prices. However, the particular case of the NMS 8, again, requires 
some elaboration. First, as already mentioned, the trade-related impacts of free trade 
had been working not only in exports but also in imports well before membership. In 
addition, the immediate harmonisation of national import duties to the level of the 
EU customs union could have resulted in higher extra-EU imports, since national 
customs duties used to be higher than the customs level of the Union. Moreover, the 
first years of membership were accompanied by rapidly increasing fuel prices. Since 
most NMS (excepting Slovenia) are heavily dependent on Russian deliveries, extra-
EU imports should have experienced an increasing share in total imports, just be-
cause of the price factor. Lacking fundamental analysis, some speculations only can 
be made in order to explain trade creation in imports of the NMS 8. On the one hand, 
institutional membership seems to have created a qualitatively new status for the new 
members. Thus, legal certainty, EU-level transparency and institutional adequacy 
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may have fostered not only exports to the NMS 8 by large Western European trans-
national companies but, increasingly, by small- and medium-sized firms, too. On the 
other hand, rapid and sustained economic growth (three to five times higher than the 
average growth rate in the EU 15) may have created additional demand for intra-EU 
exports. Finally, also rapidly growing intra-NMS trade has to be reckoned with (al-
though, as it will be shown, this effect can be clearly identified in export develop-
ments as well). Detailed figures, including the performance of the individual new 
members have been summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Dynamics of NMS 8 trade, 2003–2006  
(Index: 2003 = 100.0) 







Czech Republic 175.9 162.3 171.2 182.9 205.9 111.9 
Estonia 188.0 178.7 149.8 201.9 367.1 136.1 
Latvia 189.8 195.0 172.4 196.6 256.6 190.4 
Lithuania 182.5 180.3 184.4 201.7 179.2 153.3 
Hungary 155.7 145.0 142.0 153.5 214.9 130.6 
Poland 184.2 164.8 176.1 171.1 218.4 150.6 
Slovenia 164.2 156.9 163.7 159.0 165.1 150.3 
Slovakia 172.2 183.3 173.0 185.8 167.6 176.1 
NMS 8 173.3 163.2 165.7 173.8 205.6 140.0 
EU 25 total 130.7 135.5 129.3 131.2 133.6 143.4 
Source: Here and in Tables 3-6 the author’s own calculations based on Eurostat: External and intra-
European Union trade. Monthly Statistics, various issues. 
 
A cross-country survey reveals that with a few and remarkable exceptions, all 
NMS 8 countries produced much higher growth rates in their total, intra- and extra-
EU trade, respectively than overall EU 25 figures. The only exception is represented 
by three countries in extra-EU imports that are responsible for the lower NMS 8 av-
erage than the EU 25 total (Estonia, Hungary and, particularly, the Czech Republic). 
However, the trend of intra-EU import creation was a strong and common feature for 
all new members. (Differences in growth rates between intra-EU and extra-EU im-
ports were particularly high in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and 
Poland). At the same time, cross-country comparison indicates a differentiated pic-
ture of the dynamics of intra- and extra-EU exports. In general terms, as already 
stated, the latter registered a much higher dynamism (trade diversion, or extra-EU 
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trade creation), however, it did not characterise all countries of the group. This out-
ward tendency was very strong for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and 
Poland, while intra- and extra-EU export dynamism was similar in the case of Slove-
nia. In contrast, Lithuania and Slovakia became more EU-oriented (here, the trade-
creation effect worked). 
It is interesting to analyse the differences between export and import growth 
rates. In total, the NMS 8 group achieved higher total export than total import 
growth, which can be considered not only a positive impact on trade balance (see 
later), but also as an indicator of growing competitiveness. However, the overall fig-
ure is the result of two contrasting developments. On the one hand, extra-EU exports 
grew much more dynamically than imports, while in the intra-EU framework, import 
growth proved to be higher than export growth. Still, country-specific figures largely 
differ. Higher growth of total exports vs. imports can be attributed to Poland (with a 
growth rate difference of 20 percent), the Czech Republic (13.6%), Hungary 
(10.7%), Estonia (9.3%), Slovenia (7.3%) and Lithuania (2.3%). In turn, total im-
ports grew more dynamically than total exports for Slovakia (11.1%) and Latvia 
(5.2%). Concerning intra-EU trade, excepting Poland and Slovenia, all new member 
states experienced higher import than export growth. Finally, as far as extra-EU trade 
is considered, all new members show a much higher export than import growth, with 
the only exception of Slovakia. 
Looking at the difference in dynamism of exports and imports of the individual 
countries, Hungary reveals the relatively lowest level of growth (although still 
clearly higher than the average of the EU 25). While total Hungarian exports grew by 
56 percent in a four-year period, the main competitors of the region increased their 
exports by 72 (Slovakia), 76 (Czech Republic) and 84 percent (Poland). Even Slove-
nia could expand exports by 64 percent, let alone the Baltic states with almost dou-
bling their certainly modest exports between 2003 and 2006. The basic picture is 
similar in imports; however, here the differences are not as much stressed. Due to the 
dominant share of the EU in total trade, the pattern holds for intra-EU trade as well, 
being Hungary the least dynamic new member country again (but still more dynamic 
than total EU 25 trade figures). This picture is substantially modified if we look at 
the extra-EU indicators. Extra-EU exports grew most dynamically for Hungary (ex-
cepting two small Baltic states), while imports revealed a relatively sluggish growth 
(but still higher than the Czech Republic and similar to Estonia). 
These developments already predict changes in the share of the NMS 8 and of the 
individual countries in total, intra- and extra-EU trade of the EU 25. Three main 
trends have to be underlined.  
 
1. Although from a low level, however, in all comparisons, the share of NMS 8 
kept on further growing after accession. In total EU 25 exports the share increased 
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from 6.23 (2003) to 8.26 (2006) percent, or a more than 2 percentage points “market 
gain” in four years. In total imports, the 7.31 percent share experienced an increase 
to 8.80 percent. 
2. The share of NMS 8 in intra-EU trade was substantially higher than in extra-
EU trade. As a consequence of continuous dynamic increase, the share of the NMS 8 
in intra-EU exports grew from 7.43 to 9.53 percent, while in imports it reached the 
10 percent level (from 7.65 to 10.13 percent in a four-year period). In contrast, the 
NMS 8 is still underrepresented in extra-EU trade, even if shares were rapidly in-
creasing in exports (from 3.67 to 5.65 percent), but not in imports (slight decline 
from 6.65 to 6.48 percent). In other words, and as a first and maybe superficial ap-
proach, the new countries have a relatively higher intra-EU orientation and seem to 
be less prepared to global competition. (For shares of individual countries see Tables 
S4., S5. and S6.) 
3. Despite higher growth rates of exports than imports, NMS 8 participation in 
exports resulted still lower than in imports. However, the original (2003) “gap” could 
be substantially narrowed in total trade (from 1.08 percentage points to 0.54), and in 
extra-EU trade (from almost 3 percentage points to 0.87). In contrast, and due to the 
already mentioned “trade creation in intra-EU imports”; the share of the NMS 8 
group in intra-EU exports grew slower than in imports (2.10 percentage points vs. 
2.43 percentage points). 
 
Turning attention to the individual countries, all of them participated in the higher 
export and import shares. Of course, there were some differences in dynamism, since 
the 2.03 percentage point share increase was mainly generated by Poland (0.71) and 
the Czech Republic (0.54). Hungary’s contribution was 0.26 percentage points, simi-
lar to half-sized Slovakia (0.22). Similar trends can be observed in total imports, with 
the difference that Slovakia’s share was more quickly increasing than that of Hun-
gary. 
A not less interesting approach compares export and import shares of the individ-
ual countries. In this context, the NMS 8 group shows rather diverging features. The 
Czech Republic is the only country that in 2006 showed a higher share in total EU 
exports than imports. The second group consists of the “balanced” countries, includ-
ing Hungary, Slovenia and partly Slovakia. All others reveal a much higher share in 
imports than in exports, anticipating substantial trade deficits. In intra-EU trade 
Hungary joins the Czech Republic in having higher share in exports than in imports. 
All others (excepting “balanced” Slovakia) register higher import than export shares. 
In turn, extra-EU trade is characterised by much higher import than export shares 
(with the clear exception of Slovenia having its ex-Yugoslav “hinterland” and, to a 
much smaller extent, Estonia). 
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Detailed statistics on the share of the individual NMS in total, intra- and extra-EU 
trade have also been prepared. (See Tables S7, S8 and S9.) Some remarks only on 
Hungary should be made here. First, over the four-year period, Hungary has been the 
third largest trading country (following Poland and the Czech Republic). Second, its 
share has been constantly decreasing in total exports and imports of the NMS 8 (over 
a four-year period from 22.2 to 19.9 percent in exports and from 21.2 to 18.8 percent 
in imports). The relative position of the Czech Republic, with some annual fluctua-
tions, remained constant, while Poland could increase its share (to about 30 percent 
of the group). Third, in contrast to the previously mentioned general trends, Hungary 
was the second largest country in extra-EU trade (after Poland but clearly ahead of 
the Czech Republic). More importantly, its relative share could be increased in ex-
ports (from 22.1 to 23.1 percent). In turn, its share in imports registered a decrease 
(similarly to the Czech Republic and in contrast with all other NMS). 
Table 3 
Trade balance of the NMS with the world 
2003 2004 2005 2006 Cumulative 2003–2006 Country 







Czech Republic –2.67 –1.02 +1.28 +1.54 –0.87 102.1 99.6 
Estonia –1.75 –1.90 –2.03 –2.76 –8.44 73.1 72.7 
Latvia –2.07 –2.49 –2.85 –4.17 –11.58 53.8 56.1 
Lithuania –2.37 –2.48 –3.01 –4.14 –12.00 73.1 74.1 
Hungary –4.16 –3.99 –2.90 –1.98 –13.03 96.8 93.7 
Poland –12.83 –11.78 –9.81 –11.91 –46.33 88.0 85.2 
Slovenia –0.96 –1.12 –0.87 –0.68 –3.63 96.5 94.2 
Slovakia –0.61 –1.69 –2.70 –3.26 –8.26 91.1 92.4 
NMS 8 –27.42 –26.47 –22.89 –27.36 –104.14 91.6 89.9 
 
Concerning competitiveness, an important indicator is the total, intra- and extra-
EU-based trade balance as well as the export/import coverage ratio of the group, in 
general, and of the individual members, in particular. Tables 3, 4 and 5 contain an-
nual and cumulative figures of the trade balance. Taking the four-year period, the 
NMS 8 has accumulated a trade deficit of more than EUR 100 billion, as a result of 
transformation costs, modernization efforts and higher energy prices (or deterioration 
of terms-of-trade). Almost half of it concentrates on Poland, while Hungary’s cumu-
lative deficit is similar to that of Latvia or Lithuania (much smaller economies but 
with a much larger imbalance between export performance and import needs). The 
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best performer is the Czech Republic that registered not only negligible cumulative 
deficit but resulted the only new member country that could change its trade balance 
from negative to positive in the first years of EU membership. Another encouraging 
development took place in Hungary, a country that could substantially reduce its 
original trade deficit year by year. Poland’s deficit, on a very high level, remained 
constant, while that of the Baltic countries and especially that of Slovakia were rap-
idly growing. As far as trade balance can be considered a factor of competitiveness 
of the given economy, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia provide the best 
results. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the coverage ratios. On a four-year 
basis (2003 to 2006) the Czech Republic shows a practically balanced pattern (im-
ports have been covered by exports to 99.6 percent). The next and adequately per-
forming group consists of Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia (with coverage ratios of 
92 to 94 percent). They are followed by Poland and the Baltic states, having the latter 
very low coverage ratios.3 
Table 4 
Trade balance of the NMSs with the EU 25 
2003 2004 2005 2006 Cumulative 2003–2006 Country 







Czech Republic +4.68 +2.49 +2.99 +4.22 +14.38 107.1 107.7 
Estonia –0.43 –1.07 –1.45 –2.58 –5.53 65.6 75.3 
Latvia –1.46 –1.82 –2.09 –3.36 –8.73 51.0 56.2 
Lithuania –0.91 –1.30 –1.21 –2.50 –5.92 74.0 78.9 
Hungary +4.28 +2.89 +2.46 +3.01 +12.64 107.4 109.3 
Poland –3.32 –6.21 –5.60 –3.76 –18.89 94.7 91.7 
Slovenia –1.71 –2.92 –2.50 –2.36 –9.49 84.0 80.4 
Slovakia +1.61 +0.19 –0.19 +0.90 +2.51 103.3 103.1 
NMS 8 +2.74 –7.75 –7.59 –6.43 –19.03 97.3 97.5 
 
An analysis of the trade balance with the EU can be particularly interesting, since it 
reflects the result of free trade between differently developed countries. At least for 
some countries, both cumulative and annual figures contradict traditional theories. 
Namely, three countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia register surplus in 
their intra-EU trade over the whole period (excepting Slovakia in 2005). Moreover, 
  
3 Naturally, high trade deficits can be financed by the exports of services or other incomes, including 
foreign capital, international loans, private remittances, etc. Still, the balance of trade in commodities used to be 
seen as a major indicator of international competitiveness of the given country. 
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Hungary reveals the highest (positive) coverage ratio, followed by the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia. At the other end of the scale, Latvia, a country with China-like growth 
rate, can cover a bit more than half of its imports by exports. Intra-EU trade balance 
and coverage ratios positively correlate with different levels of involvement in global 
trade and investment flows. Also, it supports the view that, in the era of globalization, 
different development levels do not automatically play a decisive role in the evolution 
of bilateral trade balances. Overall competitiveness and geographic orientation of large 
transnational companies located in the given country affects trade performance and 
balance more essentially than traditional factors, including national business cycles.4 In 
turn, the Baltic countries and Slovenia seem to be much less involved in the interna-
tional network of manufacturing, with obvious impacts on their trade balance and 
global competitiveness (at least in the tradeable sector). 
Table 5 
Trade balance of NMSs with the extra-EU 25 region 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
Country 









Czech Republic –7.35 –3.51 –1.71 –2.68 –15.25 81.9 70.1 
Estonia –1.32 –0.83 –0.58 –0.18 –2.91 93.5 65.7 
Latvia –0.61 –0.67 –0.76 –0.81 –2.85 62.7 55.8 
Lithuania –1.46 –1.18 –1.80 –1.64 –6.08 71.6 66.8 
Hungary –8.44 –6.88 –5.36 –4.99 –25.67 75.5 63.0 
Poland –9.51 –5.57 –4.21 –8.15 –27.44 70.9 67.9 
Slovenia +0.75 +1.80 +1.63 +1.68 +5.86 137.5 142.8 
Slovakia –2.22 –1.88 –2.54 –4.16 –10.80 54.4 58.1 
NMS – 8 –30.16 –18.72 –15.33 –20.93 –85.14 76.1 69.4 
 
Finally, in extra-EU trade all countries, with the evident exception of Slovenia, 
indicate huge imbalances and low level of coverage ratios (even if the latter was 
slightly improving during the observed period). High deficit in extra-EU trade can be 
the result of three – partly interconnected – developments. First, all countries are 
  
4 For instance, Hungary’s key trading partner is Germany. A decade ago, upswing or recession in the 
German economy was considered to be a key external factor of the growth rate of the Hungarian economy. 
Certainly, this correlation did not ceased to exist, however, it is much weaker than before. As a large part of 
Hungary’s exports to Germany does not have its final destination on the German market, but represents a 
growing input into German production for exports, the most important external driving force is shifting from 
the growth of the respective national economy to the global competitiveness of (German or in Germany located 
international) companies. 
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substantial energy importers, and most of the imports come from extra-EU sources 
(predominantly from Russia). Second, increasing openness, as a consequence of im-
plementing the customs union, may enhance global competition to which domestic 
economic actors are not prepared. Third, and in a more positive approach, high im-
ports can also be the consequence of a qualitatively different level of becoming in-
volved in the global network of transnational companies. While the first factor af-
fects all NMS (excepting Slovenia), the last one can only be clearly identified in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic (and most recently in Slovakia, too). As compared 
to the size of the economy and total trade, the growing deficit of the other countries 
(mainly the Baltic states) can be explained by missing or “deficient” industrial com-
petitiveness. 
Finally, the exceptional case of Slovenia needs some remarks. The surplus is due 
to two factors, namely the different geographic orientation of energy imports on the 
one hand, and, more importantly, to having maintained traditional trade contacts with 
ex-Yugoslav republics, on the other. In the short and, perhaps, medium term this can 
be considered as an intelligent decision; its longer term impacts are much more am-
biguous. In principle, there are two different extra-EU orientations in the exports of 
the NMS 8. One is based on global competitiveness, partly reinforced by successful 
market access to the huge internal market (in most cases in the framework of the ex-
ports of transnational companies located in several NMS). The other can be consid-
ered as exports to a “captive” market that, although it offers traditional opportunities 
and keeps production and allocation networks, is unable to create a competitive envi-
ronment. In fact, most Western Balkan countries possess a large number of protec-
tionist measures, inherited from the former Yugoslav Federation. It is not yet clear to 
what extent the Slovenian orientation to the ex-Yugoslav markets will be able to 
keep or (re)generate the international competitiveness of Slovenian firms heavily en-
gaged in this area. Already anticipating the next part of the study, it has to be stressed 
that growing regional orientation of the new member countries is embedded into a 
different environment, since most countries in question have open markets and free 
trade with the EU. Thus, they have to conquer new markets in keen and healthy 
European (and increasingly global) competition. 
2. The impact of membership on intra-NMS trade 
One of the most predictable and positive consequences of the accession of the 
new member countries was the dramatic increase of intra-NMS trade. It was not dif-
ficult to anticipate this trend due to 
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– the high level of protectionism practiced by all acceding countries 
over several years, despite the existence of CEFTA,5 
– the sustainable and rapid growth in the NMS 8 group, 
– regional strategies of transnational companies, and 
– a different quality of confidence-building towards new and more 
cautious market players (small- and medium-sized enterprises, non-
European investors) as a result of accession. 
 
Not less importantly, it was expected that the liberalisation of trade among the 
NMS 8 countries would create a high level of transparency concerning the regional 
(and partly European and global) competitiveness of the respective economies. De-
spite the generally justified expectations, some developments may have caused sur-
prise (and mainly positive shocks). 
 
1. Intra-NMS trade turnover more than doubled in four years (from EUR 45.5 bil-
lion to EUR 97.9 billion, or by 115 percent, see Table S10, as well as corresponding 
figures for overall intra-exports and intra-imports of individual countries for Table 
S11.).6 Thus, it became by far the most dynamic factor not only of the trade devel-
opment of the NMS, but also that of the EU 25. Although there is no quantitative as-
sessment as of today, this development has definitely contributed to the strengthen-
ing of EU 25 competitiveness (accompanied by corresponding capital flows).  
2. New member countries could make use of the opening-up of regional opportu-
nities at various degrees. Above-average export growth was reported in all Baltic 
countries and in Hungary. The latter could increase its NMS-exports by 168 percent, 
the second largest increase after the small Latvia (231 per cent). In turn, other NMS 
countries registered lower than average, although higher than global and EU 25 
growth rates. (See Table 6.)  
3. A completely different picture developed in intra-NMS imports. The most dy-
namic increases happened in the Baltic countries and in Slovenia, while the Czech 
data remained about the average. In turn, Slovenian, Polish and Hungarian imports 
registered lower-than-average growth rates. 
4. As a continuation of the previous paragraphs, the liberalisation of regional 
trade upon accession was used differently from country to country. Some of them 
could achieve much higher export than import growth rates (mainly Hungary and 
Latvia, but also Slovenia and Poland), while others reported higher import than ex-
  
5 In its name, CEFTA was a free-trade area among more or less similarly developed (or underdeveloped, in 
some cases more mis-developed) countries. In ideas, it looked much better than in practice. Bilateral trade 
barriers to a large number of commodities could never have been abolished. However, joining the EU on May 
1. 2004, all obstacles were immediately lifted and the way for unrestricted free trade was cleared. 
6 Bilateral (cross-country) export and import data are provided in Tables S12. and S13.  
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port growth (mainly Lithuania, but also Estonia, Slovakia and to a lesser extent also 
the Czech Republic). However, contrary to some other regional integrations (e.g. 
Mercosur – South American Common Market or ASEAN – Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations), different export and import growth rates do not necessarily lead to a 
classification of the NMS 8 into primarily exporters (“unilateral beneficiaries” of EU 
membership) and importers (“unilateral losers” of membership).  
5. “Intra-NMS trade propensity” differs from country to country. This is due both 
to historical links, as represented by the surviving strong economic linkages between 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and to geographic proximity (Baltic countries7). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the highest share of intra-NMS exports and im-
ports (as measured in total trade) can be identified for Latvia, Lithuania and Slova-
kia, followed by a second group consisting of the Czech Republic and Estonia. In 
turn, the share of intra-NMS exports remains between 11 and 14 percent for Slove-
nia, Hungary and Poland. Similar pattern can be observed in imports. 
6. The dynamics of intra-NMS trade does not necessarily correspond to the previ-
ous description. In fact, all NMS have increased the share of intra-NMS exports and 
imports in their total trade. In other words, within the enlarged EU, a definitive trade 
creation occurred among the NMS 8 group and, consequently, a trade diversion from 
other markets (whether EU 15 or extra-EU markets, see more details later in this sec-
tion and Section 4.). The largest degree of orientation towards the NMS markets can 
be found in Latvia, a country that not only has the highest share of intra-NMS ex-
ports in total exports (above 30 percent), but increased the share of NMS-related ex-
ports from 17.3 to 30.2 percent in four years. In addition, high increase of NMS 
share in total exports characterises Lithuania, Hungary Estonia and Slovakia, while 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia reported lower, but still unanimous in-
crease in the share of NMS in their respective total exports. In imports, by far the 
biggest increase was registered in Slovakia, most probably not independently of the 
(belated) high economic growth and foreign direct investments that are increasingly 
relying on inputs to be imported from the neighbouring EU countries.8 
7. In a four-year period a clear export- and import-related pattern of intra-NMS 
trade had been evolving. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia first of 
all benefitted from intra-NMS trade on the export side, being the share of intra-NMS 
  
7 Although the Baltic countries over almost half a century belonged to the ex-Soviet Union, central 
planning did not allow deeply-rooted regional (Baltic) cooperation, since each ex-Soviet republic was given a 
specialization pattern considering all-Soviet and not regional (Baltic) advantages and requirements. 
8 In the last years, most politicians and economic-policy experts were focusing on how to acquire large-
scale foreign direct investments. Much less attention was given to the foreign-trade-related consequences of 
such investments, particularly additional import requirements. It is an open question, whether it is better to 
attract a large-scale investment from abroad or to build a strategy on supplying this project with high-quality 
and high value-added inputs. 
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trade much higher in their exports than in their imports. On the other side, Slovakia 
registered a more import-related linkage to intra-trade (although also its export-
related link was the second highest). Finally, the Baltic countries indicated a more 
balanced picture between intra-NMS export and import shares. (See Table 7.) 
 Table 6 
Dynamics of intra-NMS 10 trade, 2003–2006 
(Index: 2003 = 100.0) 
Country Exports Imports 
Czech Republic 196.4 212.9 
Estonia 231.1 283.6 
Latvia 331.1 252.0 
Lithuania 236.3 320.2 
Hungary 267.7 192.1 
Poland 209.3 187.3 
Slovenia 202.9 161.3 
Slovakia 198.1 242.2 
NMS 8 average 214.3 216.5 
Table 7 




2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Czech Republic  16.5  17.3  18.0  18.4  12.1  13.2  14.5  15.9 
Estonia   14.1  17.8  17.5  17.4  11.3  15.2  16.9  17.9 
Latvia  17.3  21.9  29.1  30.2  24.4  27.9  31.5  31.5 
Lithuania  19.4  21.4  22.9  25.2  11.6  18.3  18.2  20.5 
Hungary  7.5  8.7  11.0  13.0  8.1  9.1  10.0  10.7 
Poland  12.0  11.8  12.2  13.6  8.0  9.2  9.4  9.1 
Slovenia  8.5  8.8  9.3  10.5  8.3  8.9  8.9  8.6 
Slovakia  23.9  25.2  27.7  27.5  22.4  27.5  29.4  29.6 
* Total exports and total imports, respectively, 100 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat [2007]: External and intra-European Union trade. Monthly 
Statistics. No. 4.  
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Another calculation based on the share of intra-NMS trade within the increment of 
total trade in the period between 2003 and 2006 provides further interesting data. In to-
tal, new intra-NMS exports generated in the first years of membership approached 
EUR 27 billion, of which about half was accounted for by the Czech Republic and Po-
land (for more detailed data see Table S14.). Further important “contributors” were 
Hungary (18%) and Slovakia (17%), while the share of the Baltic countries (despite the 
dramatic increase of intra-NMS trade) and Slovenia remained rather modest.  
Looking at the most important bilateral flows within the intra-NMS trade, tradi-
tional economic relations, geographic proximity and the size of the respective 
economies (both as an exporter and importer) proved to be decisive. (For detailed 
figures on the share of the individual NMS in total intra-NMS exports, imports and 
turnover see Table S15. Cross-country trade flows have been summarized in Table 
S16.) As another and qualitatively new factor, the development of cross-country 
clusters mainly generated by transnational companies can be added. However, robust 
statistical evidence is still missing, even if some investment and trade flows are 
likely to support this assumption. According to the 2006 figures, there have been al-
together 14 bilateral trade flows, both in exports and in imports that exceeded the 
volume of EUR 1 billion. (See Table 8.)  
 Table 8 
Most important bilateral trade flows among the new member countries, 2006* 
Exporting country Importing country Amount (million EUR) 
Czech Republic Slovakia 6.378 
Poland Czech Republic 4.759 
Slovakia Czech Republic 4.653 
Czech Republic Poland 4.310 
Poland Hungary 2.668 
Hungary Poland 2.366 
Hungary Slovakia 2.278 
Czech Republic Hungary 2.267 
Slovakia Poland 2.057 
Hungary Czech Republic 2.039 
Slovakia Hungary 1.913 
Poland Slovakia 1.812 
Poland Lithuania 1.292 
Lithuania Latvia 1.249 
* Bilateral export/import items over EUR 1 billion. 
Source: Eurostat [2007]: External and intra-European Union trade. Monthly Statistics. No. 4.  
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Excepting two channels (Poland–Lithuania and Lithuania–Latvia, and vica 
versa), all of them have been registered among the four Visegrád countries. In turn, 
Slovenia does not appear in any of these bilateral trade flows. Based on export and 
import figures, bilateral trade can be divided into four categories. The first is repre-
sented by close trade relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia (with a 
turnover of EUR 11 billion). The second category is occupied by Czech–Polish 
trade relations (turnover above EUR 9 billion). All major bilateral trade relations of 
Hungary (as well as Polish–Slovak trade) belong to the third section with a turn-
over of EUR 4 to 5 billion with each of the Visegrád countries. Finally, the lowest 
category is represented by unilateral Polish exports to Lithuania and Lithuanian 
exports to Latvia (respective imports do not reach the limit of EUR 1 billion).  
Generally, the most important bilateral relations indicate high growth rates be-
tween 2003 and 2006 as well. Thus, the initial position was in most cases further 
strengthened by EU membership. Still, some specific developments have to be 
highlighted. First, the four-year cumulative growth of bilateral trade between the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia (87%) lagged behind the overall growth rate of intra-
NMS trade (115%). This can be explained by the initial high level of trade but also 
by the growing and successful competition by other NMS, mainly Poland and 
Hungary. This development is underlined by the fact that Hungarian exports to 
Slovakia more than trebled and also Polish exports to this country grew by 135 
percent. Also, trade between the Czech Republic and Hungary has shown above-
average growth rates both in exports and imports. Even more dynamic growth 
could be observed in Latvian exports both to Estonia and Lithuania, as well as 
Lithuanian exports to Poland. Interestingly, the growth rate of Slovenian trade re-
mained relatively modest (it only exceeded the NMS average in exports to Hun-
gary). (For details see Table S17.) Some bilateral relations, mainly characteristic of 
the smaller new member countries, remaining in the volume between EUR 500 
million and EUR 1 billion have revealed partly even higher growth rates. (See Ta-
ble S18.) 
One of the most interesting trends of intra-NMS trade can be identified in the 
development of trade balance of the member countries. Although, by far, it does 
not cover the whole trade, trade surplus and deficit positions provide some indica-
tion concerning the structure of the given economy, and to a not lesser extent, its 
competitiveness. Since intra-NMS trade is an integral part of intra-EU trade, sur-
plus and deficit positions in general, and relevant changes in these positions, in 
particular, can be considered as an indicator of changing competitiveness. Table 9 
summarizes the most important figures. 
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Table 9 
Intra-NMS trade balance of NMS 8* 
(EUR million) 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 Change 2003–2006 
Czech Republic +1548 +2123 +2415 +2125 +577 
Estonia –84 –170 –284 –534 –450 
Latvia –686 –890 –994 –1378 –692 
Lithuania +211 –228 –93 –329 –540 
Hungary –537 –550 +190 +1140 +1677 
Poland +861 +506 +1111 +2869 +2008 
Slovenia –66 –113 –10 +292 +358 
Slovakia +142 –926 –1232 –688 –830 
* Including trade with Cyprus and Malta. 
Source: See table 1 and the author’s own calculations. 
 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the figures. First, from the very 
beginning, the Czech Republic and Poland could build up strong surplus positions. 
While it remained stable for the Czech Republic, Poland could substantially increase 
its trade surplus in the last years. Second, traditional deficit countries include the 
Baltic states that raises some dilemmas (and contradictions) between high economic 
growth and international (regional) competitiveness. In other terms, the obvious dif-
ference between nominal and real convergence to the EU can be identified, at least 
based on intra-NMS trade figures. Third, Slovakia has lost its initial (slight) surplus 
position and started to accumulate heavy deficits, most probably as a consequence of 
rapid growth on one hand, but ambiguous and “one-sided” modernization on the 
other. Fourth, two countries, Hungary and Slovenia could change their original defi-
cit position into a surplus. This change was relatively smooth and small for Slovenia 
but remarkable for Hungary. Between 2003 and 2006 the Hungarian trade balance 
with the NMS improved by almost EUR 1.7 billion. It can hardly be questioned that 
this has been an important indicator of enhanced competitiveness. However, the fac-
tors of the improvement have not yet been analysed in detail. Therefore, one can only 
speculate whether the dramatic change was the result of trade liberalisation in the 
other new members so that previous protectionism affected Hungarian exports very 
adversely. Or we can see behind the positive trend, a well-designed and longer-term 
regional strategy of transnational companies functioning in Hungary. Another factor, 
mentioned by some company leaders is that Hungary is able to produce up-market 
products that find growing demand in neighbouring countries without equivalent 
quality of domestic production. Moreover, it is unknown to what extent Hungarian 
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and Hungary-located small- and medium-sized companies started to profit from EU 
membership of the Central and North Eastern European countries. Furthermore, the 
favourable impact on Hungarian exports of high growth rates in the neighbouring 
countries has not been quantified. Finally, the role of the exchange rate, i.e. the de-
valuation of the Hungarian currency against the Czech or Slovak crown or, to a 
smaller extent, the Polish zloty should also be taken into account.9 
It is not less noticeable that Hungary’s bilateral trade balance with most NMS 
countries indicated surplus in 2006, being the only exception Poland and Malta. De-
velopments between 2003 and 2006 are illustrated in Table 10. (Additional coverage 
ratios are included in Table S19.) 
Table 10 
Hungary’s trade balance with the new member countries 
(EUR million) 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Czech Republic –234 –315 +20 +270 
Estonia –8 –5 –46 +9 
Latvia +27 +40 +58 +75 
Lithuania +26 +55 +90 +124 
Poland –303 –288 –384 –206 
Slovenia +66 +144 +298 +259 
Slovakia –75 –117 +248 +629 
NMS 7 –501 –486 +284 +1.160 
Malta –47 –77 –130 –58 
Cyprus +12 +13 +36 +38 
NMS 9 –536 –550 +190 +1.140 
     
Bulgaria  + 85 +150 +241 +341 
Romania +421 +683 +839 +751 
* Based on Hungarian statistics (partly available corresponding Eurostat data indicate much lower values). 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on Eurostat: External and intra-European Union trade, vari-
ous issues and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s Monthly Report. KSH [2004]: A KSH jelenti. No. 12. 
Budapest. 
 
Figures for the first half year of 2007 seem to reconfirm both high growth rate 
and sustainability of Hungary’s surplus position in trade with the NMS. Exports in 
  
9 Figures of 2006 do not reflect the potential export-generating impact of the Hungarian stabilization 
package. Due to the (almost) stagnating domestic consumption, a higher share of production is expected to look 
for and hopefully find new markets, including those in the NMS. 
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the first half year of 2007 were almost EUR 1.5 billion higher than in the comparable 
period of 2006, while imports increased by more than EUR 1 billion. Trade surplus 
reached almost EUR 600 million with the nine countries that joined in 2004, and 
were more than doubled if Bulgaria and Romania, two new members as of January 
2007 are taken into account (EUR 1411.5 million against EUR 989 million a year 
earlier). Moreover, exports to NMS 12 (including Bulgaria and Romania) grew 
quicker than imports as compared to the first half-year figures of 2006 (31 vs. 28 
percent). Finally, exports in the first half of 2007 were 29 percent higher than im-
ports (as compared to 26 percent in the first half year of 2006). (For detailed statisti-
cal information see Table S20.) 
3. Commodity pattern of NMS 8 trade after membership 
The commodity structure of the EU 25 reflects the theoretically supported charac-
teristics of trade of an integration consisting mainly of highly developed countries (at 
least as compared to most of its trading partners). Machinery and transport equip-
ment (generally covering the overwhelming part of high-tech goods) accounts for 
more than 40 percent of total exports (and 35 percent of total imports). It also corre-
sponds to the theory that this difference disappears in intra-EU trade, being machin-
ery exports and imports (SITC 7) practically on the same level (37%). At the same 
time, the different levels of development are clearly manifested in the fact that in ex-
tra-EU exports the share of machinery exports represent a much higher share of total 
exports than in imports (44 vs. 30 percent). In addition, mainly fuel (almost a quarter 
of total extra-EU imports), raw materials and labour-intensive consumer goods ac-
count for a higher share in imports than in exports. 
At the first glance, exports by NMS 8 reveal the same commodity pattern. How-
ever, some interesting contradicting theoretical assumptions can also be identified. 
First of all it may surprise that the share of machinery and transport equipment in to-
tal, intra-EU and extra-EU exports have a higher share than both in EU 25 exports 
and in the exports of (much) more developed members of the integration (47 percent 
in total, 48 in intra- and 45 percent in extra-EU exports). Second, chemicals (SITC 5) 
amount to a lower share in case of NMS 8 as compared to EU 25. Third, and this 
seems to underline theoretical assumptions, the share of manufactured goods classi-
fied by material (SITC 6) and other consumer goods (SITC 8), predominantly con-
taining material- and labour-intensive products slightly exceeds the figures of EU 25 
(excepting the share of SITC 8 in extra-EU exports of the NMS 8). 
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Table 11 
Comparison of the commodity structure of exports by EU 25 and NMS 8 
(in percent of total exports)* 
EU 25 NMS 8 Commodity 
group Total Intra Extra Total Intra Extra 
SITC 0  5.8  6.5  3.4  5.6  5.4  6.0 
SITC 1  1.3  1.1  1.6  0.6   0.5  0.9 
SITC 2  2.6  2.7  2.2  2.8  3.0  2.1 
SITC 3  5.8  6.1  4.6  4.6  4.5  5.1 
SITC 4  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1 
SITC 5  15.0 13.8  15.8  7.2  6.0  11.4 
SITC 6  16.0 16.7  14.4  19.5 19.6  19.2 
SITC 7  40.6 36.7  43.8  47.3 48.0  44.8 
SITC 8  10.8 10.6  11.3  11.6 12.1  9.7 
* Deviations from 100 due to omission of SITC 9 and eventual roundings. 
Source: Table 1 and the author’s own calculations. 
 
A comparison of the import structure of EU 25 and NMS 8 reflects the moderni-
zation efforts of the latter, since the share of machinery in total imports amounts to 
40 percent (EU 25 35 percent). Similarly, manufactured products classified by mate-
rial, a major input to industrial production and exports has a higher share (19 vs. 16 
percent). In turn, the share of consumer goods, chemicals and energy are somewhat, 
but not significantly lower. Intra- and extra-EU trade pattern indicates features re-
flected in total trade pattern. Machinery exports of NMS 8 represent always a higher 
share than for EU 25. The higher share of SITC 6 in intra-EU imports of NMS 8 and 
the lower share of the same group in extra-EU imports of the group as compared to 
EU 25 means that the new members in their imports of manufactured goods over-
whelmingly rely on intra-EU deliveries. Another smaller difference can be found in 
the underrepresentation of agricultural goods (SITC 0) in NMS 8 trade on each of the 
three levels (1. total, 2. intra, 3. extra). This is obviously the consequence of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the main (exporting) beneficiaries of which are among 
the old member countries. Detailed figures have been collected in Tables 11 and 12. 
(Additional statistics in value terms have been attached on the overall commodity 
pattern of exports and imports of the EU 25 and the NMS 8 group in Tables S21., 
S22. and S23.) 
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Table 12 
Comparison of the commodity structure of imports by EU 25 and NMS 8 
(in percent of total imports)* 
EU 25 NMS 8 Commodity 
group Total Intra Extra Total Intra Extra 
SITC 0  6.1  7.0  4.5  4.7  5.3  2.9 
SITC 1  0.9  1.2  0.4  0.7  0.7  0.4 
SITC 2  3.5  3.1  4.2  2.9  2.2  4.8 
SITC 3  13.4  6.9  24.7  11.6  4.1  31.9 
SITC 4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.2 
SITC 5  12.6  15.3  8.0  11.1  13.3  5.2 
SITC 6  14.7  16.2  12.0  18.8  21.8  10.6 
SITC 7  34.6  37.4  29.7  39.6  42.2  32.4 
SITC 8  11.3  9.7  13.9  9.3  9.6  8.4 
* Deviations from 100 due to omission of SITC 9 and eventual roundings.  
Source: Table 1 and the author’s own calculations. 
 
Overall figures, however, hide substantial differences among the individual coun-
tries. Similar to the old members, the new members also have different groups of 
countries once the survey goes more into country-specific details. The pattern of ex-
ports in general, but the rather different share of machinery in particular sheds light 
on different levels of development, different technology content and different types 
(stages) of involvement into the global division of labour driven by transnational 
companies. Taking total exports of the NMS 8, and based on the share of machinery 
in total exports, at least four groups can be identified. The first and most developed 
category is represented by Hungary, with machinery exports reaching 62 percent of 
total exports. The second group includes the Czech Republic (53%) and Slovakia 
(48.5%). To the third group belong Poland (40.2%) and Slovenia (38.0%), although 
with rather different “fine structures”. Finally, the bottom line is represented by the 
Baltic countries (between 16.6 percent for Latvia and 30.9 percent for Estonia). Al-
most similar categorisation can be made in intra- and extra-exports.10 Table 13 pro-
vides basic information that will not be further elaborated here in detail. (For more 
information on overall and intra-NMS commodity structure of the new members 
consult Tables S24. and S25., as well as Tables S26. and S27., respectively.) Here, 
just some important differences will shortly be highlighted. 
  
10 In intra-exports of machinery Estonia would rather belong to the third group, together with Poland and 
Slovenia, while in extra-EU exports of machinery the figure for the Czech Republic approaches the 
corresponding figure for Hungary. 
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Table 13 
Commodity pattern of NMS exports 
(percent, total exports = 100.0)* 
Country SITC 0+1 SITC 2+4 SITC 3 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 

































































































































































































































































        
* Deviations from 100 due to the omission of SITC 9 
Note. One-digit SITC classification. 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat [2007]: External and intra-European Union trade. 
Monthly Bulletin. No. 4. 
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Firstly, agricultural exports occupy a substantial share of total, intra- and extra-
EU exports in Latvia and Lithuania. Secondly, exports of raw materials seem to be 
important items mainly for Latvia (almost a quarter of total exports to the EU) and 
Estonia. Energy exports are the most important single item in the commodity pattern 
of Lithuania as well as in extra-EU exports of Estonia. Thirdly, exports of chemicals 
represent a stout share in extra-EU exports of Slovenia. Fourthly, Hungary (and 
Lithuania) indicate strong deviation from the general pattern of NMS 8 concerning 
the share of manufactured goods classified by materials. The much lower share 
seems to indicate much less material-intensive production and export structures. 
Fifthly, final manufactured goods (mainly labour-intensive products) have a similarly 
clear underrepresentation in Hungarian and Slovakian exports. 
Furthermore, Table 13 provides interesting information on the differences in the 
commodity pattern of intra-EU and extra-EU exports. However, for a more detailed 
and unbiased analysis further statistical figures are required that can be found in the 
share of the EU in total exports of the respective commodity groups. (See Table 14.) 
Table 14 
Share of intra-EU and extra-EU exports by NMS 8, classified into one-digit SITC categories, 2006 
(percent) 
Country SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 3 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 Total 
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(Continuation.) 
Country SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 3 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 Total 



























































































    
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat [2007]: External and intra-European Union trade. 
Monthly Statistics. No. 4.  
 
Similar to the EU-orientation of total exports, almost all one-digit commodity 
group exports indicate a strongly integration-focusing structure. Considering the 
most important product groups, only a few deviations from the general rule can be 
observed. More than half of Slovenia’s chemical exports and Lithuania’s machinery 
exports are directed towards extra-EU markets. Moreover, Estonian (and Hungarian) 
energy exports are extra-EU-focused. Taking NMS 8 average figures, exports have a 
particularly heavy concentration on EU markets in raw materials, final consumer 
goods, machinery and also other manufactured products (all of them reveal higher 
shares than the average intra-EU share of 77.6 percent). It may also be noted that 
Hungarian agricultural exports indicate a relatively strong extra-EU orientation (33 
percent as compared to a 26 percent share of extra-EU exports in total exports). The 
fundamental task of this section and the tables included was to analyse differences 
and similarities in the export structure of NMS, because it calls attention not only to 
structural differences but also to the factors of competitiveness and, consequently, to 
the sustainability of current processes. Of course, import structures are also influenc-
ing this process but to a less intensive and manifest way. Therefore, corresponding 
import statistics have been included into the internet Supplement. (See Tables S28. 
and S29.). In the same way, a more detailed list of the main double-digit commodity 
groups in total, intra- and extra-EU exports by the individual new member countries 
in 2006 (based on a threshold of EUR 1 billion for each double-digit group) has been 
attached to the Supplement. (See Table S30.) 
Statistical figures on under- and overrepresentation of the NMS 8 exports, as 
compared to the corresponding EU 25 shares in different one-digit commodity 
groups have been summarized in Table 15. 
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 Table 15 
Share of NMS 8 in EU 25 exports by main one-digit commodity groups* 
Commodity group In total EU 25 exports In total intra-EU  exports 
In total extra-EU  
exports 
SITC 0  7.9  7.5  9.9 
SITC 3  6.6  6.6  6.4 
SITC 5  4.0  3.9  4.1 
SITC 6  10.1  11.2  7.5 
SITC 7  9.6  11.7  5.8 
SITC 8  8.8  11.0  4.8 
SITC 0–9 (total average)  8.3  9.5  5.6 
* Total exports being always 100.0. 
Source: Table 1 and the author’s own calculations. 
 
The most important message of the figures is that the exports of the new member 
countries have a clear specialisation on manufactured goods. More importantly, they 
are clearly specialised on machinery exports in intra-EU exports (followed by spe-
cialisation on other manufactured goods as well). In contrast, they are underspecial-
ised in agricultural exports. In contrast, extra-EU exports reveal the highest speciali-
sation in agricultural products and in material-intensive manufactures. Machinery 
exports are only slightly “overrepresented”, while there is a “negative specialisation” 
on final consumer goods. (Country-specific details can be found in Table S31.) 
Finally, the trade balance by major commodity groups deserves attention. (See 
Table 16.) Again, some countries strongly challenge the theoretical background, 
since the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have substantial surplus in their to-
tal and intra-EU trade of machinery and transport equipment. While, however, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia show positive balance of machinery trade both in intra- 
and extra-EU relations, Hungary’s large intra-EU surplus is accompanied by deficit 
in extra-EU machinery trade. This is not necessarily lacking competitiveness in ex-
tra-EU markets but a different micro-level structure of this sector in Hungary that 
underlines the intensity of global involvement of machinery-producing companies 
located in Hungary (and the consideration of locational advantages of Hungary not 
only in the European but in the global context). In contrast to Central European new 
members, high deficits in machinery trade characterise all Baltic countries. From the 
many interesting aspects the figures offer for deeper analysis, one more only has to 
be highlighted here. Looking at the agricultural trade of the new members, Poland, 
Hungary and Lithuania register surplus, while the other countries report deficit. This 
deficit is mainly or completely due to agricultural trade with EU countries and the 
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comparative advantage of the old members in this area, either due to the unilaterally 
beneficial impacts of the Common Agricultural Policy or to the different structures 
of agriculture (and the marketing organizations dealing with food products). In extra-
EU agricultural trade all new members, excepting Slovenia, have a surplus (by far 
the highest surplus registered by Hungary). Hungarian figures refute the frequently 
expressed but mistaken view that following membership Hungary stopped to be a net 
agricultural exporter. Certainly, the traditional trade surplus with the EU countries 
had been declining in recent years (to EUR 152 million surplus in 2006), but surplus 
with extra-EU partners is substantial (and most probably enjoy the export-subsidy 
mechanism of the Common Agricultural Policy). 
Table 16 
Trade balance of total, intra-EU and extra-EU trade of NMS*, 2006 
(EUR million) 
Country SITC 0 SITC 3 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 Total SITC0-9 
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(Continuation.) 
Country SITC 0 SITC 3 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 Total SITC0-9 

































































        
* According to selected one-digit SITC commodity groups. 
Note. For corresponding coverage ratios see Table S31. 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat [2007]: External and intra-European Union trade. 
Monthly Statistics. No 4. 
4. Trade diversion – trade creation.  
Summary figures and conclusions 
Following the description and analysis of intra-NMS trade features as well as some 
structural characteristics of the commodity pattern of exports (and partly imports), in 
the last part I return to the “mainstream” issue. How did the geographic orientation of 
NMS trade change as a result of the three years of membership in the EU?  
In order to consider major geographic proportions and, at the same time, to call 
attention to the changes occurred, figures have been placed in two tables. Table 17 
summarizes the share of intra- and extra-trade (with special reference to trade among 
the NMS, as part of EU trade), while Table 18 offers a dynamic picture by illustrat-
ing the percentage changes in trade orientation between 2003 and 2006. (For more 
detailed figures see Tables S32. and S33.) 
Contrary to trade creation theories of regional integrations, the share of NMS 8 
exports to the EU 25 in total exports was falling between 2003 and 2006. The aver-
age fall by 3.6 percentage points does not truly reflect the rather heterogeneous de-
velopments in the respective new member countries. Namely, a very dramatic reori-
entation of exports to extra-EU markets took place in Estonia (16.8 percentage 
points), but also in Hungary (7.1 percentage points) and Latvia (7.3 percentage 
points). Much more modest export reorientation to non-EU markets characterised 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In turn, two countries, Lithuania and Slo-
vakia slightly increased the share of EU 25 in their total exports. 
TRENDS IN EXTERNAL TRADE 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 11 
71 
Table 17 
Main geographic areas of NMS trade, 2003–2006 
(percent, being total exports and imports, respectively, 100.0) 
Exports Imports 
Country Geographic area 
2003 2006 2003 2006 
      



















































































































































































      
Note. Intra-EU is equivalent to EU 25, while extra-EU includes all countries outside EU 25 (in conformity 
with the number of EU members as of the end of 2006). 
Source: Table 1 and the author’s own calculations. 
ANDRÁS INOTAI 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 11 
72 
 Table 18 
Shifts in the trade orientation of NMS, 2003–2006 
(changes in percentage points) 
Country Exports Imports 
   














































































































    
Source: Table 1 and the author’s own calculations. 
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Even more interesting is the composition of export-share changes if we take into 
account the old EU 15 and intra-NMS trade separately. Since intra-NMS exports in-
creased their share in total exports in all NMS, logically, the share of exports to EU 
15 had to experience an even sharper decline than the previously mentioned average 
figures. Intra-NMS exports produced a particularly important increase in Latvia (12.9 
percentage points), but also in Lithuania (5.8 percentage points) and Hungary (5.5 
percentage points). As a result, EU 15 shares dropped dramatically in two Baltic 
countries (Estonia and Latvia, both with a percentage decline of more than 20 per-
cent) and in Hungary (12.6%). The main beneficiaries of this structural reorientation 
of exports were both new member countries and extra-EU partners. In case of Esto-
nia but evidently in Hungary too, the main driving force consisted in extra-EU orien-
tation of exports (although in Hungary NMS exports also played an important role). 
In other countries, higher NMS shares of exports could only partly compensate for 
the loss of EU 15 shares (excepting Slovakia). 
In this context, some key strategic questions emerge that affect both structural 
characteristics and the assessment of overall international competitiveness of the in-
dividual NMS. To be sure, the rapidly growing non-EU orientation is a clear sign of 
enhanced global competitiveness (particularly, and rejecting widespread negative 
views, in the case of Hungary). Excepting, of course, the case if export reorientation 
takes place towards less competitive, protected and, at the end of the day, captive 
markets (in this context, the Estonian case needs further analysis). Moreover, reori-
entation of exports towards NMS markets can mostly be explained by the immediate 
lifting of protectionist barriers as of May 01, 2004, as well as the regional strategies 
of leading transnational companies located in selected NMS countries. 
In contrast to exports, trade-creation theory could be verified by the develop-
ments in the geographic orientation of imports after membership. In total NMS 8 im-
ports the share of the EU 25 grew by 4.5 percentage points. Much higher intra-EU 
orientation (at the same time, lower level of global resource seeking) can be identi-
fied in the case of the Czech Republic but also in two Baltic countries (Estonia and 
Lithuania). However, there is a big difference even in this case since the Czech ori-
entation towards the EU 25 was largely driven by the growing share of EU 15 im-
ports, while the Baltic countries (including Latvia) have achieved higher EU 25 
shares due to much stouter shares of intra-NMS imports exclusively (look at the 
similar and not less interesting figures for Slovakia). Since the three small Baltic 
countries’ intra-NMS trade is heavily concentrated on this trilateral flow, and the 
presence of large transnational companies is limited as compared to Hungary or the 
Czech Republic, intra-Baltic trade may easily turn out to be focused on “captive” and 
small markets. At least, growing regional-market orientation cannot be linked to 
stronger EU 15 orientation as an indicator of European (or global) competitiveness. 
In the most developed, increasingly competitive and structurally diversified Central 
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European countries both EU 15 and NMS shares were growing during the observed 
period (strongly in the Czech Republic and moderately in Hungary, Poland and Slo-
venia). 
This paper tried to look at one of the most evident areas of the accession of 2004. 
First consequences on the geographic orientation and structure of trade can already 
be detected. Although they do not tell the full story, but can and should be used as 
important indicators (proxies) to explain the pattern of economic growth (high 
growth rates in themselves do not throw light on structure and sustainability), mezo- 
and micro-structural developments and, last but not least, competitiveness of the in-
dividual countries. In this context, the Hungarian performance should be assessed not 
only because of a number of misleading and superficial views but, more importantly, 
because only such an objective basis can support medium- and longer-term eco-
nomic-strategy decisions. 
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Recent research on poverty and social exclusion in 
Hungary concluded that despite the economic growth of 
the last couple of years (more than 3 percent annually), 
large disparities in the living conditions of society have 
not been eliminated and the most vulnerable groups 
seem not to have been reached by the benefits of 
growth. Although most recent data provide some evi-
dence that the process of impoverishment may have 
eased to some extent, caution is still required before 
drawing straightforward conclusions for a longer run, 
since the chronic poverty is still stagnant. Data from 
various sources (TÁRKI Social Research Inc. and the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office) show that the pro-
portion of the poor has remained consistently in the 
range of 10-13 percent since 1997 (calculating with the 
most widely used poverty thresholds, i.e. with 50 and 60 
percent of median income). It is evident that labour-
market problems constitute an important source of pov-
erty and social exclusion. Although unemployment in 
Hungary does not stand at a particularly high level 
(around 7.5 percent), the share of those who are in 
working age but inactive, is still very high (more than 40 
percent). It is clear that future economic prospects will 
heavily influence not only the labour market, but also 
the scope of manoeuvre for social policy. Although cur-
rently it seems that the EU policies have an impact on 
shaping this policy, it remains to be seen to what an ex-
tent its influence could be translated into concrete ac-
tions, and whether they could be efficient enough to 
change the current situation to a considerable extent. 
 
TÁRGYSZÓ: Social statistics.  
Poverty and social deprivation. 
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Although in Hungary the economic growth resumed in the late 1990s after the 
deep “transformational” recession of the early 1990s, there are still considerable 
disparities in living conditions, and the consequences of the massive impoverishment 
during the recession remain apparent. Poverty has been deepening and persisting 
during the period of economic transformation. Although the most recent data provide 
some evidence that the process of impoverishment may have eased to some extent, 
caution is still required before drawing straightforward conclusions for a longer run, 
since chronic poverty is still stagnant. Calculating with the most widely used poverty 
thresholds (50 and 60 percent of median income), data from various sources (TÁRKI 
Social Research Inc. and Hungarian Central Statistical Office – HCSO) show that the 
proportion of the poor has remained consistently in the range of 10-13 percent since 
1997. 
Especially in the light of economic growth of the late 1990s, standing at an 
annual average at around 5 percent between 1997 and 2000, these trends are 
astonishing. What does explain the fact that economic recovery has failed to improve 
the income situation of many people, who may indeed have fallen irrevocably 
behind?  
The “transformational” recession was very deep: until the mid-1990s GDP fell by 
about 20 percent. It had far-reaching consequences not only for the economic 
structure as such, but also to the sphere of social welfare. The crisis narrowed 
considerably the scope for manoeuvre in fiscal and social policy. But the shortage of 
adequate financial resources is obviously only part of the explanation. It is still, 
however, a relevant question why a comprehensive strategy for social policy, 
encompassing a system of supports for the poor, has not been set up. 
Within this context, it seems justified to ask whether poverty was a matter of 
political concern at all. It seems that this issue has not been among the top priorities 
of successive governments (Ferge [2001]). Obviously, one reason for this is of an 
ideological nature. It roots in the neo-liberal ideology that gained ground after the 
political changes, according to which an efficient market economy requires the state 
to play only a minimal role.1 This is reflected, among other things, in the legislation 
  
1 Its acceptance was also strongly supported by the World Bank, which played an influential role in shaping 
not only the economic but social policy too. As pointed out by Ferge–Juhász [2004] p. 234. the main elements 
of the Washington consensus included “strengthening of individual responsibility,… the emphasis on targeted 
assistance of the truly needy”, the shift from social insurance to private one, and “the abolition of universal 
benefit as wasteful”. It was in the austerity measures of 1995 (named after the finance minister at that time 
’Bokros package’), where this philosophy was most directly and visibly seen. For example, at that time the 
universal family allowance was abolished (later reestablished).  
SOCIAL-POLICY DILEMMAS IN HUNGARY 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 11 
77 
on social provisions adopted in 1993, which assigned increasing responsibility to 
local government, parallel with a withdrawal by the central state. As a result, 
successive governments have expected local-government authorities to alleviate 
poverty at a local level, although their inadequate institutional, financial and human 
resources have left them ill-equipped to carry out the responsibilities stipulated in the 
legal regulations.  
Another factor contributing to the negligence of the issue of social exclusion has 
been increasing competition for funding from a dwindling quantity of state funds, 
which has tended to prevent attention focusing on deprived people, even the ones 
most in need. (The weak position of the “losers” makes it almost impossible for their 
voices to be heard (Szalai [1999]). 
After three years of the Hungarian EU membership, the role of the EU in 
influencing social policy of the new members seems also relevant. If the accession 
process itself is considered, “the ideals and practices related to the European Social 
Model paid an unduly modest role in shaping CEE social policy during the 
enlargement” (Ferge–Juhász [2004] p. 234.) This is connected with the fact that 
social policy in the EU remained a subsidiary area, especially up to the late 1990s. In 
these days, however, the fight against social exclusion and poverty has become high 
on the agenda, especially since 2001. From then on, the member states had to prepare 
their own national action plans in order to translate the most important EU 
requirements into national practice. (In 2002 the 10 candidate countries prepared a 
“Joint Inclusion Memorandum” on this topic, which served as a basis for their 
national action plans, devised after their accession, in 2004.) In addition, the EU 
decision, taken in December 2001, to measure poverty and social exclusion on a 
permanent basis could also exert an indirect pressure on improving the effectiveness 
of social policies in all the members of the European Union. With the help of the 18 
Laeken indicators, it will become not only possible to measure poverty and make 
cross-country comparisons, but with these tools the countries are able to analyse and 
monitor the progress they achieved within a certain period of time. Some of the 
results for Hungary are to be described in the following.  
This paper is to deal with those social policy dilemmas which the country should 
face, especially as a member of the European Union. It outlines briefly the trends and 
the extent of poverty situation in Hungary as well as its main features. Therefore, the 
first section gives a general overview on the main economic and employment trends 
since the early 1990s; the second describes trends in poverty, based on macro-data 
and the results of some recent surveys. The third section is to be concerned with the 
frameworks provided by the European Union, and within this context the general 
strategy of Hungarian social policy. This section is also to deal with the current 
dilemmas and future perspectives of Hungarian social policy, with special regard to 
some of the problems of the social-assistance system. 
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1. Main economic and employment trends  
In terms of GDP growth, the most recent period since 1990, known as the period 
of economic transformation, can be divided into four phases, as Figure 1 shows. The 
first (1990–1993) brought the collapse of the state-socialist economy and an 
aggregate GDP decrease of more than 18 percent. In the second (1994–1996), the 
recession gave way to a modest rate of expansion: aggregate GDP growth of 5.8 per-
cent, which was equivalent to an annual average of almost 2 percent. In the third 
phase (1997–2000), the annual average growth was almost 5 percent, which can be 
regarded as outstanding compared with the historical performance of the Hungarian 
economy and with the performance of EU members and other Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries at the time. The fourth phase, which began in 2001 and 
seems to be persisting in 2007, has seen a deceleration of growth.  
















































Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO). www.ksh.hu 
 
As regards labour-market performance, it followed more or less the trend of GDP 
with a slight time lag. (See Figure 2.) This is reflected especially in the employment 
figures although it has to be noted that the employment level, even when it recovered 
slightly in the late 1990s, has never approached that of the year 1990. (This is 
understandable since full employment has been given up and high inactivity 
characterises the Hungarian labour market). Of course, unemployment shows an 
opposite trend to employment, but its peak was reached earlier (in 1993) than the 
nadir in employment (around 1995–1996). The reason for this disparity is assumed to 
lie mainly in the tighter eligibility conditions for unemployment benefit, which were 
Real GDP growth 
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introduced already in 1992, when the rapid increase in unemployment put strong 
pressure on government spending. The entitlement period was cut initially from two 
years to 18 months and then in late 1992 to one year, which caused large falls in 
registration. In addition, the ratio of benefit to last wage was reduced. So the more 
restrictive system offered less incentive for the unemployed to register. 
Figure 2. Trends in employment and unemployment, 1990–2006 
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Source: HCSO, Budapest. www.ksh.hu 
 
As Figure 2 shows, the fall in the number of unemployed continued towards the 
end of the 1990s. An undoubted contribution to the impressive improvements in the 
unemployment figures came from a further cut in the entitlement period for 
unemployment benefit in 2000, to only nine months. Since 2001, however, 
employment seems to stagnate and slightly increase (from 2003), but unemployment 
increased, from 2004 by more than 1 percentage point.  
When examining the labour market, it should be emphasised that growing 
imbalances led not only to unemployment, but also to a sharp fall in the population’s 
participation rate in economic activity at the beginning of the transition. The CEE 
countries, including Hungary, in the state-socialist period had participation levels far 
higher than those in the developed market economies. In the case of Hungary, 
participation has fallen to an even lower level than in the “old” members of the EU,2 
  
2 The big fall in women’s activity also contributed to this, which has been greater than men’s, leading 
largely to the decreasing total participation mentioned already. One of the main reasons is that women faced 
with the difficulty of finding a job were more inclined to choose early-retirement schemes as a preferred way of 
withdrawing from the labour market: several hundred thousand took early retirement or simply became 
housewives. (Partly as a result of changed value judgments about women’s role in the society, shown by a 
survey carried out during the 1990s (see Tóth [2000]). The fact that the retirement age used to be low under the 
planned economy (55 years for women, 60 years for men) contributed to the widespread use of these schemes. 
(Data also reflect these developments: the gender gap is the largest in the activity rate of the 55–59 age group, 
where it stands at 45.9 per cent for men and only 16.6 per cent for women.) 
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being at about 60 percent, whereas the average of the EU 15 is around 69 percent. 
This happened due to some measures against unemployment and also because a 
massive number of people voluntarily withdrew from the labour market. Examples of 
the former are “soft” methods of laying off workers, widespread resort to pre-
retirement and early-retirement schemes and to disability pensions, especially in the 
first half of the last decade. Since the beginning of transition, it has also been a 
conscious policy to admit more students into higher education by giving them more 
places, financed by the state budget, and this tendency was reinforced by the 
emerging new private colleges and universities. (By reducing the available labour 
supply, this also contributed to a decline in the participation rate). 
In 2007, however, not only do direct measures against unemployment affect 
adversely the participation rate, but other factors, as well. The poor performance is 
derived partly from the particularly low employment rate of the older population. 
This feature does not apply only to Hungary. In the “new” EU members of the region 
the average employment rate of the 55–64-year-old age group is lower than in the 
“old” EU members. (For example, in 2002, among males, the employment rate stood 
at around only 36 percent in Hungary, 41 percent in the new members, whereas it 
was 50 percent in the old members.) (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/) Reasons for 
this lie not only in some inherited institutional effects, like the lower retirement age, 
which featured all these countries during the planned economy but also in other 
factors (see Footnote 2). One of the most important out of these is the poor health 
status of the population. It seems especially true for Hungary, where until very 
recently the average life expectancy at birth stood at a low level even by East-
European standard. Under these circumstances, it can be even concluded that to some 
extent the low retirement age may be justified. The fact that employment rate of this 
age group is still low even when the retirement age was raised3 in itself indicates that 
there should be reasons other than just institutional, or problems of inheritance. In 
Hungary the very low figure is obviously due to labour market reasons too, namely 
to the sluggish demand towards older people. (Indeed, examining wages, a 
Hungarian labour economist (Köllő [2002]) proved that during the 1990s on the 
labour market in Hungary the accumulated experiences seemed to have been 
devalued against such “skills” as adaptability and flexibility, generally featuring the 
competencies of young people). As a response, disability-pension schemes became 
widespread: for example, among males even in the younger age group (50–55) 
  
3 The process of increasing the retirement age began in 1997 when it was decided that it would have been 
raised on a gradual basis to 62 years by 2009 for both males and females. Women’s retirement age stood at a 
low level of 55 in 1997, so its increase started already then by elevating the retirement age by one year in every 
two years from then on. In the case of men, however, the increase began later, in the year of 2000, since their 
retirement age stood at a higher initial level of 60 years. (As a result, their retirement age has already reached 
the targeted 62 years.) 
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around 20 percent are in such pension, and in the next age group this share is even 
higher (being 27 percent) (KSH [2004]).  
The process of economic transition from a planned to a market economy had 
catastrophic consequences especially for the Roma people, the largest ethnic 
minority in the country (their share is about 5-6 percent of the population) (Fóti 
[2003]). These effects are most apparent in the labour market. The industrialization 
process that took place under the planned economy facilitated the integration of Ro-
ma into a modern, industrial society, although their inclusion remained unstable even 
at that time, mainly because it occurred with some delay compared to the majority, 
and due to the discrimination against the Roma population. This meant that they 
stayed at the bottom end of the labour market, which made them vulnerable to any 
kind of changes there. Predictably, therefore, Roma were among the first to become 
unemployed in the late 1980s, when the first signs of economic crisis appeared, 
before the transition from a planned to a market economy. Most of those who lost 
their jobs found themselves unable to re-enter the labour market, and most of those 
who managed to nonetheless lost their chances of permanent employment (Fóti 
[2002]). These trends are clearly reflected in the data available. Representative 
surveys of the Roma show that between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s their 
employment rate dropped from 75 to 30 percent. A survey in the mid-1990s also 
indicated that Roma employment had characteristically high inflow and outflow rates 
and “an employment pattern – familiar from the Third World – of unstable 
employment and short employment spells emerging” (Kertesi [2002] p. 25.). 
Despite the low unemployment figures a massive number of Hungarians do not 
have a job. Besides the aforementioned facts, it is explained also by high economic 
disparities across regions, small areas and different types of settlements. Labour 
mobility is low (due to various reasons, such as for example underdeveloped road 
network, high petrol prices, inadequate housing market, etc.), so the unemployment 
differentials across regions, emerged in the early 1990s, remained stubbornly large. 
The eastern part of the country and remote villages are especially adversely affected by 
the high regional economic disparities. (At the same time in some Western regions 
labour shortages can be observed.) It seems that absence from the labour market 
constitutes one of the most important risk factors in the incidence of poverty. 
2. Overview on trends, extent and some features of poverty 
In light of the mentioned economic and labour-market developments, it is not 
surprising that inequalities have widened further between the highest and lowest 
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income groups during the period of the late 1980s until the mid-1990s. The 
difference in average income between those in the uppermost and lowermost income 
deciles widened from 4.6fold in 1987 to 7.5fold in 1995. Rising income inequalities 
have certainly contributed to impoverishment and increase especially in income 
poverty over this period. Since then, obviously as a result of the economic growth of 
the late 1990s, the income inequalities have been stagnating. In 2004 the difference 
was estimated to stand at 7.6 (KSH [2007]). 
As can be seen from Figure 3 and mentioned in the introduction, the proportion of 
the population living in income poverty stood at about 10 percent at the turn of the 
new millennium.4 There was a continuous rise up to 1996 and some fluctuations 
since then (but rather an increase can be observed from the level of 9.2 percent in 
1996). According to Havasi [2003] the fluctuations are connected with the stop-go 
policies of successive governments. She pointed out that “government measures 
affecting the system of social provisions have not rested on a uniform, consensus-
based welfare-policy concept. Instead, successive governments devise their policy on 
poverty according to altering values and interests, with restricted budgetary scope for 
its implementation” (Havasi [2003] p. 64.). The latter is reflected in a decrease of 30-
40 percent in real value of social provisions and services between 1989 and 1998. 
Since then they have been stagnating. The exception is the election year of 2002, 
when some improvement could be observed (Ferge–Juhász [2004]). 
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Source: Kapitány–Sépder [2004]. 
  
4 It is calculated as 60 percent of median income (using the OECD 1 equivalence scale). 
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A more recent survey of Kapitány–Spéder [2004], carried out in 2001/2002, 
estimates the poverty rate (based on income poverty5) to more than 11 percent, so in 
order of magnitude it does not differ very much from the Household Budget Survey 
(Havasi [2003]) although the authors emphasise that the results of the two surveys 
cannot be compared not only due to the entirely different methods applied, but also 
to considerable disparities in the sample. Other (income) data also confirm that the 
poverty rate in Hungary stands at around 10 percent (TÁRKI data, quoted by Bass–
Ferge–Márton [2003]), and more recent figures for the years of 2002/2003 show a 
similar level: 10.9 percent (though this was calculated with just 50 percent of the 
median income based on per capita income, and cannot be compared with previous 
data (see Szivós–Tóth [2004]). According to Ferge et al. [2002], the rate increased 
from 10 percent to 15 percent between 1990 and 2001. The poverty threshold in this 
case was 50 per cent of the average income.  
Most recent data also show similar order of magnitude: according to the 
Household Monitor Survey, carried out by TÁRKI (Szivós–Tóth [2004]), it stood at 
12 percent in 2005, whereas another survey (KSH [2007c]), conducted within the 
framework of the EU-SILC programme (“Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions”) in 2004 it was 13.4 percent. (Although the two surveys were based on 
similar methodology, with poverty threshold calculated as 60 percent of median 
income, and using OECD2 equivalence scale,6 they could hardly be compared 
directly due to other differences.  
The concept and definition of poverty is subject of many debates. The notion of 
poverty is most often associated only with income poverty. In Hungary, however, there 
are long traditions of approaching poverty from the “needs” side.7 One of the problems 
with measuring it only with income is that those data are not very reliable. This is the 
reason why usually other dimensions are also included and compared with each other, 
even within one survey in order to gauge its extent. One of these dimensions is the so-
called “subjective poverty threshold”, i.e. people are asked to estimate their own income 
situation. According to this definition, the poor are those who class themselves as such. 
  
5 The threshold is defined as 50 percent of the average income per consumption unit (using a 0.73 
equivalence scale) (Kapitány–Spéder [2004]). 
6 When analysing income positions of people, it is the household which can be chosen as a relevant unit, 
but in order to compare their positions, their size and composition, i.e. consumption needs of the individual 
members of households should also be considered. This could be done with the help of the equivalence scales. 
The OECD constructed two. According to OECD1, the following values are set: 1 to the first adult, 0.7 to 
further adults and 0.5 to children (aged 0–14). In OECD2 the respective values are: 1, 0.5 and 0.3. Apparently, 
the applied equivalence scale has an impact on the results. As Éltető and Havasi [2002] have shown on the 
example of the Hungarian Household Budget Survey of 2000, the income inequality is wider when the OECD1 
is applied, than using the OECD2. The authors elaborated a special Hungarian equivalence scale which they 
found more appropriate under the specific Hungarian conditions than the OECD scales (especially the OECD2). 
7 On the traditions of poverty measurements in Hungary and on poverty measurement with various poverty 
thresholds see details in Havasi [2003]. 
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Based on this definition, the Household Budget Survey (Havasi [2003]) found that 6.5 
percent of households (240 000 households), almost 2 million people (less than 20 
percent) can be regarded as poor. It is remarkable that most other surveys found 
similar results, i.e. about 20 percent.8 (The exception is one survey, commissioned by 
the ILO and the French government, which showed double of the usual 20 percent, 
but this had been designed to focus specifically on poor people since one of the 
sample-selection criteria of the survey was low income which was equivalent with 
the income of the poorest third of the population, identified by another survey 
(Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002]). 
Not only is the extent of poverty a cause for concern in Hungary, but also its 
depth. There have been some fluctuations in its indicator (poverty gap) since the 
second half of the 1990s. The Household Budget Survey (HBS) (Havasi [2003]) 
carried out by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), showed even an 
increase during this period. In order to obtain an approximate picture about its trend, 
it is worthwhile to present the results of both the HBS and Household Panel, as well 
as Household Monitor surveys. In HCSO Household Budget Surveys (Havasi 
[2003]) poverty gap was 16.8 percent in 1997; 19.5 percent in 1998; 22.6 percent in 
1999 and 21.7 percent in 2000 calculated as 60 percent of median income (using the 
OECD 1 equivalence scale). Meanwhile in TÁRKI Hungarian Household Panel and 
Household Monitor surveys (Szivós–Tóth [2006]) poverty gap was measured 16.8 
percent in 1996; 19.1 percent in 2000; 18.9 percent in 2003 and 22.0 percent in 2005 
calculated as 60 percent of median income, using the OECD 2 equivalence scale. 
As can be seen, despite the meaningful economic growth of the late 1990s, 
there seems to be even some increasing trend. Although another recent survey 
(EU-SILC) (KSH [2007c]) shows that in 2004 the poverty gap stood at 18.8 per-
cent, the preliminary data of 2005 suggest an increase.9 In Hungary it is well 
known that there is a group of poor people who are cut off from the labour market 
and deprived in many respects.10 In order to avoid reproduction of such a group, 
their social inclusion is of vital importance, meaning a real challenge for social 
policy. One of the key prerequisites to devise adequate policy measures is to know 
more about this group, its size and main characteristics. The data have 
continuously shown that poverty risk is especially high among children, i.e. in the 
lowest age group (0–15 years). Similarly to the previous years, in 2004 for 
  
8 As Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002] made it clear the results were very similar in various separate research 
projects.  
9 Data was calculated with the same method as by TÁRKI, i.e. 60 percent of the median income, using the 
OECD 2 equivalence scale. 
10 According to an estimate, between 1992 and 1997 about 6.1 percent of the population lived continuously 
in poverty, below 50 percent of the average income for four or more years (based on TÁRKI data 2002, quoted 
by Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002]). 
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example, their risk exceeded the national average by 46 percent. If household types 
are considered, poverty rates of single-parent and large families (with three or mo-
re children) stand also higher than the national poverty rate: 38.9 percent and 33.2 
percent as against 13 percent (KSH [2007c]). So apart from the labour-market 
position of the head of the household, the number of children and the household 
type are all decisive factors in determining whether a family falls below the 
poverty threshold. Researchers have long been warning of the particularly harmful 
effects of child poverty, as chances of the affected children are much lower for 
their social inclusion and labour-market participation. Being aware of the 
importance to prevent the reproduction of a new underclass, upon request of the 
current Prime Minister, elaboration of a new programme to fight against child 
poverty was launched in the autumn of 2005. 
In Hungary, there have been some attempts to apprehend social exclusion11 
empirically, and to measure it (e.g. Szivós–Tóth [2004]; Ferge–Tausz–Darvas 
[2002]; Kapitány–Spéder [2004]; Fóti [1998] and Fóti [2003]). One of the most 
recent ones identified social exclusion not with the isolation process, but “with the 
‘outcome’: cumulative poverty and deprivation… To capture cumulative poverty 
empirically, five fields of ‘deprivation’ considered important were examined: (1) 
income poverty, (2) consumption poverty, (3) subjective poverty, (4) housing 
poverty, and (5) housing-equipment poverty.”12 According to this measurement 
attempt, those are classed as cumulative poor, who suffer from poverty in at least 
three out of the five dimensions. It can be estimated that about 12-13 percent of the 
population live in cumulative poverty in Hungary.13 
The Table shows the position of the bottom income decile of the population as 
compared to the top income decile with respect of their expenditure. As can be seen, 
the expenditure pattern of the two groups is widely different. There are two of these 
differences which are the most conspicuous and important (but not surprising): 1. the 
bottom decile spend more than half of their income to food and to housing costs, so 
they have no choice but to spend the majority of their income to basic needs. As a 
consequence, their expenditure is lower in all other items.  
  
11 On the concept and definition on social exclusion see the works by A. Atkinson and A. Sen. 
12 The various dimensions were defined as follows. Income poverty: the threshold has been set at the 
lowermost quintile of personal net income; consumption poverty: if 45 percent or more was spent out of the 
total expenditure of a household; housing: a set of variables of the following three main factors: 1. social 
environment of the dwelling, 2. the condition of the dwelling, and 3. the standard of facilities in the dwelling; 
housing-equipment: provision of households with consumer durables; subjective: self-categorization (Havasi 
[2003]). 
13 The Household Budget Survey found 416 thousand such households (1.1 million people). However, two 
groups, the so-called “institutional households” (people living in homes for the elderly, in prisons, etc.) and the 
homeless are not included in the survey. If they are added, the total amount of people living in cumulative 
poverty can be put at 1.2-1.3 million people. In the late 1990s (in 1998, 1999, and 2000) at least two dimensions 
of poverty were present in about 28 percent of all Hungarian households (Havasi [2003]).  
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Structure of household spending in the lowest (1st) and the top (10th)  
population deciles by main expenditure groups, 2005 
(percent) 
Main expenditure groups 1st decile 10th decile Proportion of decile 10  to decile 1 
Food and comestibles 37.0 20.7 2.52 
Clothing 5.2 5.3 4.52 
Housing costs 22.3 15.6 3.15 
Domestic and housing equipment 4.3 5.0 5.14 
Health and body care 5.0 5.6 5.02 
Transport and telecommunications 13.7 25.1 8.22 
Culture, holidays and entertainment 5.9 10.9 8.27 
Other personal expenditure 1.7 4.5 12.20 
Housing investment (mortgage repayment) 4.9 7.3 6.7 
Total expenditure 100.0 100.0 4.49 
Source: KSH [2007a]. 
 
2. Apart from food, there is also a very wide gap in expenditure for transport and 
telecommunication. This reflects the fact that among households with the lowest 
income (1st decile) those living in villages are overrepresented.14 At the same time, 
the low transport expenditure also shows the isolation many of them (and their 
members) should suffer from. Especially in the case of working-age people, low 
share of transport costs could be regarded as a symptom of low labour mobility 
which, as mentioned, is one of the reasons of high regional labour-market 
differences. Another alarming phenomenon is that the gap is also wide in the case of 
the expenditure for culture, holidays and entertainment. It does not only demonstrate 
huge differences in the access to various cultural goods, but a virtual lack of chances 
for upward mobility, especially for children and young people. In addition, lower 
expenditure for holidays reflects less opportunity for members of households in the 
first income decile for recreation, thus preventing ill-health. 
It can be well assumed that the Roma are especially exposed to cumulative 
poverty. Their aforementioned poor labour-market position shows in itself their 
particular vulnerability. Although it is problematic of analysing their situation 
  
14 A previous survey, carried out in 2000, revealed similar differences between the non-poor and the 
excluded poor. According to that survey, 53 percent of the latter live in villages, whereas of the national 
population only 33.8 percent live there (Havasi [2003]). 
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separately,15 some quite recent surveys made an attempt to compare it to that of the 
majority of the population. Their findings confirmed that the Roma are 
overrepresented among those who live in cumulative poverty. For example, in 
Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002], the survey carried out in mid-2001 and focused on 
poor people (called by the authors “the sample of the poor”), the Roma became 
heavily overrepresented (more than 200 households out of about 1000), although this 
had not been the original intention.16 This certainly happened because a low income 
threshold17 was defined for the sample. In addition, the majority of the households, 
having at least one Roma member (60 percent), belonged to the bottom income third 
of the “sample of the poor” (i.e. the poorest group even among the poor people). The 
Kapitány–Spéder[2004] survey carried out more or less at the same time (late 2001), 
found that more than half of the Roma population18 can be regarded as poor, 
whatever dimension is examined (income poverty, bad housing conditions, absolute 
deprivation, etc.). Their share among those who have bad housing conditions is 
especially high, more than 20 percent (in the whole sample share of the Roma stands 
at only 4.4 percent), and this highlights that the Roma are especially exposed to 
persisting poverty. In addition, in one of the sub-samples of Kapitány–Spéder [2004] 
i.e. of families with three or more children, the majority of respondents from families 
with no working members at all are Roma, and in the majority of Roma families 
none of the members are employed. This highlights their extremely poor labour-
market position, which is closely connected with their social exclusion. 
As regards the main causes of poverty, all the surveys have unanimously found 
that apart from these ethnicity and labour-market reasons (and other factors relating 
to the latter, such as low educational attainment), it is mainly large families (with 
three or more children) who are at high risk of becoming poor.19 This fact in itself 
highlights those challenges that the social-assistance policy and the family-benefit 
system have to face.  
  
15 For example, the Household Budget Surveys do not register the respondents by ethnicity, and this is 
understandable in light of the difficulties when collecting data on the Roma. Reasons lie not only in the 
problems of definition (who can be regarded as Roma), but also in the sensitivity of this issue and provisions of 
the law on personal-data protection. 
16 The sample can be regarded as representative along age, gender and size of settlement, so it was 
emphasised that all deviation from the national average (e.g. higher number of those living in villages), apart 
from the possible sampling errors, can be attributed to the fact that the given group is overrepresented among 
the poor (Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002]). The large weight of the Roma is one example for this. 
17 HUF 20 thousand (about 80 euros), which was at that time equivalent with the income threshold of 
lowermost third population (Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002]). 
18 In this survey, two groups of the Roma are distinguished: those who identify themselves as Roma, and 
those who are regarded as Roma by the interviewers, but there is not significant difference in their poverty (Ka-
pitány–Spéder [2004]). 
19 According to the latest TÁRKI data, the poverty rate of families with three or more children is about 26 
percent, four and a half times higher than families with two children (6%) (Szivós–Tóth [2004]). 
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3. Social-policy dilemmas within the context of EU membership, 
with special regard to social assistance 
Some of the main constraints of and problems with social policy have already 
been mentioned. The topic of poverty and social exclusion has become an important 
part of public discourse by the early years of the new millennium in Hungary 
(relating partly to visible signs of deep poverty and partly to recent interests in these 
issues at the EU level, mentioned in the introduction). Data on the extent and trends 
of poverty, however, provide ample evidence on the current situation, which is still 
paradoxical. Although at present the EU encourages convergence towards the 
European Social Model, in the early and mid-1990s they approved “the changes in 
the new member states that promoted the ‘Americanization’ rather than the 
Europeanization of social policy” (Ferge–Juhász [2004] p. 235.). 
The social-assistance system has serious shortcomings, making it unable to fulfil 
its function in an adequate way. Many of the problems are connected with the fact 
that there is no declared “official poverty line” in Hungary. In addition, although the 
level for entitlement under welfare programmes (the minimum pension or some 
proportion of that sum) is guaranteed by the state, it is lower than any of the poverty 
threshold defined and examined in this paper.20 For example, in 2000 it stood at only 
87 percent of the 60 percent median income threshold (Fóti [2003]), and since then it 
has even lost its real value.  
Another problem is that since each benefit is tied to a specific target group, there 
are very poor families who fall through the welfare net because they do not fit into 
any of these groups (like, for example, large families with children,21 unemployed, 
etc.). Current inefficiency obviously derives from the fact that the Hungarian benefit 
system does not have a general benefit that gives support below a certain level of 
income. Now there seems political will to remedy this problem: There is “...a need to 
ensure, within a relatively short period of time, a socially accepted minimum level of 
subsistence for all…” (Ministry of Health, Social and Family Affairs [2003]). 
Experts suggest that this should be modified from time to time, adjusted to changes 
in living conditions and circumstances (Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002]).  
  
20 This is the reason why share of households and population living below the minimum pension is lower 
than the poverty rate, calculated at any of the thresholds. In 2000 these shares were 4.8 percent and 7 percent, 
respectively (Havasi [2003]). 
21 For example, according to a survey by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, large families seem to 
be preferred by the system but “the preference is not discernible with all poverty thresholds”. At the same 
time, the survey found that among “families with children, the targeting of benefits increased with the 
number of children” (Monostori [2003] p. 83) As pointed out by Kőnig [2004], however, this does not show 
an adequate provision for large families, but rather the fact that the adult population in income poverty is 
undersupported.  
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If the categorised system were supplemented with this rather general category, 
other disadvantages such as uncertainty and unpredictability (experienced over the 
last 15 years) could also be removed (Fóti [2003], Monostori [2003]). This problem 
seems currently a very topical issue because over the past five years the social-
assistance system has been shrinking. (The number of beneficiaries has decreased by 
more than 200 thousand, and spending was cut by 10 percent (Ferge–Juhász [2004], 
Kőnig [2004]). This happened at a time when poverty has not been eased as evidence 
presented in this paper has shown.  
Another shortcoming of the benefit system is that it ignores the economies of 
scale within families, considering individual family members, instead of the 
cohabiting community to which the individual belongs. For example, an 
investigation shows that households in which adult offspring cohabit with their 
parents are insufficiently assisted by comparison with their poverty risk. Hence it is 
necessary to set different entitlement thresholds for different types of 
family/cohabiting community (Ferge [1996]).  
Reasons for inefficiency of social assistance lie, however, not only in the 
aforementioned arrangements. Data indicate that there are also other reasons than the 
mentioned ones explaining why the welfare assistance covers only a fraction of the 
poor households (Monostori [2003]). The reason for this lies partly in the lack of 
information from the part of the public,22 partly in the role local governments play in 
social assistance. As mentioned before the legislation on social provisions of 1993 
assigned increasing responsibility to them. These changes led to over-
decentralisation, as recognised also by the “Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion 
of Hungary” (Ministry of Health, Social and Family Affairs [2003]). In 2007 central 
regulations on welfare benefits are too broad and vague. They only provide guidance, 
putting excessive burdens and responsibilities on local-government authorities, 
which tend to over-regulate their systems (Szalai [2004]), and exercise continuous 
pressure to increase discretion (Ferge–Juhász [2004]). To improve the efficiency of 
the system, central regulations and state funding need to be strengthened. The latter 
is also important as evidence shows that local-government authorities in poorer 
regions are themselves poor in resources. In principle, the system of social standards 
could help in this respect, which takes into account a number of indicators that 
measure how depressed a given region is. It is an open question, however, whether 
the system can effectively reflect the potential number of benefit recipients (Fóti 
[2003]). The government seems to have recognised this problem, which is reflected 
in recent simplification of the family-benefit scheme (after various suggestions for its 
  
22 It is true that it is much to be done in informing the public about the welfare benefits that can be claimed 
(Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002]). Havasi [2003] emphasised that the absence of necessary channels between the 
potential claimants and the authorities is still a problem, and Fóti [2003] suggested that here the role of NGOs 
needs increasing and churches could also be involved in order to help in outreach. 
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transformation).23 The budgetary sources for the family-benefit scheme, however, 
have increased only by 10 percent (Darvas–Tausz [2006]).  
As mentioned previously, the elaboration of a new programme against child 
poverty was launched in 2005. General objectives of the programme include the 
eradication of the extreme forms of social exclusion, the reduction of the number of 
poor households with children. The programme envisages integrated measures of 
improving the parents’ labour-market position, development of skills for young 
children, decreasing segregation, providing better social services, easier access to 
health care and securing more favourable housing. The programme plans to take 
affirmative actions for reducing discrimination (ethnic and against other 
disadvantaged groups, like disabled children). 
Undoubtedly, these goals are very impressive, and if only partly implemented, 
they can improve chances of future generations to a considerable extent. It remains to 
be seen, however, whether amidst strict budgetary considerations current decision-
makers will show such a long-term vision and political determination which make 
possible to perform this large-scale programme, and whether future governments will 
continue these efforts.  
4. Conclusions 
It is beyond doubt that future economic prospects will heavily influence the scope 
of manoeuvre for social policy. Although currently it seems that the EU would have 
an impact on shaping it, it remains to be seen to what an extent its influence could be 
translated into concrete actions. It is true that from the part of the EU it is a “major 
achievement to have put the issue of poverty and social exclusion on the political 
agenda”. It is an open question, however, whether “the ‘Social Model’ of the EU will 
be considered a model for the poorer and more recent member countries” (Ferge–
Juhász [2004] p. 234.). Within this context, it is also a relevant question how the EU 
requirements concerning convergence towards the European Social Model could be 
harmonised with other needs, formulated also at EU level (for example, fulfilling the 
  
23 See for example Ferge–Tausz–Darvas [2002] and Darvas–Mózer [2004]. The latter authors suggest that, 
among other things, in order to meet the aforementioned requirements, i.e. the system should be based more on 
normative support and for the sake of higher transparency, the three main family benefits 1. the universal family 
allowance, 2. the regular income-tested child-protection benefit (recently called supplementary family 
allowance), and 3. the family-tax allowance should be amalgamated. (See details in Darvas–Mózer [2004]) 
However, the family-tax allowance and the regular income-tested child-protection benefit still exist, although 
they lost their importance, and the family allowance was raised. 
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Maastricht criteria, which require very strict budgetary control, limiting further the 
social-policy expenditure).  
In addition, in the new members, including Hungary, a discernible social model 
has not been developed. As regards Hungary, with the expression of Zsuzsa Ferge, it 
could be called rather a hybrid model, where the measures do not constitute a 
coherent system (quoted by Tausz [2006]). Linked to the lack of a clear-cut, long-
term vision, in Hungary there is no consensus nowadays on some crucial questions, 
which have important implications on social policy. For example, there are still 
debates about not only “whom”, but also “how” to support those who are in need 
(possible shifts towards means-tested allowances from universal ones, whether the 
tax system should include social-policy considerations, etc.). In a broader sense, so 
far there has been no consensus about the role of the state in general and in 
supporting the poor. 
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The Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), 
the so-called V 4 had great expectations towards the EU accession in 2004. They had 
especially great assumptions of the impact of joining the EU on their agricultural 
sectors. All the more, as agriculture – despite significant structural changes – played 
and still plays a more significant role in their economies than in the EU 15. While in 
the EU 15 agriculture produces less than 2 percent of the GDP, in case of the new 
member states the contribution of agriculture to GDP is 3.8 percent.1 (Kiss [2005b]) 
Furthermore, the share of agriculture in employment in the new member states is still 
significant: it was 12.5 percent in 2004 compared to 3.8 percent in the old member 
states, indicating lower labour productivity and efficiency in the new member states.  
Nevertheless, agriculture was one of the most sensitive issues of the accession 
negotiations, because after the joining of the 8 CEECs (Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries) agricultural land in the EU has increased by 25 percent (38 million 
hectares2), agricultural production by 10 percent and the number of agricultural pro-
ducers by 50 percent (Enlargement, two years after … [2006]). 
One of the aspects of agricultural accession is the impact of (almost full-fledged) 
EU membership on agricultural production, on consumer prices and on the income of 
agricultural producers. The other aspect concerns trade in agricultural products. With 
due regard to the complexity of the issue, this paper deals only with the impact of EU 
accession on V 4 agricultural foreign trade.3 Though already more than three years 
have passed since the accession, it is a very short period of time for drawing longer-
term conclusions. In addition, data are not available for the whole period, and the 
change of the statistical system also makes analysis and comparison somewhat diffi-
cult. However, these three years might be sufficient to make a first-hand analysis, to 
draw preliminary conclusions and to accomplish the necessary corrections. 
1. Agricultural trade of the Visegrád countries after accession 
Between 2003 and 2006 the total agricultural exports of the Visegrád countries in-
creased by 81 percent, from 8.7 billion euros to 15.7 billion euros. (See Eurostat data. 
 
1 On the agriculture of the new member states see Kiss [2005b]. 
2 28.5 million hectares out of the 38 million hectares can be found in the Visegrád countries (Lukas–Mladek 
[2006]). 
3 The CEECs’ agricultural foreign trade prior to accession was analysed by Fertő [2006]. 
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www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). As total agricultural exports grew more dynamically 
than total exports, the share of agricultural products in total exports increased slightly, 
by 0.3 percentage point (from 5.9 percent to 6.2 percent). (See Table 1.) 
Table 1 
Agricultural trade of the Visegrád countries, 2003–2006  
(million euros)  
Year Imports Exports Balance 
2003 8 301 8 707 406 
2004 10 574 10 786 212 
2005 12 897 13 658 761 
2006 14 744 15 765 1 021 
Source: Here and in the following tables (where not indicated) the author’s own calculations based on Eu-
rostat database. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
At the same time agricultural imports grew less dynamically than agricultural ex-
ports; they increased by 77.7 percent and their value changed from 8.3 billion euros 
to 14.7 billion euros. However, as agricultural imports grew more dynamically than 
total imports, the share of agricultural products in total imports in case of the V 4 
countries grew from 4.9 percent to 5.4 percent between 2003 and 2006 (Eurostat 
data). With agricultural exports increasing at a higher speed than agricultural im-
ports, the region managed to keep and even improve its net agricultural export posi-
tion. 
It is self-evident that the positions of the individual Visegrád countries differ at a 
significant extent. (See Table 2.) The most dynamic export growth occurred in case 
of Poland, the leading agricultural exporter of the region. While Polish agricultural 
exports doubled between 2003 and 2006, Hungarian agricultural exports increased 
only by 23 percent in the same period of time. Even the Czech Republic – which is 
not a typical agricultural exporter – managed to increase its agricultural exports by 
83 percent. Comparing agricultural export- and import-growth rates, the greatest dif-
ference can be revealed in case of Hungary: this country is the only one among the 
Visegrád countries where agricultural-export growth lagged significantly behind ag-
ricultural-import growth. 
As far as agricultural-trade balances are concerned, two countries (the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia) remained net agricultural importers, while the other two Vi-
segrád countries, namely Poland and Hungary are still net agricultural exporters. 
However, while Poland managed to increase its agricultural-trade surplus (from 459 
million euros to 2.1 billon euros), Hungary’s agricultural-trade balance deteriorated 
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and trade surplus has been halved. The main issue is whether these changes are due 
to EU accession or not. 
Table 2 
Agricultural trade of individual Visegrád countries 
(million euros) 
Year Imports Exports Balance 
 Czech Republic 
2003 2394 1495 –899 
2004 2929 1884 –1045 
2005 3430 2538 –892 
2006 3906 2733 –1172 
 Hungary 
2003 1461 2677 1216 
2004 2007 2927 920 
2005 2360 2965 605 
2006 2624 3297 674 
 Poland 
2003 3510 3968 459 
2004 4404 5204 801 
2005 5447 7095 1648 
2006 6307 8441 2134 
 Slovakia 
2003 933 567 –367 
2004 1234 771 –463 
2005 1660 1060 –601 
2006 
 
1907 1294 –613 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on Eurostat database. 
As a consequence of the mentioned changes the significance of agricultural prod-
ucts in the individual countries’ foreign trade has also changed. While in case of Po-
land the share of agricultural products in total exports have increased definitely,4 in 
case of Hungary it has decreased. As far as imports are concerned, the share of agri-
cultural goods has increased in all the Visegrád countries. (See Table 3.) 
 
4 It is nearly 10 percentage points yet. 
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Table 3 
The share of agricultural products in the individual countries’ foreign trade 
(percent) 
Year Imports Exports 
 Czech Republic 
2003 5.2 3.5 
2004 5.2 3.4 
2005 5.6 4.0 
2006 5.3 3.6 
 Hungary 
2003 3.5 7.0 
2004 4.1 6.6 
2005 4.4 5.9 
2006 4.3 5.6 
 Poland 
2003 5.8 8.3 
2004 6.1 8.6 
2005 6.7 9.9 
2006 6.3 9.6 
 Slovakia 
2003 4.7 2.9 
2004 5.1 3.5 




2. Agricultural trade with the old member states (EU 15)  
As Eurostat data show between 2003 and 2006 the agricultural exports of the Vi-
segrád countries to the EU 15 almost doubled. Their volume has increased more dy-
namically than total exports to the EU 15 and at a faster pace than total agricultural 
exports. At the same time agricultural imports have also increased very dynamically: 
between 2003 and 2006 they grew by 2.1 times. (See the Figure.)  
With agricultural imports growing more dynamically than agricultural exports, 
the V 4 countries’ agricultural-trade balance in relation to the EU 15 has deteriorated 
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further: while before accession the deficit stood at 182 million euros, by 2006 it 
reached 788 million euros. 
Total agricultural trade of the Visegrád countries  









2003 2004 2005 2006
Total agricultural exports Total agricultural imports
Agricultural exports to EU 15 Agricultural imports from EU 15
 
Source: The authors own calculations based on Eurostat database. 
Of course, the situations of the individual V 4 countries are different. (See Ta-
ble 4.) The most dynamic export growth has occurred in Slovakia, while the great-
est increase in absolute terms has been reached by Poland. Even the Czech Repub-
lic managed to have increased its agricultural exports at a higher rate than Hun-
gary. That is, Hungary was the very country out of the V 4 which could not make 
proper use of the improving market-access opportunities (possibilities). One of the 
main causes is the lower than the Polish price competitiveness of Hungarian agri-
cultural products due to higher production costs, including higher labour costs. The 
other cause has a temporary nature and relates to the insufficient preparedness of 
Hungarian administration for EU accession. This shortcoming can be eliminated in 
the short run. 
In contrast to exports, agricultural imports from the old member states have (al-
most) doubled in each Visegrád countries. As a consequence of the aforesaid trends, 
agricultural-trade balances in the Visegrád countries – with the exception of Poland – 
have deteriorated. In case of Hungary – having been the only net agricultural ex-
porter prior to accession – agricultural-trade surplus has almost vanished (Kiss 
[2007]). 
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Table 4 
Agricultural trade of individual V 4 countries with the EU 15 
(million euros) 
Year Imports Exports Balance 
 Czech Republic 
2003 1255 570 –685 
2004 1784 790 –993 
2005 2142 1059 –1083 
2006 2440 1181 –1259 
 Hungary 
2003 774 1307 533 
2004 1218 1529 311 
2005 1530 1538 8 
2006 1634 1643 9 
 Poland 
2003 1853 2036 184 
2004 2778 2974 196 
2005 3673 4115 442 
2006 4161 4903 742 
 Slovakia 
2003 325 112 –213 
2004 444 212 –233 
2005 558 316 –242 
2006 
 
619 339 –280 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on Eurostat database. 
2.1. The share of the old member states in the Visegrád countries’  
agricultural trade 
As a result of the mentioned trade flows, the relational structure of the Visegrád 
countries’ agricultural trade has also changed. In case of agricultural exports, the 
share of the EU 15 has increased by 5 percentage points. (See Table 5.) It indicates 
that in agricultural trade significant pre-accession market-access barriers remained in 
effect, despite the Association Agreement of 1991 and other measures of trade liber-
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alisation. In contrast to industrial products, trade in agricultural goods has been liber-
alised to the extent of 92 percent only before accession. 
Table 5 
The share of the EU 15 in the Visegrád countries’ agricultural trade 
(percent) 
Year Exports Imports 
2003 46.3 50.7 
2004 51.0 58.9 




At the same time, after accession the Visegrád countries’ agricultural markets 
have also been fully opened for the old member states. Before accession agricultural 
markets of the Visegrád countries have been liberalised to an extent of 85 percent 
(Kiss [2005b]). This provides a partial explanation for the 10-percentage-point in-
crease of the old member states’ share in the Visegrád countries’ agricultural im-
ports. The other explanatory factor is embedded in the change of the statistical sys-
tem: as far as import statistics are concerned, the basis of registration is not the coun-
try of origin, but the country of sender (forwarder). Consequently, agricultural im-
ports items originating from overseas or from developing countries appear in the sta-
tistics as German or Dutch imports. 
Of course, the individual Visegrád countries managed to make use of the 
slightly improving market-access opportunities at various extents. Furthermore, the 
degrees of import penetration were also different in case of the individual V 4 
countries. According to data in Table 6, before accession the EU market was more 
significant for Poland and Hungary: at that time around 50 percent of their agricul-
tural exports was directed to the market of the EU 15. However, the EU market 
was less significant for the Czech Republic, and especially for Slovakia, as the ma-
jority of their agricultural trade was conducted between themselves in the frame-
work of a customs union. Albeit, after accession all the Visegrád countries – with 
the exception of Hungary – managed to increase their market shares in the EU 15 
by 5-6 percentage points.  
As far as agricultural imports are concerned, in case of three countries (Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary) the share of the EU 15 has increased significantly, 
by 13.1, 10.1 and 9.2 percentage points, respectively. In case of Slovakia the share of 
the EU 15 has decreased, which might be due to increasing purchases from the new 
member states. 
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Table 6 
The share of the EU 15 in individual Visegrád countries’ agricultural trade 
(percent) 
Year Exports Imports 
 Czech Republic 
2003 38.0 52.4 
2004 41.9 60.9 
2005 41.7 62.4 
2006 43.2 62.5 
 Hungary 
2003 48.8 53.0 
2004 52.2 60.7 
2005 51.9 64.8 
2006 49.8 62.3 
 Poland 
2003 51.3 52.8 
2004 57.1 63.1 
2005 58.0 67.4 
2006 58.1 66.0 
 Slovakia 
2003 19.8 34.8 
2004 27.5 36.0 




2.2. The share of the Visegrád countries’ in the EU 15’  
agricultural trade 
As it has been proved by the previous analysis, the old member states play an in-
creasing role both in the agricultural exports and, especially, in the agricultural im-
ports of the Visegrád countries as a consequence of accession. The main issue is how 
the share of the Visegrád countries has changed in the old member states’ agricul-
tural trade after accession. 
According to Table 7, between 2003 and 2006 the Visegrád countries were more 
important as markets for the EU 15 than as sources of supply. Though after accession 
the significance of the V 4 countries has increased, they still play a marginal role in 
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the old member states’ agricultural trade. While the share of the Visegrád countries 
has increased both at the export and import side, the rise was slightly higher in case 
of agrarian exports (1.49 percentage point) than that of imports (1.21 percentage 
point). 
Table 7 
The share of the Visegrád countries in the agricultural trade of the EU 15 
(percent)  
Year Exports Imports 
2003 1.84 1.75 
2004 2.65 2.29 
2005 3.18 2.76 
2006 3.33 2.96 
2.3. The commodity structure 
The commodity structure of the Visegrád countries’ agricultural trade with the 
EU 15 will be analysed on a country-by-country basis during the period between 
2003 and 2006 in most product groups according to the SITC nomenclature.   
The Czech Republic. According to data in Table 8 in relation to the EU 15 the 
most dynamically increasing Czech export items were dairy products, beverages and 
cereals. Products of the sugar industry were also important. 
Table 8 
The commodity structure of Czech agricultural exports to and imports from the EU 15, 2003–2006 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Commodity groups 
million euros percent 
 Exports 
0 Food and live animals 420 622 886 952 73.7 78.7 83.7 80.6 
00 Live animals 23 55 81 90 4.0 7.0 7.6 7.6 
01 Meat and meat preparations 21 47 39 40 3.7 5.9 3.7 3.4 
02 Dairy products, eggs 44 112 171 247 7.7 14.2 16.1 20.9 
03 Fish 26 28 29 31 4.6 3.5 2.7 2.6 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 89 56 175 178 15.6 7.1 16.5 15.1 
(Continued on the next page.) 
THE IMPACT OF EU ACCESSION ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 11 
103 
(Continuation.) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Commodity groups 
million euros percent 
05 Vegetables and fruits 43 53 71 67 7.5 6.7 6.7 5.7 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations 66 153 168 118 11.6 19.4 15.9 10.0 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 39 43 61 74 6.8 5.4 5.8 6.3 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 26 27 40 41 4.6 3.4 3.8 3.5 
1 Beverages and tobacco 100 115 108 145 17.5 14.6 10.2 12.3 
11 Beverages 86 95 97 114 15.1 12.0 9.2 9.7 
12 Tobacco 13 19 12 31 2.3 2.4 1.1 2.6 
4 Animal and vegetable oils 11 12 30 43 1.9 1.5 2.8 3.6 
Total agricultural exports to EU 15 570 790 1059 1181 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Imports 
0 Food and live animals 945 1346 1644 1910 75.3 75.4 76.8 78.3 
00 Live animals 7 10 17 19 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 
01 Meat and meat preparations 61 170 264 303 4.9 9.5 12.3 12.4 
02 Dairy products, eggs 42 63 110 141 3.3 3.5 5.1 5.8 
03 Fish 25 32 48 57 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.3 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 74 97 116 144 5.9 5.4 5.4 5.9 
05 Vegetables and fruits 299 429 490 616 23.8 24.0 22.9 25.2 
06 Sugars and sugar preparations 41 54 67 67 3.3 3.0 3.1 2.7 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 106 149 186 188 8.4 8.4 8.7 7.7 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 171 207 201 205 13.6 11.6 9.4 8.4 
1 Beverages and tobacco 115 215 265 277 9.2 12.1 12.4 11.4 
11 Beverages 92 144 160 181 7.3 8.1 7.5 7.4 
12 Tobacco 23 71 105 96 1.8 4.0 4.9 3.9 
4. Animal and vegetable oils, fats 88 97 97 107 7.0 5.4 4.5 4.4 
Total agricultural imports from EU 15 1255 1784 2142 2440 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note. Here and in the following tables total agricultural exports/imports include not only the analysed prod-
uct categories (0+1+4), but the non-analysed product category 29 (crude animal and vegetable materials) as 
well, consequently, the sum of 0+1+4 is less than the total figure.  
Source: Here and in the following tables the author’s own compilation and calculations based on Eurostat 
database. 
As far as Czech agricultural imports from the EU 15 are concerned, the most im-
portant items were vegetables and fruits due to the increasing tropical-fruit deliveries 
from third countries via the EU 15 countries. In addition, imports of coffee, tea, 
spices have also increased significantly. Feeding stuff for animals and meat and meat 
preparations were also substantial import items. (See Table 8.) 
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Hungary. In contrast to Czech agricultural exports – in which the value of all ex-
port items has increased without exception – in case of Hungarian agricultural ex-
ports to the EU 15, there were 3 commodity groups, whose export value has de-
creased in absolute terms. (See Table 9.) These were the meat and meat preparations, 
fruits and vegetables, and the beverages commodity groups. The decrease is mainly 
due to the low competitiveness of these products. In spite of the significant decrease, 
even now, a quarter of Hungarian agricultural exports still consists of meat and meat 
products. The main question is whether Hungary will manage to stop the process of 
market loss to regain its previous markets. In addition, there are several product 
categories (for example, coffee, tea, spices, feeding stuff, animal fat and vegetable 
oil) in which case the value of exports has stagnated. The only product group whose 
exports have increased dynamically were cereals. In their case the value of exports 
almost tripled between 2003 and 2006, and for the moment 20 percent of Hungarian 
agricultural exports to the EU 15 is given by this product category. The significant 
growth of cereals exports is mainly due to the rapidly increasing domestic produc-
tion. However, data in Table 9 indicate that Hungarian commodity structure in rela-
tion to the EU 15 has not changed in a desirable direction after accession.     
Table 9 
The commodity structure of Hungarian agricultural exports to and imports from the EU 15, 2003–2006 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Commodity groups 
million euros percent 
 Exports 
0 Food and live animals 1161 1351 1411 1504 88.8 88.4 91.7 91.5 
00 Live animals 59 71 81 87 4.5 4.6 5.3 5.3 
01 Meat and meat preparations 419 425 401 384 32.1 27.8 26.1 23.4 
02 Dairy products, eggs 31 35 39 56 2.4 2.3 2.5 3.4 
03 Fish 5 4 13 4 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.2 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 112 193 297 349 8.6 12.6 19.3 21.2 
05 Vegetables and fruits 292 278 251 288 22.3 18.2 16.3 17.5 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations 65 82 101 101 5.0 5.4 6.6 6.1 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 33 28 26 34 2.5 1.8 1.7 2.1 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 126 138 139 118 9.6 9.0 9.0 7.2 
1 Beverages and tobacco 60 58 52 55 4.6 3.8 3.4 3.3 
11 Beverages 58 50 44 41 4.4 3.3 2.9 2.5 
12 Tobacco 2 6 7 12 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 
4 Animal and vegetable oils 9 13 9 9 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.5 
Total agricultural exports to EU 15 1307 1529 1538 1643 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Commodity groups 
million euros percent 
 Imports 
0 Food and live animals 578 938 1220 1263 74.7 77.0 79.7 77.3 
00 Live animals 9 34 60 26 1.2 2.8 3.9 1.6 
01 Meat and meat preparations 60 134 198 185 7.8 11.0 12.9 11.3 
02 Dairy products, eggs 44 60 94 116 5.7 4.9 6.1 7.1 
03 Fish 9 11 16 19 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.2 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 40 70 86 98 5.2 5.7 5.6 6.0 
05 Vegetables and fruits 145 187 230 246 18.7 15.4 15.0 15.1 
06 Sugars and sugar preparations 14 16 26 35 1.8 1.3 1.7 2.1 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 65 101 125 151 8.4 8.3 8.2 9.2 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 92 144 187 186 11.9 11.8 12.2 11.4 
1 Beverages and tobacco 68 114 103 145 8.8 9.4 6.7 8.9 
11 Beverages 55 84 93 106 7.1 6.9 6.1 6.5 
12 Tobacco 14 25 4 28 1.8 2.1 0.3 1.7 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats 50 50 59 49 6.5 4.1 3.9 3.0 
Total agricultural imports from EU 15 774 1218 1530 1634 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Fruits and vegetables remained the most important Hungarian import items from 
the old member states, though their share has decreased after accession. At the same 
time the imports of meat and meat preparations, and that of dairy products have al-
most tripled. Their share has also increased significantly. (See Table 9.) These de-
velopments might give a serious warning to Hungarian meat and dairy industries. 
Feeding stuff also remained a significant import commodity group. Its import value 
has increased due to the changing registration system, namely that overseas ship-
ments are registered as EU imports. 
Poland. In case of Poland both the value and the share of meat and meat prepara-
tions, and that of milk and dairy products have increased significantly in the coun-
try’s agricultural exports to the EU 15. These trends are due mainly to the high and 
increasing competitiveness of the products concerned. Between 2003 and 2006 the 
value of the Polish dairy exports to the EU 15 increased by 6 times. At the same time 
the share of vegetables and fruits decreased though their export value was at an in-
crease. In case of Poland one can reveal the same tendency like in case of the Czech 
Republic, namely that the exports of all the products have increased in absolute 
terms. (See Table 10.)  
There were no radical changes in the commodity structure of Polish agricultural 
imports from the EU 15, though the value of agricultural imports has increased in all 
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the commodity groups. The most important import items were fruits and vegetables, 
representing around a quarter of total agricultural imports from the EU 15. The other 
three quarters of imports were distributed rather evenly. A slight increase has oc-
curred in case of meat and meat preparations, representing less than 10 percent of to-
tal agricultural imports from the EU 15. (See Table 10.) 
Table 10 
The commodity structure of Polish agricultural exports to and imports from the EU 15, 2003–2006 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Commodity groups 
million euros percent 
 Exports 
0 Food and live animals 1850 2711 3744 4392 90.9 91.2 91.0 89.6 
00 Live animals 112 169 212 239 5.5 5.7 5.2 4.9 
01 Meat, meat preparations 339 493 745 984 16.7 16.6 18.1 20.1 
02 Dairy products, eggs 101 315 569 613 5.0 10.6 13.8 12.5 
03 Fish 202 295 414 540 9.9 9.9 10.1 11.0 
04 Cereals, cereal preparations 48 119 299 285 2.4 4.0 7.3 5.8 
05 Vegetables and fruits 801 855 966 1145 39.3 28.7 23.5 23.4 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations 56 159 122 92 2.8 5.3 3.0 1.9 
07 Coffee, tea, spices 76 142 155 197 3.7 4.8 3.8 4.0 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 58 80 110 112 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.3 
1 Beverages and tobacco 31 90 130 205 1.5 3.0 3.2 4.2 
11 Beverages 28 60 84 100 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 
12 Tobacco 3 30 47 105 0.1 1.0 1.1 2.1 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats 3 23 67 123 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.5 
Total agricultural exports to EU 15 2036 2974 4115 4903 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Imports 
0 Food and live animals 1398 2099 2843 3252 75.4 75.6 77.4 78.2 
00 Live animals  32 56 81 61 1.7 2.0 2.2 1.5 
01 Meat and meat preparations 75 216 369 389 4.0 7.8 10.0 9.3 
02 Dairy products, eggs 32 52 96 127 1.7 1.9 2.6 3.1 
03 Fish 67 171 319 355 3.6 6.2 8.7 8.5 
04 Cereals, cereal preparations 87 188 187 249 4.7 6.8 5.1 6.0 
05 Vegetables and fruits 423 594 816 979 22.8 21.4 22.2 23.5 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations 62 63 78 100 3.3 2.3 2.1 2.4 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 202 289 332 382 10.9 10.4 9.0 9.2 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 244 239 284 268 13.2 8.6 7.7 6.4 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Commodity groups 
million euros percent 
1 Beverages, tobacco 108 226 309 308 5.8 8.1 8.4 7.4 
11 Beverages 91 120 163 194 4.9 4.3 4.4 4.7 
12 Tobacco 15 106 146 114 0.8 3.8 4.0 2.7 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats 175 208 219 274 9.4 7.5 6.0 6.6 
Total agricultural imports from EU 15 1853 2778 3673 4161 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Slovakia. Slovakian agricultural exports to the EU 15 have also increased in all 
product categories. The country’s agricultural exports are characterised by a high de-
gree of specialisation as 20 percent of exports consists of dairy products and an an-
other 20 percent of cereals. The share of both product groups increased between 
2003 and 2006. Sugar exports have also increased significantly, its share has dou-
bled. At the same time the share of live animals has decreased from 16 to 11 percent.  
Table 11 
The commodity structure of Slovakian agricultural exports to and imports from the EU 15, 2003–2006 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Commodity groups 
million euros percent 
 Exports 
0 Food and live animals 91 180 279 309 81.3 84.9 88.3 91.2 
00 Live animals 18 29 28 38 16.1 13.7 8.9 11.2 
01 Meat and meat preparations 6 15 27 20 5.4 7.1 8.5 5.9 
02 Dairy products 14 27 63 67 12.5 12.7 19.9 19.8 
03 Fish 1 1 1 1 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.3 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 15 21 38 70 13.4 9.9 12.0 20.6 
05 Vegetables and fruits 14 30 30 24 12.5 14.2 9.5 7.1 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations 7 28 41 46 6.3 13.2 13.0 13.6 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 8 20 34 30 7.1 9.4 10.8 8.8 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 8 7 8 7 7.1 3.3 2.5 2.1 
1 Beverages and tobacco 16 19 17 17 14.3 9.0 5.4 5.0 
11 Beverages 10 12 13 14 8.9 5.7 4.1 4.1 
12 Tobacco 6 7 5 3 5.4 3.3 1.6 0.9 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats 3 8 12 8 2.7 3.8 3.8 2.4 
Total agricultural exports to EU 15 112 212 316 339 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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0 Food and live animals 263 347 430 501 80.9 78.2 77.1 80.9 
00 Live animals 3 3 7 10 0.9 0.7 1.3 1.6 
01 Meat and meat preparations 18 39 66 60 5.5 8.8 11.8 9.7 
02 Dairy products, eggs 9 15 23 23 2.8 3.4 4.1 3.7 
03 Fish 7 8 10 12 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.9 
04 Cereals, cereal products 18 21 26 31 5.5 4.7 4.7 5.0 
05 Vegetables and fruits 63 107 136 171 19.4 24.1 24.4 27.6 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations 16 13 11 20 4.9 2.9 2.0 3.2 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 28 44 57 74 8.6 9.9 10.2 12.0 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 59 64 53 60 18.2 14.4 9.5 9.7 
1 Beverages and tobacco 28 35 61 44 8.6 7.9 10.9 7.1 
11 Beverages 18 20 28 32 5.5 4.5 5.0 5.2 
12 Tobacco 10 15 33 13 3.1 3.4 5.9 2.1 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats 15 25 22 32 4.6 5.6 3.9 5.2 
Total agricultural imports from EU 15 325 444 558 619 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
As far as Slovakian agricultural imports from old member states are concerned, 
the most considerable increase has occurred in the vegetables and fruit-product cate-
gory. Its share has almost reached 30 percent. The second and the third most impor-
tant commodity groups were coffee, tea, spices, and meat and meat preparations.  
2.4. The relational (geographical) structure  
The most important export partners for the Visegrád countries in relation to the 
EU 15 are Germany, Austria and Italy. While the shares of Germany and Austria 
show a decreasing tendency, that of Italy is on the increase. Further significant ex-
port markets are Great Britain and the Netherlands. (See Table 12.)  
Table 12 
The geographical structure of the Visegrád countries’ agricultural  
exports to and imports from the EU 15, 2006 
Exports Imports 
Country  
million euros percent million euros percent 
Austria 607.80 8.11 531.30 6.50 
Belgium 240.00 3.20 395.00 4.83 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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million euros percent million euros percent 
Germany 3044.90 40.61 2846.90 34.81 
Denmark 29.20 0.39 423.00 5.17 
Spain 277.20 3.70 662.30 8.10 
Finland 61.30 0.82 50.20 0.61 
France 439.50 5.86 523.30 6.40 
Great Britain 740.30 9.87 240.70 2.94 
Greece 168.40 2.25 136.60 1.67 
Ireland 42.23 0.56 64.10 0.78 
Italy 982.70 13.11 717.00 8.77 
Luxemburg 4.20 0.06 3.50 0.04 
The Netherlands 673.40 8.98 1313.70 16.07 
Portugal 18.30 0.24 16.70 0.20 
Sweden 168.50 2.25 253.00 3.09 
EU 15 7497.93 100.00 8177.30 100.00 
Note. Due to the roundings the total can be different from 100. 
For the Visegrád countries the most considerable import partners are Germany 
and the Netherlands from where around 50 percent of the EU 15’s agricultural im-
ports arrive. Further significant suppliers are Spain, Italy and Austria. Agricultural 
imports are more concentrated than agricultural exports. 
3. Agricultural trade with the new member states  
The next issue to be covered is what impact EU accession made on agricultural 
trade among the new member states. According to data in Table 13 Poland and Slo-
vakia managed to increase their agricultural exports to the new member states very 
dynamically: both countries have doubled the value of agricultural exports to the 
newly joined countries. Even the Czech Republic succeeded in increasing its agricul-
tural exports by 80 percent, while in case of Hungary agricultural exports grew only 
by 60 percent. As far as agricultural imports from the new member states are con-
cerned, the import penetration was the most vehement in Hungary: between 2003 
and 2006 agricultural imports from the new members tripled, while in the other V 4 
countries they “only” doubled. That is, accession had a very significant trade-
creation effect in the intra-trade of the new member states. Emerging opportunities 
were mainly utilised by countries with low production costs.   
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Table 13 
Agricultural trade of the Visegrád countries with the new member countries (EU 10) 
(million euros) 
Year Imports Exports Balance 
 Czech Republic 
2003 550 636 87 
2004 705 802 97 
2005 910 1093 182 
2006 1152 1197 45 
 Hungary 
2003 221 356 136 
2004 416 444 29 
2005 524 470 –54 
2006 689 567 –122 
 Poland 
2003 324 593 268 
2004 398 799 401 
2005 525 1171 646 
2006 624 1585 961 
 Slovakia 
2003 448 365 –83 
2004 654 469 –185 
2005 977 627 –350 
2006 1140 807 –333 
Apart from price competitiveness, the activity of foreign capital in the agro-food 
sector also had a significant impact on intra-trade in the field of agriculture. This as-
pect is analysed by a recent study of the Research Institute of Agricultural Econom-
ics (Budapest). According to the authors, the relatively poor performance of Hungar-
ian agricultural exports to the new member states is due to the fact that Hungarian 
investments in the Visegrád countries’ food economy might replace former commod-
ity exports and might generate additional agricultural imports (Kürti et al. [2007]). 
The main beneficiary of the expanding agricultural intra-trade was definitely Po-
land which managed to increase its agricultural trade surplus in relation to the new 
member states by 3.5 times. (See Table 13.) While the Czech Republic was able to 
maintain its trade surplus, in case of Slovakia agricultural trade deficit in relation to 
the new member states has increased by 4 times. Unfortunately, Hungary turned to 
be the main loser as its pre-accession agricultural trade surplus has vanished and the 
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value of agricultural-trade deficit in relation with the new member states has in-
creased significantly (Kiss [2007a]). 
The next issue to be discussed is how the relational structure of the Visegrád 
countries’ agricultural trade changed in relation to the new member states. According 
to data in Table 14, in agricultural exports – with the exception of Slovakia – the 
share of the new member states has increased (by 4 percentage points in the cases of 
Hungary and Poland). That is, accession has opened up the agricultural markets of 
the new member states for each other. As far as agricultural imports are concerned, 
the situation varies. In Polish trade the share of the new member states did not 
change significantly, they failed to conquer new markets in the country. In Hungary 
and Slovakia the share of the new member states has increased by 11 percentage 
points, while in the Czech Republic by 6.6 percentage points. 
Table 14 
The share of the new member countries in the Visegrád countries’ agricultural trade 
(percent) 
Year Exports Imports 
 Czech Republic 
2003 42.5 22.9 
2004 42.6 24.1 
2005 43.1 26.6 
2006 43.7 29.5 
 Hungary 
2003 13.3 15.1 
2004 15.2 20.7 
2005 15.9 22.2 
2006 17.2 26.3 
 Poland 
2003 14.9 9.2 
2004 15.3 9.0 
2005 16.5 9.6 
2006 18.8 9.9 
 Slovakia 
2003 64.4 48.0 
2004 60.8 53.0 
2005 59.2 58.9 
2006 62.4 59.8 
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4. The significance of the enlarged EU in the Visegrád countries’ 
agricultural trade 
Based on calculations on Eurostat data, the following conclusions might be 
drawn.  
– The share of the EU 25 has increased in case of all countries con-
cerned, both on the export and the import sides. 
– The EU share has increased more significantly in case of agricul-
tural imports than in case of agricultural exports. 
– With the exception of Poland, the Visegrád countries depend to a 
higher extent on the EU supply than on the EU market. The ratio is the 
highest in Hungary where there is a 20-percentage-point difference be-
tween the export and import shares. In Poland a more symmetrical 
agro-trade dependence can be revealed. 
– As far as the significance of the EU market is concerned, there 
are considerable differences among the Visegrád countries: while in 
the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia nearly 90 percent of ag-
ricultural exports is directed to the enlarged EU (out of which a sig-
nificant part goes to each other’s market), three quarters of the Polish 
and two thirds of the Hungarian agricultural exports find a market in 
the EU 25. That is, in case of Hungary, despite accession the agricul-
tural sector is still “underrepresented”, consequently markets of third 
countries have a relatively high significance. 
– As far as the import shares are concerned, with the exception of 
Poland, nearly 90 percent of all the Visegrád countries’ agricultural 
imports arrive from the enlarged EU. In case of Poland the share of 
third countries is relatively high, around 25 percent. 
Similarly, some future-oriented conclusions might also be drawn. (See Table 15.) 
Though even in these days the EU 25 play a determining role in the Visegrád coun-
tries’ agricultural exports, the share of the EU countries will increase further, espe-
cially in the cases of Hungary and Poland. This expected increase is due to the fact 
that in 2007 the EU was enlarged by Bulgaria and Romania which used to be signifi-
cant agricultural markets for Hungary and Poland. Dismantling trade barriers might 
promote agricultural trade. However, further market expansion in the EU is feasible 
only under the conditions of increasing production and improving competitiveness. 
In addition, agricultural markets of third countries should not be neglected. All the 
more as agricultural markets in the EU are saturated, and both the old and the new 
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member states are not interested in increasing their agricultural imports from the 
member states. The expected conclusion of the WTO Doha Round negotiations and 
further liberalisation of agricultural trade will not have any impact on intra-EU agri-
cultural trade as it has already been fully liberalised for the 27 incumbents. However, 
market access for third countries might improve. As far as agricultural imports are 
concerned, a minor change might only occur in case of Poland, where the share of 
the EU countries is the lowest.  
Table 15 




EU 15 EU 10 EU 25 EU 15 EU 10 EU 25 
 Czech Republic 
2003 38.0 42.5 80.5 52.4 22.9 75.3 
2004 41.9 42.6 84.5 60.9 24.1 85.0 
2005 41.7 43.1 84.8 62.4 26.6 89.0 
2006 43.2 43.7 86.9 62.5 29.5 92.0 
 
Hungary 
2003 48.8 13.3 62.1 53.0 15.1 68.1 
2004 52.2 15.2 67.4 60.7 20.7 81.4 
2005 51.9 15.9 67.8 64.8 22.2 87.0 
2006 49.8 17.2 67.0 62.3 26.3 88.6 
 
Poland 
2003 51.3 14.9 66.2 52.8 9.2 62.0 
2004 57.1 15.3 72.4 63.1 9.0 72.1 
2005 58.0 16.5 74.5 67.4 9.6 77.0 
2006 58.1 18.8 76.9 66.0 9.9 75.9 
 
Slovakia 
2003 19.8 64.4 84.2 34.8 48.0 82.8 
2004 27.5 60.8 88.3 36.0 53.0 89.0 
2005 29.8 59.2 89.0 33.6 58.9 92.5 
2006 26.2 62.4 88.6 32.4 59.8 92.2 
* 
On evaluating the effects of EU accession on agricultural foreign trade, we can 
make the following summarising statements. 
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1. The degree of utilising the advantages emanating from opportunities to have 
free, unlimited access to a 450-million market differs in the Visegrád countries. 
2. Just like in case of the Association Agreement, so also in that of accession, the 
mutual opening of the markets worked to the disadvantage of the less competitive 
partners, hence the agricultural imports of the new member states increased more 
than their exports, and so their agricultural foreign-trade balance deteriorated. 
3. The weaker export performance and the growing imports of the countries (like 
Hungary) lagging behind the others can be traced back to the following factors: 
quantitative and qualitative problems in domestic production; low productivity ema-
nating from capital shortage and outdated technology; uncompetitive prices deriving 
from relatively high production costs; inadequate infrastructure and logistics; insuffi-
cient preparedness of the producers and of the institutional background (Somai 
[2004]); and deficient marketing activity. 
4. Just like in the case of the Association Agreement, so also in that of accession, 
the old member states were able to utilise much better the opportunities provided by 
the unlimited market access. As a result – and also due to some other factors like the 
privatisation of the food industry in the new member states by foreign capital, mo-
nopolistic or oligopolistic market situations, or the procurement policy of the foreign 
supermarket chains (Kürti et al. [2007]), the EU 15 countries were able to increase 
their exports to the new member states better than their imports grew from these 
countries. 
5. In several new member countries (Hungary among them) the commodity struc-
ture did not become modernised, the main items of export growth were unprocessed 
agricultural products (e.g. cereals), while the ratio of high value-added goods (like 
processed meat and milk products) decreased. 
6. It is difficult to reveal by what criteria certain (e.g. Polish or Slovakian meat 
and meat product) export-growth trends were realised, especially in the case of agri-
cultural trade among the new member states; we do not know what compromises (in 
the field of food safety) were made in the course of price competition. 
7. Naturally some old trends still survive three years after accession. Such are, for 
example, the dominance of the German market in the new members’ exports and, to 
a lesser extent, also in their imports; or the dominance of the Visegrád countries in 
the agricultural trade of the new members among themselves; or the Slovakian-
Czech dominance in these two countries’ agricultural trade. New actors can only 
slowly or hardly come onto the stage. 
8. The EU succeeded in asserting its sometimes covert, sometimes overt tactics:  
– to boost the new member states’ agricultural trade so as not to en-
danger the old members’ already saturated agricultural markets, which 
were increasingly threatened by third countries, and simultaneously  
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– to help the old members in finding an enlarging market in the 
new member states for their products, which had been accumulating in 
spite of the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.  
9. As regards the perspectives (European Comission [2006]), following the 2007 
enlargement the role of the EU in the agricultural trade of the Visegrád countries will 
further increase, and this might even mean a 100 percent dependence in case of some 
countries and in that of their imports. In the field of exports, at the same time, the Vi-
segrád countries will have to reckon with intensifying competition not only within 
the EU due to enlargement, but also in the markets outside the EU, especially in cer-
tain goods, like poultry products. Furthermore, these countries will also have to 
struggle with the growing crowding-out effects of imports in their domestic markets. 
10. In addition, neither the further expected reforms of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, nor the conclusion of the WTO Doha Round will improve the market position 
of the new member states. The reforms of the various sectors (e.g. sugar, vegetables 
and fruit, wine) are clearly aimed at decreasing production and preventing market 
problems, that is, one cannot expect either production growth or an increase in mar-
ket share.5 And even if, following the conclusion of the Doha Round, market-access 
possibilities improved, this would not mean any additional market enlargement in the 
intra-EU market. And this statement relates to as much as 80 percent or even more of 
the agricultural exports of several countries (Kiss [2007b]). What makes things 
worse, it seems certain that subsidies will not be allowed to be used for boosting ex-
ports in case of the remaining, say, 20 percent. There is only one way out of this dual 
trap, namely, if the world-market prices of agro-products will grow and will stabilise 
on a high level as a result of the development and sustention of a demand-driven 
market, since in this case there will be an opportunity to increase production and to 
sell the products without export subsidies.6 
11. Although till 2013 the author can expect a rise in agricultural support, if part 
of this must be spent according to the principle of cross compliance on investments 
which are necessary but do not foster either efficiency or competitiveness, then the 
growing agricultural support will rather affect land prices and land rents, i.e. there 
will be a growth in production costs, but not in competitiveness. 
12. The still existing price competitiveness of the new member states can be ex-
pected to diminish. Firstly, because production costs will grow as a result of an in-
crease in input prices, primarily in labour costs. Secondly, production costs will also 
rise due to growing land prices and land rents, which will be effected partly by the 
opening up of the land market after the transition period, and partly by the incorpora-
 
5 Moreover, they will decrease production in the new member states from 2009 as they will also be obliged 
to make some of their agricultural territories lie idle.  
6 On the likely development of world agriculture see Kiss [2007b]. 
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tion of area payments into land prices.7 And simultaneously with the rising input 
prices, a decrease in administrative prices can also be expected as a consequence of 
the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.  
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The Arab world became an important trading partner of Hungary in the 1970s. 
By the late 1980s, and especially after the political transition in Hungary, trade rela-
tions were falling back substantially. The Arab region, however, remained a surplus-
generating relation for Hungarian foreign trade, and during the last five years (2002–
2007), with the revival of Arab trade relations, the amount of this surplus increased 
to USD 1.4 billion.  
This study presents an overview of trade relations with the Arab countries, by 1. 
presenting the features of trade in the region first, then by 2. characterising the spe-
cial relations between the European Union and the Arab countries, which became de-
terminant for Hungary after gaining full membership in the Union with the emerging 
new possibilities and, at last, by 3. giving a country-by-country profile of relations. 
1. Arab countries in the world economy 
The Arab countries are developing economies and derive their revenues mainly 
from exporting oil and gas or from the sale of other raw materials and minerals. In 
the early 1970s a “Golden Age” had begun for the region. In 1973 the great Western 
oil conglomerates suddenly faced the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), a unified bloc of producers. In consequence of the war against Israel, the 
Arab world imposed an oil embargo against the Western countries, and all OPEC 
members agreed to use their leverage over the world-price-setting mechanism of oil 
in order to raise world oil prices. The market price of oil rose substantially. 
The earnings of oil nations were enormous. The extra income spurred them into a 
buying spree never seen before in these countries. Especially weapons were pur-
chased, but they undertook major economic development programmes as well. Even 
countries without huge oil revenues, like Egypt, Lebanon or Jordan, benefited indi-
rectly from the oil-money. They sent manpower to oil producers (workers in oil in-
dustry, teachers, doctors, etc.), and hosted Arab capital as well. 
The Golden Age has not lasted forever. Higher prices resulted in increased explo-
ration and production outside of OPEC. The organization had to face the lower de-
mand and higher supply on the world market. From 1982 to 1985, OPEC strove after 
setting production quotas appropriately low to stabilize prices. These efforts met with 
repeated failure as various members of OPEC produced beyond their quotas. During 
most of this period Saudi Arabia repeatedly cut its production in an attempt to stem 
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the free fall in prices. In 1986, being tired of this role, the Saudis increased produc-
tion from 2 million to 5 million barrels per day. Crude-oil prices fell below USD 10 
per barrel by mid-1986. Despite the decline, Saudi revenue remained about the same 
with higher volumes compensating for lower prices. For other oil producers, how-
ever, the drop in prices represented a serious problem; with the vanishing abundance, 
expenses had to be pared down. 
The price of crude oil spiked in 1990 with the lower production and the uncer-
tainty associated with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War, but 
after the liberation of Kuwait crude-oil prices returned to the period of steady de-
cline. The economic growth in the region, particularly in the oil-exporting coun-
tries suffered during the 1990s when real oil prices plummeted to pre-1973 levels. 
Recent years, however, have seen significant economic growth in the Arab world, 
due largely to a new increase in oil and gas prices, which tripled between 2001 and 
2006, and also because of the efforts by some states to diversify their economic 
bases. 
The major export products of the Arab world are still crude petroleum and petro-
leum products. There are some other export items, but these are mostly primary 
products, too. Qatar exports gas, Jordan fertilizers, Syria cotton and Morocco vege-
tables. Their dependence on a restricted number of export products makes them more 
vulnerable to price fluctuations. Some countries have gradually shifted to manufac-
tures with greater technological input. Bahrain exports aluminium, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) aluminium and garments, Egypt and Tunisia textiles and garments. 
Some countries, particularly some in the Gulf, are diversifying their exports by way 
of re-exports. This has allowed them to move away from primary exports and has re-
duced the risks of price fluctuations. However, at the same time competition among 
the Gulf countries for the regional re-export markets has been rising. 
Countries that export to a small number of countries are more vulnerable to 
changes in demand than others, whose export markets are diversified. Overall, 
MENA (– Middle East and North Africa)1 countries’ export markets are not diverse. 
Over half the region’s exports flow to industrial countries, mainly to Europe. In case 
of many MENA countries, this reflects historical and political ties. For example, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia tend to export to France, Egypt to the United States. Syria until the 
mid-1980s had exported to Eastern Europe, but by the mid-1990s turned to Italy, 
France and neighbouring Turkey. 
The high concentration of MENA’s exports to a few markets is mainly due to its 
abundance of oil, most of which being directed to the industrialized countries. When 
oil is excluded, Algeria’s and Egypt’s exports still flow mainly to developed coun-
tries. However, the big oil-producing countries send most of their non-oil exports to 
 
1 I.e. the Arab countries plus Israel and Iran. 
TAMÁS SZIGETVÁRI 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 11 
120
other countries within the region, especially those of the Gulf, which generally ex-
port to one another. Syria’s non-oil exports are directed to Lebanon and Saudi Ara-
bia, while Yemen’s are aimed at Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 
1.1. The Maghreb 
The Maghreb region consists of four North African states, Morocco, Algeria, Tu-
nisia and Libya.2 Maghreb trade structures share similarities, particularly those of 
Morocco and Tunisia. The two countries without substantial oil extraction have simi-
lar factor intensities of exports (mostly labour-intensive), while Algeria’s and 
Libya’s exports are mostly natural-resource intensive. Algeria and Libya are net oil-
exporters, the former with a relatively big population and economy. In Algeria, im-
port substitution was focused on heavy industry, especially steel and petrochemicals, 
while in Morocco and Tunisia the emphasis was set on light industry, producing es-
sentially consumer goods, and on the food and agriculture sector. 
Despite recent export performance, Maghreb countries remain poorly integrated 
into the global economy. Over the last few years, these countries lowered both trade 
and non-trade barriers and increased their trade integration. In spite of these efforts 
the share of non-oil exports in their GDP remained less significant than in any other 
region of the Arab world. The contribution of non-oil exports to GDP fluctuates 
around 15 percent. 
The agriculture and food, and the consumer-goods sectors continue to be pro-
tected; primary exports (energy, minerals and agricultural products) will remain es-
sential tools of maintaining foreign-trade balance; light manufactured goods that en-
joy comparative export advantages (basically garments and to a lesser extent electric 
components) face keen competition from Asian countries and suffer a sluggish 
growth in international trade. 
In Algeria, the hydrocarbons sector is the backbone of the economy, accounting 
for roughly 60 percent of budget revenues, 30 percent of GDP, and over 95 percent 
of export earnings. Algeria has the eighth largest reserves of natural gas in the world 
and is the fourth largest gas exporter. 
The Libyan economy depends primarily upon revenues from the oil sector, which 
constitute practically all export earnings and about a quarter of GDP. These oil reve-
nues and its small population give Libya one of the highest per capita GDP in Africa. 
The non-oil manufacturing and construction sectors, which account for about 20 per-
cent of GDP, have expanded from processing mostly agricultural products to include 
the production of petrochemicals, iron, steel and aluminium. As climatic conditions 
 
2 Mauritania used to be considered a part of the region. 
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and poor soils severely limit agricultural output, Libya imports about 75 percent of 
its food supplies. 
The Maghreb’s foreign trade is highly concentrated on the EU which, on average, 
accounted for 64 percent of the region’s imports and more than 70 percent of its ex-
ports in 2005. Morocco and Tunisia show structural trade deficits, while Libya and 
Algeria post up surpluses (the latter in years when oil prices are high). The Moroccan 
and Tunisian trade deficits pass on to the current-account deficits whenever there are 
contractions of income from tourism and remittances, and, in some years, foreign in-
vestment. Foreign-trade imbalances have improved, despite the high trade deficit 
outside the energy sector. Tunisia consistently posts up current-account deficits, 
while Morocco has modest surpluses. Algeria and Libya have high current-account 
surpluses due to the high price of crude oil. 
1.2. The Mashreq 
In the Mashreq region Syria and Iraq have substantial reserves of oil. Egypt also 
produces oil, but its importance in the country’s exports is less significant. Lebanon 
and Jordan are net oil importers. In Egypt and Jordan the liberalisation of economy 
and trade was taking place over the last decade. In Syria, the reform process unfolds 
much more slowly, partly because oil revenues made the postponement of major 
structural reforms possible. Strict currency policy was eased by the government and 
the activity of private banks was allowed. Further liberalisation in the economy, 
however, may induce tensions in society and interfere with the interests of the strong 
state sector. 
Syrian exports rose to USD 10.1 billion in 2006, with an annual increase of 19 
percent. Crude oil continues to represent the single most important export item; ex-
ports of crude oil and other minerals reached 40 percent of total. Textile and foot-
wear, which comprises raw cotton, yarns and garments ranks second with a total of 
19 percent and is followed by live animals and vegetable products, chemicals and 
food. Meanwhile, imports of refined oil ranked first among import goods with a 30 
percent stake of total. Italy was Syria’s main export market and bought alone 20 per-
cent of all the country’s exports. Italy far surpasses Syria’s second most important 
partner, France, which is followed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq. 
Iraq’s economy is also dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided 
about 95 percent of foreign-exchange earnings. Rising oil prices during the 1970s cre-
ated increases in export revenues. Then the economy was severely damaged by finan-
cial problems caused by the massive expenditures during the eight-year war with Iran, 
which also diminished oil-export facilities. The drop in world oil prices and Iraq’s ex-
porting problems due to international sanctions essentially put an end to the glut in the 
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country. The UN imposed trade restrictions on non-oil exports as well; Iraq was tradi-
tionally the world’s largest exporter of dates. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the new 
Iraqi government tries to rebuild the economy and oil exporting capacities especially, 
but persistent political chaos in the country poses serious difficulties. 
Egypt’s economy depends mainly on agriculture, media and entertainment, and 
tourism, while petroleum exports have a minor role; there are more than three million 
Egyptians working abroad, mainly in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Europe, 
whose remittances are also the most important item on the balance of payments. Eco-
nomic conditions have started to improve considerably after a period of stagnation as 
the result of the adoption of more liberal economic policies by the government, the in-
creasing revenues from tourism and a booming stock market. The devaluation of the 
local currency improved the competitiveness of manufacturing industries, but to main-
tain the pace of growth even broader reforms would have to be implemented. 
Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources. Since 2000, exports of 
light manufactured products have been driving economic growth, principally textiles 
and garments manufactured in industrial zones that enter the United States tariff and 
quota free under the bilateral US–Jordan Free Trade Agreement. Similar growth in 
exports to the European Union under the bilateral Association Agreement and to 
countries in the region holds a considerable promise to divert Jordan’s economy 
away from its traditional reliance on exports of phosphates and potash, overseas re-
mittances and foreign aid. The government boosts the information-technology and 
tourism sectors as further promising growth sectors. The low-tax and low-regulation 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone is considered the model of a government-provided 
framework for private-sector-led economic growth. Tourism is a very important sec-
tor of the Jordanian economy, contributing 10-12 percent to the country’s GNP in 
2006. Major imports of the country are crude oil (from Iraq), machinery, transport 
equipment, food, live animals and manufactured goods. 
Lebanon was traditionally the centre of different service activities (finance, edit-
ing, etc.) in the region. As a consequence of the long civil war Lebanon lost this po-
sition. The country’s economy has always been more open than the economies of 
other Arab countries. The costs of reconstruction after the civil war were enormous, 
and the country permanently balanced on the verge of bankruptcy. Then after several 
years of consolidation the Israeli attack in 2006 caused devastation in the infrastruc-
tures again, set back tourism, and spoilt nearly all achievements in the economy. 
1.3. The Gulf 
The revenues gained from the exportation of crude oil over the last 30 years have 
made the rapid modernisation of GCC (–Cooperation Council for the Arab States of 
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the Gulf)3 economies and infrastructures possible. The GCC holds 45 percent of the 
world’s oil reserves and supplies 20 percent of global crude production. Apart from 
Bahrain and Oman, all GCC states are members of OPEC. 
Until 1999 a period of oil-price consolidation was witnessed by the Gulf states 
forcing them to search for alternative sources of revenue. It created a need to diver-
sify their economies, including the privatisation of public enterprises. Since 2000 a 
second oil boom has been generating budget surpluses at the value of tens of billions 
and creating a financial base for diversification. 
The GCC countries share many economic characteristics. Oil contributes about 
one third to total GDP and three fourths to annual government revenues and exports. 
There are, however, important differences among the GCC countries. Per capita in-
come ranges from less than USD 8000 in Oman to USD 28,400 in Qatar 
The structures of GCC economies and the composition of their exports are also 
changing. The weight of the manufacturing sector has been growing very rapidly in 
Saudi Arabia, as has re-export and related activities in the United Arab Emirates, 
while the banking and insurance sector is by far the single most important sector in 
Bahrain. In Qatar natural gas is well on the road to bypassing oil as the key sector of 
the economy, and in Oman the growth strategy centred on developing natural-gas re-
sources and tourism has just begun to bear fruit. To strengthen their cooperation, in 
2003 the Gulf countries agreed a free-trade pact and plan to establish a common 
market in 2007. By 2010 the GCC even expects to have a common currency. 
2. The European Union and the Arab countries 
Hungary, by joining the European Union, adopted its common trade policy. Con-
sequently, Hungary’s economic relations with the Arab world cannot be assessed 
without the introduction of EU–Arab relations. The Mediterranean has always re-
ceived much attention from Europe (and the European Community – EC) due to its 
geographic proximity and former colonial ties. However, probably as a result of 
clashing interests, there was no such conception governing the relations with the 
Mediterranean as, for instance, the Lomé Convention, which provides guidance to 
Africa for Europe. Toward the Mediterranean, the Community showed a reactive, 
rather than a proactive policy, i.e. it mostly followed the events and did not shape 
them. Although, several agreements have been concluded with the countries of the 
 
3 The GCC is a regional organisation created in May 1981 by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates. 
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region, they all have only been bilateral agreements owing to the lack of multicul-
tural institutionalism. 
After the 1973 crisis the chances to achieve a general agreement decreased. The 
EC protected its agriculture with one-sided actions, if needed, and the development 
of the light industry was hampered by the restrictions imposed on textile exports. The 
partnership agreements provided more advantages than a free-trade agreement in 
theory, although they offered few consultation rights and did not mention the pros-
pect of full membership at all. As a result of protests from the US, the Mediterranean 
countries were unable to provide the EC a preferential treatment themselves. 
By the 1990s the stance of the EC on the Mediterranean changed. With the disap-
pearance of the confrontation of the two (capitalist and socialist) systems, the dan-
gers threatening the Union seemed to have moved from the eastern part of Europe to 
the South, therefore the member states of the Community introduced a new Mediter-
ranean policy. Maastricht and the peace settlement in the Middle East made it possi-
ble to give new dimensions to the relations. 
The approach speeded up within the frames of the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship (EMP) from 1995. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agreements, upon 
which the free-trade zone could be formed, replaced the former agreements made 
with Arab countries. The new, global Euro-Mediterranean Partnership consists of 
three separate but complementary “pillars”: 
1. the pillar of politics and security, aiming to define the frames of 
a region of peace and political stability; 
2. the economic and financial pillar, providing the establishment of 
a flourishing area; and 
3. the social, cultural and humanitarian pillar which fosters the de-
velopment of human resources and the understanding between the 
various cultures while also helps build relations between the non-
governmental organizations of both sides. 
The realisation of the process started with concluding bilateral agreements be-
tween the EU and certain countries in the region. Most of the Mediterranean coun-
tries have already signed Euro-Med contracts (Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, the Palestine 
Authority, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria and Lebanon). With Syria, the negotiations have 
been closed, but the agreement has not been signed yet. 
Although the contracts already signed are not identical in all details, their struc-
ture and the main points are. Besides the free flow of goods, they include specifica-
tions on the flow of capital, the rules of economic competition and the protection of 
investments. In addition to financial and economic cooperation, the improvement of 
political dialogue and social and cultural cooperation are also included in the agree-
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ments. In 2004, the EMP became a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), which means the EMP expanded by the Eastern neighbours (i.e. the former 
Soviet Republics). In the framework of ENP, the EU donates financial support to the 
participating countries in the implementation of their reforms. 
From the Arab world, three Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) 
have the closest relations with Europe, mainly due to former French colonial rule. 
Morocco even asked for accession to the EC in 1987, but the European Council re-
fused the request on the grounds of Paragraph 237 of the Rome treaty, as Morocco is 
not a European country. Morocco and Tunisia were the first to sign the Euro-Med 
agreements and leave no stone unturned to take advantage of the opportunities that 
the agreements offer. With Algeria, there were several problem areas, like the tense, 
almost war-like political climate and the not prepared state of the economy, i.e. the 
one-sided structure of exports and the isolated market from the outer world. How-
ever, Algeria’s natural resources are indispensable for the EU. Similar was the case 
with Libya, but in the mid 1990s the country opted out of the partnership. Later it be-
came an observant, and, in these days, both sides try to warm up relations. 
The five countries in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean and the Palestine Au-
thority are also subjects of the EU’s new Mediterranean policy. The co-operation be-
tween the Mashreq and the EU countries is rather dependant on the peace talks. Is-
rael has an edge over the others in the region as concerns its economy and is an equal 
partner of the EU. At the beginning of the partnership process, there was some hope 
for economic cooperation between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries. Un-
fortunately, expectations have not come true, and the tension between the Israelis and 
the Arabs persists. In the long run Iraq could be an important partner as well with its 
traditionally strong ties to the European countries, but under the current circum-
stances the question cannot be put on the agenda. 
The European Union maintains strong economic links with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. The parties signed an economic cooperation agreement in 1988 which laid 
the foundations for a future expansion into a bilateral free-trade agreement. The ne-
gotiations of this contract have been prolonged for 16 years due to legal and human-
rights-related issues. Nevertheless, one of the EU’s objectives in 2007 is to finally 
sign the agreement with the GCC.4 
The GCC is currently the EU’s fifth largest export market and the EU is the 
GCC’s first trading partner. GCC countries benefit from the preferential access to the 
EU market under the Union’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and ex-
ported 36.4 billion euros worth of crude oil, petrochemicals and aluminium products 
to the EU in 2006. The EU valued its exports to GCC countries in 2006 at 54 billion 
 
4 Mandelson calls for EU-GCC FTA deal to boost Gulf Economies, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/february/tradoc_133369.pdf 
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euros and that makes the Gulf the fifth most important market of the Union.5 Major 
exports include power stations, petrochemical plants, aircrafts and cars. Currently, 
GCC countries receive one third of their imports from the EU. 
3. Hungary’s foreign trade 
As a member of the Soviet block, Hungary was to maintain economic relations 
primarily with “friendly” countries within the “socialist camp” and among develop-
ing countries. Trade relations were driven by ideological and not by economic rea-
sons. Hungarian foreign trade contacts with the Arab world soared in the 1970s. The 
growing purchasing power of oil-exporting Arab countries, the launch of ambitious 
developing programmes created an enormous demand for goods, know-how and ser-
vices. The annual average growth rate of Hungarian exports reached 16 percent in 
these years, the bulk of which flowed to Algeria, Syria, Iraq and Libya, the major 
destinations. The dynamic pace of trade relations slowed down in the early 1980s, 
and then from the mid-1980s the fall of oil prices caused a sharp decline in the im-
port and investment activities of the Arab countries. In the same period, the competi-
tiveness of Hungarian goods on international markets declined substantially. 
The transition period of Hungary in the 1990s was marked by a radical change of 
economic partners, and the orientation of Hungary’s exports shifted from ex-socialist 
to developed countries. In case of developing countries, the change was not so evi-
dent as in the first years of the transformation their share in Hungary’s exports even 
increased. After 1993, however, Hungarian deliveries to developing countries began 
to decrease in absolute terms as well, while imports from these countries continued 
increasing dynamically. As a direct consequence of these tendencies, the traditionally 
active Hungarian trade balance toward developing countries gradually turned nega-
tive, and since 1998 more than half of the deficit have stemmed from the trade with 
developing countries. The importance of several traditional relations, like those with 
India and the Arab countries have faded and the newly industrialised Southeast Asian 
countries and China replaced them. The main reasons behind the fallback of eco-
nomic relations with the Arab countries are the following. 
– In the 1970s and 1980s the trade relations of Hungary were fea-
tured by active state involvement, often based on intra-state agree-
 
5 European Commission, External Trade, GCC trade statistics,  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113482.pdf 
HUNGARIAN-ARAB ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
HUNGARIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW, SPECIAL NUMBER 11 
127 
ments. The almost complete withdrawal of the state from this field has 
produced serious consequences. 
– The liberalisation of foreign trade and the fundamental changes in 
the structure of economy afflicted a great number of small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises with poor capitalisation (lack of expertise and 
language knowledge, high transport costs, etc.) 
– The lack of instruments to promote trade in developing regions 
(e.g. missing state guaranty or export credits for enterprises willing to 
export).  
– The output of once major products Hungary exported to the Arab 
region (steel and aluminium goods, chemicals, agricultural products) 
decreased significantly. 
– The first democratically-elected governments in the early 1990s 
planned to give priority to alternative (i.e. non-Soviet) crude-oil 
sources which should have been strengthening the relations with oil-
exporting Arab countries. The closedown of the Adrian oil pipeline by 
the collapse of Yugoslavia made the strategy of diversification almost 
impossible. 
– The establishment of diplomatic contacts with Israel and the 
growing economic relations thereafter made relations with some Arab 
countries tense. 
3.1. Current trends in relations 
Between 1999 and 2006 Hungarian exports increased nearly threefold, from USD 
25 billion to USD 74 billion.6 Among developing countries (4.8fold increase), the 
fastest growing regions were Sub-Saharan Africa (17fold increase) and the Arab 
countries (9fold increase), while in Asia (4.6fold increase overall) the growth of ex-
ports to China was one of the fastest (10.7fold increase). (See Table 1.) 
Table 1 
Hungarian exports by regions, 1999–2006 
(USD million) 
Region 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total exports 25 012 28 092 30 498 34 337 43 008 55 469 62 272 74 055 
Developed countries 20 969 23 463 25 121 28 148 34 531 42 945 45 293 50 621 
(Continued on the next page.) 
 
6 If otherwise not indicated, all data are from Hungarian Central Statisctical Office’s database. www.ksh.hu 
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(Continuation.) 
Region 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Central and Eastern Europe 3 103 3 627 4 280 4 794 6 740 10 015 13 550 18 911 
Developing countries 941 1001 1 097 1 395 1 736 2 508 3 429 4 523 
Asia* 587 625 673 805 615 1 030 1 384 2 109 
China 71 41 113 155 178 391 401 762 
Arab world 167 168 203 363 792 1 033 1 333 1 447 
Africa** 35 39 41 100 170 282 406 598 
America*** 151 159 167 187 171 263 307 346 
* Asia without Israel, Japan and the Arab countries. 
** Africa without Arab countries, i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa. 
*** America without Canada and the USA. 
Source: Here and in the following tables KSH (Hungarian Central Statistical Office – HCSO). 
www.ksh.hu. 
When analysing development in trade relations, imports have to be considered as 
well. With China, not only exports increased dynamically, but imports as well (6 
times), which resulted in a trade deficit, growing from USD 539 million to USD 3.1 
billion in the same period. In case of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab countries, 
however, the role of imports was still negligible, so the growth of exports made the 
trade surplus increase. (See Table 2.) 
Table 2 
Hungarian trade balance, 1999–2006 
(USD million) 
Region 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total –2 996 –3 987 –3 184 –3 275 –4 667 –4 780 –3 648 –2 924 
Developed +65 +1 002 +1 755 +3 017 –875 +761 +2 102 +1 684 
Central and Eastern Europe –904 –1 845 –1 319 –1 459 –1 766 –972 –65 +915 
Developing –2 156 –3 144 –3 620 –4 832 –2 026 –4 569 –5 686 –5 523 
Asia* –1 940 –2 970 –3 464 –4 837 –2 883 –5 760 –7 378 –7 881 
China –539 –898 –1 321 –1 930 –858 –2 483 –3 187 –3 097 
Arab World +136 +124 +162 +315 +778 +1 011 +1 310 +1 397 
Africa** –65 –49 –95 +2 +134 +248 +364 +564 
America*** –297 –265 –242 –258 –54 +22 +11 +142 
* Asia without Israel, Japan and the Arab countries. 
** Africa without Arab countries, i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa. 
*** America without Canada and the USA. 
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Taking a glance on the trade figures with Arab countries (Table 3), one can imme-
diately realize that the main factor behind the explosive growth in exports was product 
group 76 (SITC), i.e. telecommunication equipments. In case of Hungary it means mo-
bile phones. The multinational company Nokia has three European plants, located in 
Finland, Germany and Hungary (Komárom). Beside Europe, these factories supply the 
Middle East and Africa as well. In Komárom 300 million phones were produced in 7 
years (until the end of 2006) (www.nokia.hu), and mobile phones have been among the 
most important export products of Hungary recently. Total exports of Hungary in SITC 
76 increased from USD 1984 million (1999) to USD 12 776 million (2006). 
Hungarian exports to the Arab world were growing at a rapid pace in the last six 
years with an annual average of 44 percent. The exports of Nokia from Hungary to 
the region totalled up to USD 1030 million in 2006. Without the mobiles, “tradi-
tional” exports were growing from USD 167 in 2000 to USD 416 million in 2006, 
i.e. with an annual average growth rate of 17 percent. Among the “traditional” export 
items other machineries reached USD 210 million in 2006, agricultural products 
USD 101 million, and manufactured products (mainly chemicals) USD 100 million. 
In case of agricultural products, the results in 2006 were by far the best (in the previ-
ous years they were between USD 30 and USD 60 million). By manufactured goods, 
the year 2005 was the peak with USD 195 million, and then 2006 meant a fallback. 
Non-telecom machinery grew from around USD 50 million to USD 210 million. 
Table 3 
Trade relations between Hungary and the Arab world, 1999–2006 
(USD million) 
Denomination 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Exports 167 168 203 363 792 1 033 1 333 1 447 
Food* 50 38 37 33 31 56 61 101 
Manufactured** 25 56 66 77 99 109 195 100 
Machinery*** 54 68 96 253 670 854 1 080 1 241 
Mobile phone**** 1,2 1,4 32 183 568 717 915 1 030 
Imports 31 44 41 48 14 22 23 50 
Trade balance +136 +124 +162 +315 +778 +1 011 +1 310 +1 397 
*  SITC 0, 1. 
**  SITC 5, 6, 8, 9. 
*** SITC 7. 
**** SITC 76. 
While analysing the trade statistics with Arab countries (and with many other de-
veloping countries as well), one can see that Hungarian imports declined signifi-
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cantly in 2003. It should be known that there are methodological reasons behind this 
phenomenon; until 2002 the import data were presented by the country of origin; 
since 2003 it is presented by the country of consignment. In consequence, many 
goods (especially agricultural products and raw materials) coming from developing 
countries to Hungary are being indicated as Dutch (Rotterdam) or German (Ham-
burg). 
4. Country-by-country analysis 
Currently two Gulf countries (the UAE and Saudi Arabia) are the major export 
partners of Hungary in the region, due partly to their re-export activity, partly to their 
increasing demand in the period of high oil prices. They are followed by three 
Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq) and three Maghreb countries (Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia). (See Table 4.) 
Table 4 
Arab countries ranked by the value of exports, 2006 
(USD million) 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 1. UAE  13.0 10.0 32.8 131.8 462.2 590.0 557.7 452.1 
 2. Saudi Arabia 23.0 28.2 39.7 83.8 99.5 109.1 190.1 234.1 
 3. Egypt  28.7 28.7 26.9 23.6 40.6 61.5 112.6 186.9 
 4. Jordan  4.8 4.3 6.3 11.6 18.7 47.2 55.8 87.0 
 5. Iraq 1.1 1.9 3.5 2.6 6.5 14.7 114.5 74.9 
 6. Algeria 16.2 6.9 11.0 15.5 24.7 21.7 49.0 71.9 
 7. Morocco 15.8 6.6 9.9 13.5 16.5 16.1 46.0 60.1 
 8. Tunisia 10.2 14.8 9.1 14.5 25.9 22.9 34.4 54.9 
 9. Kuwait 11.7 21.4 17.7 9.1 26.1 47.2 30.8 49.1 
10. Syria 14.7 17.3 19.2 20.1 24.1 21.3 58.4 47.1 
11. Libya 5.8 4.7 4.9 3.0 5.1 3.0 19.3 38.1 
12. Bahrain 0.8 0.6 1.2 3.0 6.6 11.3 14.4 31.0 
13. Lebanon 15.0 17.5 15.5 17.7 19.2 46.9 33.7 20.6 
14. Yemen 4.9 2.8 2.3 3.7 6.8 4.6 2.7 16.0 
15. Qatar 0.7 0.9 1.0 5.1 2.8 9.0 6.1 15.8 
16. Oman 0.7 1.3 1.8 4.5 6.8 6.0 7.6 6.9 
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The United Arab Emirates has been Hungary’s most important partner in the 
Arab world for years with an export volume of over USD 450 million. Hungarian 
exports increased explosively between 2000 and 2004, almost exclusively in conse-
quence of selling a vast amount of mobile phones, and reached a peak in 2004 with 
USD 590 million. The Arab Emirates re-exported the mobile phones to other coun-
tries in the region. In the last to years, however, with the direct exports to other coun-
tries, the trade with the UAE decreased slightly. Beside mobile phones (85 percent), 
the export of chemicals, lamps, vehicle components and some manufactured goods 
increased as well, from around USD 10 million before 2001 to USD 65 million in 
2006. The imports from the UAE to Hungary is far the “bulkiest” among the Arab 
states with USD 23 million (Egypt is second with USD 8 million), but they wit-
nessed a rapid increase in the last two years. The imports consist of petrochemical 
and steel products. 
Saudi Arabia is the largest and maybe the most lucrative market in the region. It 
creates fierce competition where business positions can be reserved only by good-
quality products. Hungary’s exports to Saudi Arabia have been growing dynamically 
in the last five years, reaching USD 230 million in 2006. The most important prod-
ucts are mobile phones (66 percent in 2006), steelwork, lamps, automobile compo-
nents, dairy and pharmaceutical products, deep-frozen vegetables, poultry, glassware 
and cosmetics. Saudi Arabia is the second largest market for Hungarian agricultural 
products in the region, with USD 19.8 million in 2006. Imports are almost negligible, 
consisting of some petrochemical products. 
Egypt, as the most populous Arab country, is a traditional market for Hungarian 
products. In the 1990s, Egypt was the main export destination of Hungarian foreign 
trade in the region, although the volume of exports (around USD 25 million) was 
much lower than in 2006. The fast increase of exports to Egypt was generated from 
2003 on by mobile phones, constituting 72 percent of total exports in 2006. Other 
major export products are vehicle components, cables, lamps and agricultural ma-
chinery. Egypt’s demand for food grows rapidly and offers an excellent market for 
Hungarian products. Although Hungarian products (wheat, dairy, chicken) are well 
known in the country, Hungarian agricultural export reaches only USD 1.8 million. 
On the import side, Hungary buys textile products, vegetables and some row materi-
als from Egypt, worth a modest USD 8 million. 
Jordan has never been an important trading partner for Hungary before. In the 
last seven years, however, the exports to Jordan grew 20fold, due to mobile phones 
providing 88 percent of all exports in 2006. Other export products are meat, frozen 
vegetables and machines. From the CEE region, the trade with Hungary increased 
the most rapidly. Since 2000, more than 120 thousand tourists visited Jordan (Exim-
bank) which made the current account between the two countries, despite the huge 
trade deficit, more balanced. 
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Iraq was one of Hungary’s most important trading partners in the developing 
world in the 1970s and early 1980s. Several Hungarian firms took part as main con-
tractors in investment projects there. The war against Iran, however, raised difficul-
ties in payments, and from the mid-1980s most of the firms wound up business in 
Iraq. After the fall of the Saddam regime Hungary was ready to take part in the re-
construction of the country. ITD Hungary established the Coordination Office for 
Iraqi Reconstruction to help Hungarian firms interested in business opportunities in 
Iraq. Iraq is one of the major recipients of Hungarian Aid Policy as well, via humani-
tarian aid and training. Exports racketed in 2005 reaching USD 114.5 million, and 
then in 2006 they were falling back to USD 75 million, 90 percent of which was 
made up by mobile phones. 
In the 1980s Algeria was one of the most important partner in trade, and not only 
among Arab countries. In 1984 mutual trade reached USD 200 million, of which 
more than 80 percent was exports.7 The main export goods were agricultural prod-
ucts (mainly maize, chicken, eggs) and such other well-known Hungarian export 
products like buses, lamps, electronic fittings and equipments. The Algerian civil war 
and the political transition in Hungary adversely affected relations. 
Hungarian exports grew from USD 7 million in 2000 to over USD 70 million in 
2006, with mobile phones (75%) as the major export products and an increasing 
amount of agricultural products (16%). Imports are still negligible. 
Being a mainly western-allied country in the cold war period, relations were in-
significant between Morocco and Hungary. The contractual base of trade and eco-
nomic relations was established only in the late 1980s. Until 2003 Hungary had a 
more or less balanced trade, around USD 20-30 million, with slightly growing im-
ports and fluctuating exports. The main Hungarian export products were wheat, elec-
tronic goods and ceresin, while imports constituted of electronic products, clothes 
and agricultural products (mainly sardine). Since 2004 Hungarian exports multiplied, 
and reached USD 60 million in 2006.8 More than 90 percent of exports were ma-
chinery (66 percent of whole exports were mobile phones in 2006), the rest were 
manufactured goods (7%), while the share of agricultural products decreased. The 
EU-financed programmes may offer new opportunities for Hungarian firms to par-
ticipate in Moroccan projects.  
The majority of import products from Morocco are agricultural goods (80%), 
while machinery and manufactured goods have a minor share. Following 2003, an 
ever growing number of Hungarian tourists visit Morocco. 
 
7 In 1999 Hungarian total trade with the Arab countries were lower than that. 
8 There is a significant difference between Hungarian official statistics and Moroccan trade statistics. 
According to Moroccan data, Hungarian exports to Morocco were much higher (USD 63 million instead of 
USD 46 million in 2005) (Eximbank). 
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The relations with Tunisia were sluggish before 1990. Until 2002 Hungary used 
to have a slight deficit in trade turnover. Today it has a robust surplus, with USD 55 
million of exports and USD 4 million of imports. Hungarian exports consist of mo-
bile phones (over 60 percent), wheat, maize, pharmaceuticals, lamps and electronic 
components. The service sector is of special importance in bilateral relations. Hun-
gary is active in oil-research and water-well drilling, and 40-50 thousand Hungarian 
tourists visit Tunisia each year (Eximbank). The imports from Tunisia declined 
mainly because of the methodological reasons mentioned previously. The main 
products imported from Tunisia are wires, printed circuits, transformators, inductors, 
textile products and dates. 
In case of Kuwait, mobile phones consist around 60 percent of Hungarian ex-
ports, besides lamps, computer fittings, automobile components, and food products 
like cheese and deep-frozen peas. In 2004, there was a minor drop in exports, the 
reasons of which were selling of fewer mobiles and steelworks, and the growing 
competition in the cheese market. The proportion of agricultural products in exports 
has been decreasing; at present it is just over 2 percent. Hungary is the most impor-
tant exporter from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. The imports from 
Kuwait are marginal. 
Syria was also among the traditional partners of Hungary in the region; however, 
its share in Hungarian exports was steadily shrinking over the 1990s. The mobile-
phone-generated Hungarian export boom reached Syria in 2005, and in recent years 
exports soared from USD 15-20 million to USD 50-60 million. Nonetheless, it is in-
teresting that mobile phones (35%) have an important but not overwhelming role in 
the exports to Syria. Manufactured goods still have a significant share with USD 19 
million (over 40 percent of total), which are mainly chemicals worth USD 15.4 mil-
lion, but lamps and port cranes are exported as well. Major projects in electric indus-
try may increase the volume of trade. Hungarian imports are modest, and confine 
mainly to textile products. 
With the liberalisation of the Syrian economy, a set of opportunities will 
emerge for Hungarian firms, not only in traditional trade, but in development pro-
jects as well. The services export is not negligible; Hungarian firms are active as 
subcontractors of the local oil company (USD 20 million in 2003). Syria gives pri-
ority to projects in water management, electricity supply and agricultural develop-
ment. Hungarian firms intend to participate in such projects, and Syria welcomes 
Hungarian participation, but a lack of appropriate financial instruments set back 
implementation. Syria has not been satisfied with Hungarian credit facilities; it ex-
pects aid-like financing instead of credits, as it works in case of many other EU 
countries (Eximbank). There is still strong governmental influence in the economy, 
so good relations with the administration – on Hungarian governmental level as 
well – are essential.  
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Libya was once an important partner for Hungary in the region, however, the UN 
embargo against Libya and the political transition in Hungary set trade relations 
back. From 2005 a rapid increase can be witnessed in Hungarian exports. Not only 
owing to mobile phones (they make up 23 percent of exports), but mainly because of 
a boom in food exports. The USD 26 million worth food exports in 2006 (i.e. 70 per-
cent of total exports) represent the highest value in the region. 
Bahrain is a new trading partner for Hungary. Before 2000, Hungarian–Bahraini 
trade relations were marginal, based mainly on the exports of some Hungarian food 
products. Regrettably, in the last two years agricultural trade could not be registered. 
In 2005 Ganz Transelektro Electric Co. Ltd (since 2006 owned in 100 percent by In-
dian Crompton Greaves, a member of Thapar Group) won a bid of USD 18 million 
to export electric transformators (Eximbank). However, in 2006, mobiles still had an 
overwhelming share (90%) in Hungarian exports. 
In case of Lebanon, agricultural products have an important role in bilateral trade 
relations. The exports of agricultural products were between USD 10 and USD 14 
million during the whole period. In 2004, mobile-phone exports rose to USD 26 mil-
lion, then they were falling back to USD 1.5 million, and food represented 65 percent 
of Hungarian exports in 2006. 
In Hungarian exports to Yemen agricultural products (dairy, frozen vegetables, 
meat) have the highest stake (85%). Yemen is the only Arab country to which Hun-
gary did not export any mobile phones (at least not directly). 
Qatar is one of the most dynamically developing countries in the region with 
great opportunities for trade and services activities. The trade volume between the 
two countries is still low, with a growing share of mobiles (55%) and some other tra-
ditional manufactured export goods as lamps. Food exports are concentrated on 
cheese and other dairies. Qatar intends to increase its liquid-gas exports to Europe 
but, despite its diversification efforts, Hungary can hardly receive any. 
Hungarian trade with Oman is relatively insignificant, although with the selling 
of mobile phones (65 percent of total in 2006), exports increased in recent years. Be-
side mobiles, Hungary mainly exports other machineries to Oman. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The increase of Hungarian exports to the countries of the Arab world was aston-
ishing: in the last six years the annual average growth rate reached 44 percent. The 
rapid pace was mainly due to the export activity of the mobile giant Nokia, which de-
livered mobile phones made in Hungary to the countries of the region worth USD 
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1030 million in 2006. Traditional exports were growing dynamically as well, al-
though at a much lower pace. 
The opportunity to develop Hungarian–Arab economic and trade relations further 
still exists. Doors are definitely wide open for Hungarian firms to go into business in 
the region, and they are welcome in most of the countries. However, local circum-
stances and business tradition require more time and energy to do a successful deal. 
Unlike multinationals with global marketing structures, Hungarian small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises need to rely on the help of professional organisations such as 
Eximbank, ITD Hungary (Investment and Trade Development Agency), and various 
industrial and trade chambers. The partnership of the European Union and some 
Arab countries open up new prospects in the diverse developing projects of the re-
gion. The participation in these projects, however, needs more intense attention in 
Hungary toward the Arab world. 
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
INDICATORS IN HUNGARY 2005 
In this publication, sustainable development indicator set 
elaborated by the Statistical Bureau of the European Union 
(Eurostat) are presented in time-series, in eight themes. The 
indicators cover the three pillars of sustainable development: 
economy, society and environment. The topics presented in this 
publication: economic development; poverty and social 
exclusion; ageing society; public health; climate change and 
energy; production and consumption patterns; management of 
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